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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
1. The Problem of the Dissertation.
The prominent position of personalism in the United
States is the product of many interdependent thinkers.
Moreover, as personalism has developed three specific types
have emerged.
The problem of the investigation is thus twofold.
First, it deals with historical development: Who were the
specific thinkers in the history of American philosophy?
What was the background, the intellectual objective, and the
place of each in society and in philosophy? To what extent
were they personalistic? Kow was their thought related?
Second, it considers the chief types of personalism in the
United States. Who are their most significant representa-
tives? What are the basic ideas in each type? What is the
influence of each?
An eminent personalis t of today has suggested that
historical research is one of the chief tasks confronting
personalism. ^ The present writer concurs. Hence the pur-
pose of this investigation is to study the development of
personalism in the United States and to discuss the chief
1. Brightman, Art. (1921), 168-170.
1

2types of personalism as represented by Howison, Calkins, and
Bowne.
2. A Definition of Personal ism.
There are numerous definitions of personalism. Vari-
ous views will become evident as the investigation progress-
es. In order to arrive at a working definition, however,
several representative personalists may be quoted. Bright-
man has referred to personalism as the "theory that only
persons are real: that all true being is personal." 2 Knud-
son has written:
... We may define personalism as that form of
idealism which gives equal recognition to both
the pluralistic and monistic aspects of experi-
ence and which finds in the conscious unity,
identity, and free activity of personality the
key to the nature of reality and the solution
of the ultimate problems of philosophy.
3
Flewelling thinks of personalism in a similar manner, having
written that it is "a modern term applied to any philosophy
which considers personality the supreme value and the key to
the meaning of life. 11^ For the purposes of this disserta-
tion the term personalism is used in the broad sense of any
philosophical system which makes personality its fundamental
principle in the various fields of philosophy such as episte-
2. Brightman, ITP, 389.
3. Knudson, POP, 87.
4. Flewelling, Art. (1942), 229.

3mology, metaphysics, philosophy of education, aesthetics,
ethics, social philosophy, and philosophy of religion.
It follows that systems which emphasize personality
in one field or another will he considered even if they are
not completely personalistic. Labels are often misleading.
It is conceivable that one might rather be termed a great
religious spirit than a Methodist or a Buddhist; or an Amer-
ican rather than a Republican or a Democrat; or a world
citizen rather than a Chinese or Italian or Bulgarian. So
in philosophy, labels are misused. Among the personalis ts,
Whitman has been referred to variously as a naturalist, mys-
tic, theist, pantheist, and transcendental 1st. Cook,^ a
personalist, terms his system ideal realism, yet he has also
been called a natural theist. Bowne, a plural-monistic per-
sonalist, terms himself a the is tic idealist, a transcendent-
al empiricist, an idealistic realist, and a realistic ideal-
ist. Hocking, who makes personality the key to reality,
says he is not a personalist. He has written:
Personally I am not a personalist. I do not
think that any cooperating plurality of beings
is a final fact. Their relations to one another
indicate that they are not independently real:
there is a One which explains their together-
ness."
Hocking's thought is, nevertheless, similar to that of Royce
5. Cook was an eminent Congregational minister. His person-
alistic thought will be considered in the chapter dealing
with plural-monistic personal ism.
6. In a letter to the writer dated January 12, 1943.

4and Calkins, who are absolutistic personal is ts. Harkness,
who is in the Bowne-Brightman tradition, has said in conver-
sation that she does not hold to personalism, which to her
is simply the literal tradition in America, hut that she is
a realistic theist. Confusion is increased when Wieman says
that he does not know whether Brightman is a naturalist or a
liberal. ^ Labels are not as important as the emphasis of
the thinker or system. For that reason, then, as has been
suggested, systems which emphasize personality will be con-
sidered in this dissertation even if they are not coherently
and systematically personalistic.
Each of the three specific types of personalism to be
discussed must be defined. Personalism has been classified
into various types, as pluralism, atheistic pluralism, pan-
theistic personalism, absolute idealistic personalism, rela-
tivistic personalism, teleological personalism, theistic
personalism, finitistic personalism, realistic personalism,
panpsychistic personalism, and plural monism. Some of the
representatives of these several schools are not American
philosophers, hence their thought is outside the scope of
this investigation. In dealing with personalism in the
United States the chief types seem to have fallen logically
into three basic categories (although it must be remembered
that there are important differences within each type). The
7. Wieman, GOR, 487n.

5first type is pluralistic personalism; it emphasizes the in-
finite uniqueness of every person. The second type is abso-
lutistic personalism; it maintains that every person is part
of the absolute person. The third type is plural-monistic;
it holds to both the uniqueness of each person and to the
cosmic significance of the Supreme Person who is the creator
and sustainer of all the others.
3. The Work of Previous Investigators.
No important statement of personalism* s position in
the development of American philosophy has yet appeared.
Little, in fact, until recently, has been written about the
general history of American philosophy. In these writings,
only casual references have been made to the types of per-
sonalism in America.
Three groups of previous investigators have been help-
ful, however, in the preparation of this dissertation. The
first consists of the recent writers in the field of Ameri-
can philosophy. The writers and their works, in chronologi-
cal order, are: Jones, Early American Philosophers (1898);
Riley, American Philosophy (1907); Santayana, "The Genteel
Tradition in American Philosophy" (1911); Riley, American
Thought from Puritanism to Pragmatism (1915) ; Santayana,
"Philosophical Opinion in America" (1918); Rogers, English
and American Philosophy Since 1800 (1923); Ralph Barton

6Perry, Philosophy of the Recent Past (1926); Cell, "Die
Philosophie in Nordamerika, M in volume five of Ueberweg f s
Grundriss Geschichte der Philosophie (1928); Charles M.
Perry ( ed. ) , The St . Louis Movement in Philosophy ( 1930 )
;
Schneider, The Puritan Mind (1930); Townsend, Philosophical
Ideas in the United States (1934); Muller, Amerikanische
Philosophie ; Anderson and Fisch, Philosophy in America
(1939); Muelder and Sears, The Development of American Phil-
osophy (1940).
The second group of previous investigators is com-
prised of those writers who have given information about the
life and thought of Johnson, Edwards, Alcott, Whitman, David-
son, Harris, and Royce. Reference will be made to these
sources in the chapter concerning the development of person-
alism in the United States. Frequent use has also been made
of the Dictionary of American Biography .
The third group of previous investigators are those
individuals who have referred to types of personalism or who
have given an account of the thought of the chief personal-
is ts, Howison, Calkins, and Bowne. Knudson has given a suc-
cinct statement of types of personalism in Philosophy of
Personalism (1927). Kessler, in an unpublished doctoral
dissertation, has ably treated the problem of Personal istic
Monism Versus Pluralism from the absolutistic viewpoint
(1919). The most important work on Howison is Buckham and
Stratton, George Holmes Howison , Philosopher and Teacher

7(1934). The chief account of the life and thought of
Calkins is Updike, In Memoriam, Mary Whiton Calkins (1931),
which consists of a group of articles that will be referred
to in the fourth chapter. The three most important general
works on Bowne are Plewelling, Personal ism and the Problems
of Philosophy (1915), Knudson's above-mentioned Philosophy
of Personal ism , and McConnell, Borden Parker Bowne (1929).
Numerous articles about Bowne— too many to list here—have
appeared. Most significant among them is Brightman f s "Per-
sonalism and the Influence of Bowne." 8 Reference will be
made to others who have touched upon the problem of the dis-
sertation as it develops. For the most part, original
source material has been used; that is, the investigation is
based upon the works of the personalis ts themselves.
4. The Scope and Importance of the Study.
The scope of the dissertation is at once broad and
limited. It is a bold attempt to point out what has been
previously neglected by personalis ts, that personalism is as
indigenous in America as any thought system can be in a na-
tion which exists in a world community of nations that are
related to each other. It also points out that there are
three dominant types of personalism in the United States
—
8. See Brightman, Art. (1927).

8pluralistic, absolutistic, and plural-monistic.
The investigation, bold in what it attempts, is never-
theless limited in scope. It does not deal with personalism
outside of the United States except as that influence occa-
sionally hears upon the problem. It does not deal with the
total history of personalism as a system. It does not de-
lineate to any great extent the differences among the per-
sonalis ts within the three types considered. Not much is
made of the differences in thought, for instance, in Bowne,
Wilson, and Ladd, or of the differences in the views of
Knudson, Brightman, and Flewelling. These differences, sig-
nificant as they are, lie beyond the scope of this investi-
gation. A final limitation is that the main body of the
dissertation concludes with the work of Bowne. Reference is
made to his large following, but no effort is made to give a
complete view of contemporary personalism. While much use
is made of the ideas of current personal is ts, the investiga-
tion does not pretend to be a systematic critique of the en-
tire school of personalism. Despite the limitations, the
writer hopes that the investigation will help to clarify the
position of personalism in the United States.
5. The Method of Procedure.
One of the most important parts of the investigation
is the discussion of the development of personalism in the

9United States. In this chapter the life and thought of each
of the personalis ts who contributed to the establishment of
a personalis tic tradition in America up to the time of Howi-
son, Calkins, and Bowne will be considered. These men are
Johnson, Edwards, Alcott, Whitman, Davidson, Harris, and
Royce. Throughout this chapter, effort will be made to in-
dicate the relations of the thinkers to each other and to
the personalistic heritage which gradually evolved.
The three distinct types of personalism that have
been partially represented by the earlier personalists be-
come clearly evident in the systems of Howison, Bowne, and
Calkins. Their systems are not treated in that chronologic-
al order; rather a logical order is used. Howison, who was
prominent before the other two and was also more closely re-
lated to the earlier American personalists, is considered
first. Calkins 1 absolutistic personalism is then discussed,
for it is in sharp contrast with Howison 1 s pluralistic per-
sonalism. The third and final type considered is plural-
monistic personalism, represented by Bowne. Bowne wrote
many books before either Howison or Calkins published their
significant works. His system is considered last, however,
for four reasons. (1) It is the logical synthesis of the
other two. (2) It gives the most coherent account of the
varied aspects of experience, thereby doing justice to both
pluralism and monism. (3) It is the most typical view in
the history of American personalism. (4) Plural is tic-monis-

10
tic personalism of the Bowne tradition is most widely held
at the present time.
After an examination of the three types of personal-
ism, comparisons will be made. Similarities and differences
will be seen in the fields of epistemology, metaphysics,
ethics, social philosophy, and philosophy of religion. A
critical conclusion of the entire work will follow. In the
appendix there will appear an abstract of the dissertation
and an annotated edition of Whitman's "Personalism"— the
first article published by that title in America.
The present study deals with two limited aspects of
personalism, yet a greater knowledge of personalism 1 s Ameri-
can heritage and its distinct types will indicate its posi-
tion as a major system of philosophy in the United States.

CHAPTER II
THE DEVELOPMENT OP PERSONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES
Personal ism has developed steadily in the United
States through the interpenetration of numerous philosophic-
al ideas. Men and movements on a wide speculative frontier
have contributed in comprehensive succession to its sharply-
wrought ideas. As an integral part of the general history
of American philosophy, personalism has been expanded and
fortified with increased strength and clarity in each of the
five recognized periods into which the broader philosophical
history falls. These periods will be mentioned briefly to
enable one to form a background against which he may discern
the contributions made to personalism by such thinkers as
Samuel Johnson, Jonathan Edwards, Amos Bronson Alcott, Walt
Whitman, Thomas Davidson, William Torrey Harris, Josiah
Royce, George Holmes Kowison, Mary Whiton Calkins, and
Borden Parker Bowne.
First, in the history of American philosophy, was the
colonial period under British influence. Samuel Johnson,
who published the first book on ethics in America ( First
Principles of Moral Philosophy , 1746 ) , and Jonathan Edwards
,
who was for a brief time his student, were the most impor-
tant figures. Although independent of each other in the
source of their thought, they both adhered to personalistic
11

12.
ideas and left a "profound and lasting impression on the
growing culture of the young nation."
The second period dated from the Revolution to about
1800. This brief interval, under slight French influence,
was dominated by the deists who were significant to person-
alism in their sedulous support of liberal Christianity.
The third period, from about 1800 through the Civil
War, was under German influence. The personalistic ideas
that came from Germany to enlarge the American speculative
enterprise were emphasis on personality, "the notion of the
activity of mind as a part of the total cosmic process, and
the view of mind as creative of reality in the levels above
nature."-*- Of personalistic significance in this period, but
also going somewhat beyond it, were Amos Bronson Alcott and
Walt Whitman, the "poet of the wider Selfhood." In addition
to their philosophical heritage, these two men envisaged a
distinct American philosophy.
The fourth period was under the leadership of the St.
Louis Philosophical Society, which was organized in 1866 by
a group of men more intensely interested in German Idealism.
The movement was "astonishingly effective," chiefly through
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy which existed from
1. See Alvin Samuel Eaag's unpublished Boston University
dissertation for an excellent treatment of Some German
Influences in American Philosophical Thought From 1S0U
To 1850 . This quotation is taken from the published
abstract of the dissertation.
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o
1867 to 1893. Personalism gained increased momentum in
this period through the composite work of Thomas Davidson,
William Torrey Harris, and George Holmes Eowison.
The fifth period of American philosophy overlaps the
fourth somewhat; it dates roughly from the middle of the
last half of the nineteenth century to the present. There
now develops a more consciously professional and American
trend. Personalism was continued in the early part of this
period by William Torrey Harris, who was during these years
an educational administrator of profound influence rather
than a metaphysician, Josiah Royce, George Holmes Howison,
who was at this time a mature writer and beloved teacher,
Mary Whiton Calkins, and Borden Parker Bowne. The last
three, who are the main subjects of our investigation,
brought the development of personalism in the United States
to mature expression in specific types.
A personalistic form of idealism has been a dominant
philosophy in America. 3 Moreover, on the basis of our in-
2. The Journal was an excellent forum for the then young
American philosophers, Pierce, James, Howison, Royce, and
Dewey. It also enabled Americans to become "aware of
their philosophical heritage." For excellent discussions
of the St. Louis School see Towns end, PIUS, 116-130,
Perry, Art. (1936), and Perry, SLM.
3. Santayana has rightly pointed out that idealism has been
a dominant philosophy in America, little as he relished
this fact. See his discussion of "The Genteel Tradition
in American Philosophy," Art. (1911). TSSiflSfe in his con-
cise treatment of American philosophy, has written that
"between about 1875 and 1900 almost every professor of

14
vestigation, it is discovered that in each period men con-
tributed hard-won ideas that cohere in a personalistic en-
semble which is most conspicuously represented by Howison,
Calkins, and Bowne.
1. Samuel Johnson (1696-1722).
Samuel Johnson, a noted clergyman and educator, was
the first American thinker to put the idea of self-activity
at the center of his philosophy. Born at Guilford, Connecti-
cut, the 14th of October, 1696, and of an excellent family
background, 4 he was destined by his father to a life of busi-
ness. His splendid education and fondness for books, how-
ever, enabled him to devote himself to the Church and the
field of philosophy. He was attracted early to the latter
through the writings of Descartes, Boyle, Locke, and Newton,
against which he had been cautioned in his college days be-
cause of their corrupt influence. ^ The most permanent influ-
ence upon his thinking, however, was made by Bishop Berkeley,
whom he met in Rhode Island upon the latter' s visit there in
philosophy in the country was an idealist, and the ideal-
ists remained in the majority for a decade or two later."
HOMP, 485. Mailer adds: "Vorherschaft des praktisch-
moralischen und des personalistisch-individualistischen
Denkens charakterisiert die amerikanische Philosophic"
AP, 288.
4. Chandler, SJ, 1.
5. Johnson, Autobiography , first published in Schneider, SJ,
I, 6.
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1729. Although his new idealism did not make a profound im-
pression upon colonial thought, it is recognized that John-
son was one of the most remarkable men of his century in
America. 6
Johnson^ relationship to personalism may be seen in
his emphasis upon self- activity in epistemology, metaphysics,
and ethics. He added to Descartes 1 n I perceive , " U I per-
ceive and act , therefore I am. M
'
7 He held much in common
with Locke and Berkeley, yet he went beyond them. In Locke
there are traces of an activistic view of mind; Berkeley de-
fines spirit as active. Johnson emphasizes that activity
still more. His ethical system, one of the first to be for-
mulated in America, placed self-activity at the center.
a. Epistemology.
In the opening section of Elementa Philosophica
,
Johnson deals with the first principles of logic and meta-
physics. There he traces the steps in the operation of the
mind from its first sense impressions until it arrives at
"that Perfection and Enjoyment of itself, which is the great
End of its Being. 1,8 By mind, Johnson means any intelligent
active being. It receives its knowledge from three sources.
6. Cf. Nicholas Murray Butler, in his foreword to Schneider,
SJ, I, v.
7. Jones, EAP, 31.
8. Johnson, NOE, 1.
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First of all, the mind has perceptions of "objects ab extra "
from passive use of the senses. These are simple ideas.
Second, the mind has ideas of "objects ab intra ," i.e., the
mind is conscious, through imagination and memory, of objects
not present to the senses. The third source is the "intel-
lectual light," the power of conceiving abstracted or spirit-
ual objects. This intuitive intellectual light is derived
from the "universal Presence and Action of the DEITY, or a
perpetual Communication with the great Father of Lights." 9
One might compare this analysis with that of John Locke. To
be sure, Johnson does draw from Locke, nevertheless he adds
the idea that the actions of the mind in gaining knowledge
"flow from a Principle of Self-exertion," 10 and that "we
have within us a principle of conscious perception, intelli-
gence, activity, and s elf- exertion. "-1-1 The activity of a
self is basic in such a theory of knowledge.
b. Metaphysics.
The idea of self-activity is also of capital impor-
tance in Johnson* s metaphysics. This is seen in his discus-
sion of causality when he distinguishes between apparent and
9. Johnson, NOE, 13.
10. Ibid., 5.
11. Ibid., 2. Johnson transcended Berkeley here, as he did
in his idea of "objects ab intra , " for this idea of self
activity, while admitted by Berkeley, was not stressed
in his writings.
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real causes and between necessary and voluntary causes; both
of these distinctions figure in most later personal ism. "It
appears," he wrote, "that only intelligent active Beings or
Spirits, can be truly efficient Causes ."12 He refers to vol-
untary effects as those which "are produced by a free volun-
tary Cause acting from a Principle of conscious Design and
Self- exertion.
"
13 In a letter to Bishop Berkeley he ex-
pressed this thought, saying, "A proper active efficient
cause I can conceive none but Spirit; nor any action, strict-
ly speaking, but where there is a Will."14 Further, he rea-
sons by analogy that inasmuch as there are active finite be-
ings, there is an infinitely intelligent and active being,
the "Father and Lord of all." This "infinite eternal Mind
. . . comprehendeth all Space and Duration, and every Thing
that is within His boundless intellect." 1^ It maintains uni-
ty within multiplicity, identity through diversity, and its
"whole is greater than either of its parts." It produces
matter and form by "will and power." Finally, "The whole
System of Spirits or intelligent B eings, as being endowed
with Understanding, Counsel, Design and Liberty of Acting,"
is "under the Conduct and Moral Government of the DEITY." 16
The intelligent, self- activity of the Real is clearly
12. Johnson, NOE, 21.
13. Ibid., 20-21.
14. Quoted by Schneider, SJ, II, 271.
15. Johnson, NOE, 35-36.
16. Johnson, ITSP, 6.
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evident in all of Johnson* s thought.
c. Ethics.
In 1746, Johnson published his First Principles of
Moral Philosophy . 17 It "received the approbation of sober
and thoughtful men,"18 and was referred to by one leading
New England theologian as "the most perfect piece of Ethics
,
and in the best form, that I have seen in any language. n1^
The Ethics is divided into two sections. The first deals
with such speculative questions as the nature of man, the
17. The second edition of Johnson's Moral Philosophy was
even more personalistic than the first"! In the first
edition he had written, concerning knowledge of self-
existence: "I know that I am made, because I have a Be-
ing and did begin to be." P. 23. In the second edition
he wrote in place of this: "I know that I have a Being,
because I perceive and act. ... I can have no Notion
of the Existence of an intelligent active Being without
conscious Perception and Activity." Pp. 22-23. Fur-
ther, the second edition indicates a closer relationship
of thought between Johnson and Bowne than between him
and Howison or Calkins; in a statement that was in the
second edition but not in the first Johnson wrote of
God: "He is therefore the great Parent Mind , from whom
derives all Light and Knowledge to every created Intelli-
gence. ..." P. 28. Finally, Johnson's more thorough
personalism in the second edition is evidenced in a
statement concerning mental health that antedated much
modern psychology. It appeared only in the second edi-
tion. "As One's Conscience is properly One's self, it
is the greatest Madness in the World, for a Man to live
at a perpetual Variance with himself, and the first
Point of Wisdom, always to keep Friends with himself."
P. 83. The second edition appears in Elementa Philo-
sophlca
,
published by Benjamin Franklin in 1752.
18. Beardsley, LOSJ, 123.
19. In Benjamin Coleman's letter to Johnson, in Beardsley,
LOSJ, 123.

19
author of man, and the end of his being. The second section
considers the specific duties of practical ethics that result
from the speculative. The essential idea of Johnson's ethi-
cal system is seen in his definition of moral philosophy and
of moral good. Moral philosophy is, in part, "knowledge of
the Moral World , or the World of intelligent free Agents."20
"Moral Good consists in freely choosing and doing whatsoever
Truth and right Reason dictate as necessary. . . .
"
21
Johnson 1 s concern for self was clearly seen throughout
his entire system. He wrote, regarding the nature of man,
that it is evidently active and "can chuse or refuse, will or
nill, act or not act, from a Principle of Self-exert ion. 1,22
From this he argued that man's creator, the "Almighty Being,"
must "have Unders tanding , Knowledge , Will, Force , and Ac-
tivity ; must have Liberty , Choice , Deliberation , Self- exer-
tion . "23 The end of man's being is to improve himself in
this life so that he can become "eternally happy in the En-
joyment of GOD and all that is good."24 From these basic
truths it follows that man as a rational and free agent is
obligated to himself, to God, and to his fellow-creatures.
Johnson's metaphysical personalism found its climax in ethi-
cal personalism.
20. Johnson, FPMP (1st ed. ), 9.
21. Ibid., 10.
22. Ibid., 17-18.
23. Ibid.,. 24.
24. Ibid., 42.
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2. Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758).
Another significant leader of colonial thought who
also expressed personalistic ideas was Jonathan Edwards.
Considered by his earliest biographer "one of the greatest
,
best
, and most useful of men, that have lived in this age," 25
he closely allied himself, as had Johnson, to the church and
the field of education. The only son of a Puritan minister
in a family of eleven children, he received an excellent edu-
cation, first at the hands of his father and elder sisters,
and later at Yale College. He entered college at twelve
years of age and later graduated with the highest honors. 2^
Evidence of his "rare intellectual precocity" 27 is seen in a
letter he wrote when twelve years of age refuting the idea
of the materiality of the soul, and in an undergraduate paper
entitled Of Being . It is said that "even while a boy, he be-
gan to study with his pen in his hand"; 2® and as a man he
continued to be a prolific writer. All through life he was
systematic and vigorous in method, original and penetrating
in thought. It was during his college days that he became
specifically interested in philosophy, after having read in
his third year John Locke* s Essay on Human Understanding .
25. Hopkins, LCOE, iii. See also the more recent biogra-
phies: McGiffert, JE, and Winslow, JE.
26. Jones, EAP, 46-47.
27. Allen, JE, 3. For an indication of Edwards 1 superior
intelligence see also Smyth, Art. (1890).
28. Dwight, LOE, 33.
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The suggestions of personalism in his thought are chiefly
evident in these early days of his intellectual development.
The source of Edwards 1 idealism has been a debatable
question over the years, but now seems to be fairly well
settled. While his thought is similar in some respects to
that of Johnson and Berkeley, it is independent of them. In
an early Life of Berkeley , Fraser maintained that Edwards
was dependent upon Berkeley,^ yet thirty years later he con-
cluded in his four volume Works of George Berkeley , W I find
no positive proof that Berkeley was known to Edwards when
his Notes were written," and further, "We may conclude that
they never met." 30 It is also of interest to note in regard
to Johnson* s influence that as a student at Yale Edwards was
discontented with him as a tutor. 31 On the other hand,
Edwards was indebted to Locke, as mentioned, to Newton, and
to Cudworth. Gardiner suggests that he may have also been
influenced by the early part of Descartes* Meditations and
by John Norris 1 Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World . 52
a. Epistemology.
Some suggestions of Personalism are seen in Edwards*
theory of knowledge. He begins with Locke *s view that knowl-
29. Fraser, LOB, 182-190,
30. Fraser, WOGB, IV, 398.
31. Cf. Gardiner, Art. (1900), 586, and Christie, Art.
(1931), 30.
32. Gardiner, Op. cit. , 590.
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edge depends upon sensation, and that spirit is power, yet
differs from him in greater emphasis on the importance of
the mind as an "active Cause." 33 The mind actively deals
with the sense data, organizing separate sensations into an
objective, coherent order of experience, building up knowl-
edge by perceiving the union or disunion of ideas. An intui-
tive, divine light vitalizes knowledge without itself provid-
ing information; the end of all knowledge is to "understand
divine things." 34 Specific acts of the mind consist of un-
derstanding and will, both of which are "the highest kind of
created existence." The understanding is concerned with
such factors of experience as perception, reasoning, and
memory, whereas the will includes such factors as the affec-
tions, desires, and volitions. It is to be observed that
Edwards thus includes emotion under will. He defines the
faculty of the will as "that Faculty or Power or Principle
of Mind by which it is capable of choosing ; an Act of the
Will is the same as an act of chusing or choice." 3^
b. Psychology.
Consideration of the will leads one logically to
33. Edwards, FOW, 50. See Locke, ECHU, Bk. II, chp. XXI,
sec. 4.
34. Edwards, Works
,
IV, 6. By "Works" will be meant the
four volume Worcester edition published by Robert Carter
and Brothers in 1881, unless otherwise stated.
35. Edwards, FOW, 1.
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Edwards* concern for other psychological problems which he
treats personalistically. He emphasizes, for example, per-
sonal identity, writing in his discourse, "Original Sin,"
"If we come to the personal identity of created intelligent
beings ... it cannot be denied that this is one thing es-
sential to it. "^ He also emphasizes activity and accepts
the theory of interaction common to personalists. The soul
causes activity; the mind causes alterations in the body;
the soul is the author of external actions. Finally, the af-
fections are "very much the spring of men*s action;"3^ and
"the affections are no other than the more vigorous and sen-
sible exercises of the inclination and will of the soul."38
While not directly relevant to personalistic theory,
Edwards* observations of cases of conversion really mark the
beginnings of modern psychology of religion. His critical
analysis of the sense of guilt and sin, self-examination,
and attainment of the "peace of God" on the part of his con-
verts indicates his accurate knowledge of personality. He
wrote of the conversions of the people of Northampton,
Massachusetts:
Commonly persons 1 minds immediately before this
discovery of God»s justice are exceedingly rest-
less and in a kind of struggle and tumult, and
sometimes in mere anguish; but generally, as
soon as they have this conviction, it immediate-
36. Edwards, Works
,
II, 487.
37. Edwards, Works , III, 6.
38. Ibid., 3.
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ly brings their minds to a calm, and a before
unexpected quietness and composure; and most
frequently, though not always, the pressing
weight upon their spirits is then taken away,
and a general hope arises. . . .39
c. Metaphysics.
Self- activity and consciousness play a large part in
Edwards 1 metaphysics. 40 His Calvinism, seen in some of his
sermon titles, such as "Men Naturally God f s Enemies," "The
Eternity of Hell Torments," and "Sinners in the Hands of an
Angry God," is especially evidenced in his attack on the
"metaphysical notion of action and agency,
"
4^ by which he
39. Edwards, NWOG, 41-42. See especially Edwards 1 objective
account of the conversion of Abigail Hutchinson and of
Phebe Bartlet. So important was this Narrative of the
Surprising Work of God by Edwards that John Wesley pub-
lished it in London in 1755 and sold copies for four
pence. In his psychology of religious experience Ed-
wards anticipated William James' monumental Gifford
Lectures. When discussing the importance of suggestion
and imitation in the conversion experience James says,
"No one understands this better than Jonathan Edwards
understood it already." James, VRE, 200n. See also Fay,
APBJ, 46. Of greater importance to our investigation of
the rise of personalism is the fact that Bowne recog-
nized the importance of Edwards. Bowne wrote: "Edwards
had not the language of modern psychology, but he had
recognized the fact of suggestibility and the influence
of expectation in the religious field with all clear-
ness." Bowne, IOG, 141. It is also to be noted that
Bov/ne was critical of the emotionalism of the early re-
vival experiences "under Edwards's influence." Bowne,
SIC, 214-215.
40. Edwards is recognized preeminently as a metaphysician.
See Edwards, Works
,
II, 172, Townsend, PIUS, 39, and
Gardiner, Art. (1900), 573.
41. Edwards, FOW, 198.
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means the Arminian view. It is only fair to Edwards, howev-
er, to see that he conscientiously and sincerely attempted
to maintain the idea of freedom on a Calvinistic basis, sug-
gesting that necessity is not inconsistent with liberty. 42
In fact, he denies the charge of determinism, saying that
"Man is entirely, perfectly, and unspeakably different from
a meer Machine, in that he has Reason and Understanding, and
has a Faculty of Will, and so is capable of Volition and
choice."43 Further, in his discussion "Concerning God f s Mor-
al Government," he holds that men are created in the image
of their Creator, writing, "They are voluntary agents, and
can produce works of their own will, design and contrivance,
as God does."44 Man is different from all of the other
parts of the world in that he can know his Creator, the end
for which he is made, and can actively promote the end and
design of creation.
Edwards 1 central metaphysical idea is that all exist-
ence is to be thought of in terms of consciousness. Con-
scious beings alone really exist. "AS BODIES, the objects
of our external senses, are but the shadows of beings."4^
42. Bowne, in fact, supports Edwards against the charge of
determinism writing, "Indeed, it would be much nearer
the truth to say that Calvinists were first among modern
theologians to affirm a natural freedom in man. " Bowne,
SIT, 417-418.
43. Edwards, FOW, 226.
44. Edwards, Works
,
I, 566.
45. Edwards, "The Mind," in Works (Dwight ed. ), I, 697.
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"This Infinite and Omnipresent being cannot be solid."46
Space and time are ideas in God's mind. For man they are
merely conditions of his finite existence. This is person-
alistic idealism, as Berkeley and, later, Bowne held it.
The specifically personalistic ideas of Edwards appear chief-
ly in his early metaphysical writing. However, they blend
with his later theology. Gardiner has written:
It is scarcely to be doubted that had Edwards
been asked at any time in his later years to
state exactly what he thought of the constitu-
tion of the material universe, he would have
replied in much the terms in which he had ex-
pressed the meditations of his youth, that its
substance was the "infinitely exact and precise
Divine idea, together with an answerable, per-
fectly exact and stable Will, with respect to
correspondent communications to created minds,
and effects on their minds."47
d. Ethics.
The moral part of the universe is for Edwards, as
later for Kant's personalistic ethics, the "end of all the
rest of creation.
"
4^ Basic in his idea of ethics are the
principles of will, volition and agency. Seen against the
background of his Calvinistic attack on the Arminian notion
of the liberty of the will, one might wonder whether or not
46. Edwards, in "Notes on Natural Science," Works (Dwight
ed.), I, 706. Edwards' early essays do not appear in
the Worcester edition of his works.
47. Gardiner, Art. (1900), 595-596.
48. Edwards, Works
,
II, 223.
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individuals could exert free moral choice. Edwards is an
emphatic champion of moral choice, although it must be under-
stood that he distinguishes between a moral agent as a ruler
and one as a subject. God being the only ruler, man is nec-
essarily a subject under his control (a view manifestly out
of harmony with Kantian autonomy). 49 Within that framework
of creation man has complete moral freedom. It has been
pointed out that Edwards distinguished man from the machine
on the basis of choice and the ability to act. Here he dis-
tinguishes man from the beasts "in those Faculties & Prin-
ciples of Nature, whereby He is capable of moral Agency.
The highest virtue is love to God; the greatest moral excel-
lency is holiness. God is man's first cause and his last
end.
While no attempt has been made to catalogue complete-
ly all the varied thoughts of this eminent theologian and
philosopher, it is evident that he contributed to the gener-
al development of personalis tic thought in America. An ac-
tive mind is basic in his epistemology. A dynamic soul is
central in his psychology. His metaphysics rests upon the
consciousness of the Real, and his ethics upon the action of
a moral agent.
49. See Brightman's treatment of moral autonomy and espe
cially his reference to Kant, ML, 266-267.
50. Edwards, POW, 30.
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3. Amos Bronson Alcott (1799-1888).
The period of American philosophy from the time of
Edwards to that of Bronson Alcott has been called the age of
reason and the period of enlightenment. Its spirit was rev-
olutionary and forward-looking. Men rebelled against the
tyrannies of Europe and planned for the future of America.
Action was dominant. Thinking was based upon deism, utili-
tarianism, humanism, free-willism, and later, idealism. Two
groups helped make possible a later union of Christianity
and philosophy, such as took place especially in the work of
Borden Parker Bowne, by supporting liberal Christianity.
These were the deists and the later group of transcendental
-
ists, both holding that God is rational, that man is a moral
agent, and that the physical universe is subservient to sen-
tient beings. Their views therefore belong roughly in the
personalist tradition.
Among the deists, Ethan Allen (1737-1789) was an
early leader. He revolted against Puritanism and attacked
the Calvinistic system, yet maintained that God is wise and
that man is a rational agent. Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790)
typified the spirit of the day by rising from New England
provincialism to world recognition. He was a conventional
deist of the period, but represented enterprising social-
mindedness. He wrote a book on ethics in addition to his
Poor Richard. Thomas Paine (1737-1809) was the chief
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popularizer of deism. His claim to philosophic distinction
is his book, The Age of Reason , Elihu Palmer (1764-1806), a
religious radical, held to a supreme Deity, and maintained
that man is possessed of moral and intellectual faculties.
Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) was a zealous freethinker whose
social and political thought grew out of philosophic reflec-
tion. He rejected the Calvinism of Edwards, but was con-
cerned with just and good government based upon recognition
of the worth of every person.
More akin to personalism in spirit was a gradually de-
veloping transcendentalism. It is represented by such stal-
wart leaders of American thought as William Ellery Channing
(1780-1842), Theodore Parker (1810-1860), Henry David
Thoreau (1817-1862), Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882), Amos
Bronson Alcott (1799-1888), and Walt Whitman (1819-1892).
Transcendentalism combined Platonism and the mysticism of
Plotinus, the ethical idealism of Calvinism, and romanticism.
It emphasized the "divinity of nature, the worth of man, and
the capacity of man to know the truth directly. ,l53-
Alcott was closely associated with this latter group
of thinkers, and has been called the most transcendental of
the transcendentalists. 52 He differed from them, however,
as he did from the deists, in his clear-cut personalism. He
51. Muelder and Sears, DAP, 112.
52. Bates, Art. (1928), 139.
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was the first thorough-going personalist. He contended for
personal is tic ideas in conversation with Charming earlier
than 1838, "defended his thesis of personality" against the
arguments of Emerson in 1863, and defined his position in
1877. His biographer, Shepard, has written of him, "The
ideas implicit in Personalism are discoverable in nearly
everything that Alcott thought and said and did.
"
53
Alcott came from humble, early American ancestry.
His schooling was limited to what he obtained in the dis-
trict school and from two clergymen. He had hoped to go to
Yale, but did not because it was necessary to help support
the large family of which he was a member. He spent four
and a half years, with little success, peddling in Virginia
and the Carolinas. Philosophy claimed him, and he returned
to New England. There he developed his personalism from
many sources. He was familiar with Plato, Locke, Berkeley,
Kant, and Edwards, was a frequent visitor at the St. Louis
School, and knew Brokmeyer, Whitman, Davidson, Harris and
Howison. He had most of these men lecture at Concord and
thought well enough of Harris to recommend him to President
Eliot of Harvard for a position on its faculty. 54 A clergy-
53. Shepard, PP, 497. See also 494 and 495, and Alcott, TT,
153. It is to be noted, however, that as far as the in-
vestigator can determine Whitman was the first American
to use the word "personalism." See Whitman, Art. (1868).
54. Alcott knew Howison, one of the chief subjects of our
investigation, well, for he was not only impressed with
Howison in St. Louis but also, as head of the Concord
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man wrote of Alcott's insistence on the personality of God,
that it grew "out of his rare inborn piety." 55 Shepard adds
a similar thought when he says that Alcott's personalism was
"a coalescence of thoughts and attitudes with which he had
been all his life familiar," and that it was "worked out by
his habitual integration of his own native materials." 56
a. Metaphysics.
Alcott was an avowed personalist. He held that all
separate persons are harmoniously related to the Supreme Per
son. "The Person," he wrote in his diary in 1874, "is the
presupposition of all things and beings."57 This idea of a
Being that is self-determined and independent was, for him,
a ttnew calculus." It was
an organon alike serviceable to metaphysician
and naturalist - whereby things answer to
thought, facts are resolved into truths, images
into ideas, matter into mind, power into per-
sonality, man into God; the One soul in all
souls revealed as the Creative Spirit pulsat-
ing in all breasts, immanent in all atoms,
prompting all wills, and personally embosoming
School of Philosophy, had him lecture there many times.
Howison lectured there in 1879 on "Philosophy from Leib-
nitz to Hegel," in 1882 after his return from Europe on
"Present Aspects of Philosophy in Germany," and in 1883
on "Hume and Kant." He was also announced as lecturing
there in 1885, 1886, and 1887.
55. Bartol, Art. (1888), 5.
56. Shepard, PP, 499.
57. Shepard, JOBA, 450. This idea resembles Bowne»s fre-
quent remark that "personality is the key to reality."
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all persons in one unbroken synthesis of Be-
ing. 58
The phenomenal world is only an aspect of mind, which
in turn is "crowned in personality." Frequent are the ex-
pressions, "Nature is thought in solution," "Nature is
thought immersed in matter," "The world is but the symbol of
the mind," 5^ and thinking "is the finding of the Person or
Self, distinct from matter and mortality." 60 All other meta-
physical ideas such as space, time, and causality are to be
thought of in terms of a person. "The Person wanting all is
wanting." 61 Only in terms of personality can one understand
the Real.
b. Philosophy of Education.
Alcott* s personalism led him to a progressive educa-
tional philosophy far in advance of his day. He is spoken
of by Morrow as "the greatest of all American schoolmas-
ters," 62 and by McGuskey as the "catalytic agent" for the
educational progressives of today. 63 He hoped to educate
the entire personality. His educational procedure "was di-
rected toward the harmonious development of the physical,
58. Alcott, TAB, 164.
59. Ibid., 174-176.
60. Alcott, TT, 135.
61. Alcott, TAB, 182.
62. Morrow, POLW, 9. See also Haefner, ETAP, for a critical
consideration of Alcott ! s philosophy of education.
63. McCuskey, BAT, 170.
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esthetic, intellectual, and moral natures. . . . " 64 He at-
tempted to discipline and liberalize the mind, to relate his
students to the great minds of the ages, and to bring indi-
viduals into a social sense of community. "Living at the
breath /sic/ of Shakespeare," he wrote, "the depth of Plato,
the height of Christ, gives mastery, or if not that, a wor-
thy discipleship.
"
65 He had great hope in youth, and was
encouraged by the fact that young people did not derive in-
formation from authority and tradition, but were "ambitious
of entering upon the study of the human spirit, its origin,
duties, and destinies. • . ."66 jje was not always success-
ful in his schools, yet that itself is a tribute to his edu-
cational philosophy. An example of this is the fact that
his Temple School in Boston finally closed when many parents
refused to send their children there because a colored girl
had been admitted. The strong spiritual note prevalent in
Alcott 1 s program is further evidenced in his view that knowl-
edge was not enough to make a person. Knowledge must be ac-
companied by love lest it "lapse from pure intellect into
sense." Love, "the proper intellect of spirit and spring of
intuition," enables us to "find ourselves in Him who is ever
seeking us." 67 Through the development of mind men come
64. Bates, Art. (1928), 139.
65. Alcott, TAB, 134.
66. Alcott, TT, 24.
67. Alcott, TAB, 185-186.
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into "the Palace of Power and Personality." 68
c. Social Philosophy.
Alcott 1 s social philosophy, based upon his metaphysi-
cal idea that all persons have eternal significance, was a
voice of the future. He rejected the Puritan heritage of
individualism, held so strongly by Emerson, to look forward
with Whitman, Davidson, Harris and Howison to a more ade-
quate form of social solidarity. As all finite persons are
related to each other and to the Supreme Person in the spir-
itual realm, so all persons must be organized in society.
The only sure means of freedom and happiness is in associa-
tion. 6^ "Personality," he wrote, "pertains to the state. . .
Being one, states represent community of persons solely."
The "richest crop" of a Christian community "is a virtuous
and free population."^ His liberal social philosophy is
evidenced in the above-mentioned fact that he was concerned
for the educational opportunities of negroes. He was half a
century in advance of his day when he advocated the then
68. Alcott, TAB, 178.
69. A modern personalist, Brightman, expresses a similar
idea in the phrase "organic pluralism." Alcott and his
personalistic contemporaries were striving for a bal-
ance between early American individualism and what has
come to be totalitarianism. They sought an enlightened,
well-organ!zed civilization in which personality could
be expressed most creatively.
70. Alcott, TT, 53-54.
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radical idea that women must "possess equal privileges with
man" in forming the laws of the state and in administering
them. He agrees here with Whitman, Calkins, and Bowne,
and thereby was a voice of the future rather than one of the
past. In this respect he was a more acute thinker than
Emerson, and wrote in his journal September 12, 1868, that
Emerson
declines signing Lucy Stoned appeal for Wom-
an's Right to Suffrage, but will write and
send her his views. I will write and send her
my signature. I say: "Gladly sign your appeal,
assured that woman is soon to have her place
in the state with every right of the citizen.
What ideal republics have fabled, ours is to
be. Nor need we fear the boldest experiments
which the moral sense of the best women con-
ceives and advocates."*7^
Shepard recounts an occasion when Alcott attended a meeting
of the New England Labor League at seventy-five years of age.
Alcott
listened with keen interest to such 'declared
radical men 1 and 'communists' as Colonel
Green, Stephen Foster, E. H. Heywood, and John
Orvis. He himself spoke at the convention,
expressing approval of its general purposes
and suggesting some of the quieter and less
destructive ways by which reformers might do
their work.'''3
"Labor," he later wrote, "is wholesome." It "humanizes, ex-
alts." 174 Personality, then, finds its greatest expression
71. Alcott, TAB, 90.
72. Shepard, JOBA, 389.
73. Shepard, PP, 498-499.
74. Alcott, TT, 50. This is especially similar to progres-
sive social views expressed by Whitman, Davidson, and
Calkins.
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in actively co-operating with others in building the perfect
moral community.
d. Philosophy of Religion.
The expansive thought of Alcott culminated in a per-
sonal istic philosophy of religion. Reality is spiritual;
the Supreme Person is God; man, who has eternal worth, ex-
periences immortality. What creeds a man possesses, what
hymns are sung, or whether or not there is a prayer in a
formal worship service are inconsequential questions to Al-
cott. "Religion is too essential to cling to any dogma."'75
The important thing is that " Personal ism , the dependence of
the many on the One . • . conducts by logical sequence to
theism, idealism, and the positive faiths of the orthodox
sects."76 Alcott wrote in his diary of January 8, 1868, "I
insist on Personal Theism, and the need of instrumental ac-
tion for planting it." 7,7 In September of the following
year, he wrote in Concord, "Plainly, the drift of thinking
here in New England, if not elsewhere is toward a Personal
Theism. . . . " 78 The Supreme Person is the creator and sus-
tainer of the world and all life; He is transcendent yet im-
manent, the all in all.
75. Alcott, TT, 102.
76. Ibid., 153.
77. Shepard, JOBA, 390.
78. Alcott, CD, 265.
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Man, too, is a person of infinite worth. He is a
"soul, informed by divine ideas, and bodying forth their
image." 79 He utilizes will to progress from instinct to per-
sonality through the several stages of sense experience, un-
derstanding, fancy, reason, imagination, and conscience. He
has freedom to create his own world. "Pure personal Power
is above restraint or constraint, being a law in itself. "8°
He is bound only by the Kantian categorical imperative.
"None can escape THE PRESENCE, THE OUGHT is everywhere and
imperative. "81 Finally, man is immortal; he "accepts noth-
ing short of an eternity of fellowships in his illimitable
future." 82 "Heaven is . . . our port and resting place some-
time in the stream of ages." 83
4. Walt Whitman (1819-1892).
Walt Whitman, the "American Giant" of literature, was
likewise a champion of personalism. He was, as far as the
author can determine, not only the first American to use the
word, but also the first one to publish a magazine article
entitled "Personalism." 84 He sang with spirit: "Chanter of
79. Alcott, TAB, 166.
80. Alcott, TT, 158.
81. Ibid., 159.
82. Ibid., 174.
83. Alcott, TAB, 208.
84. See Galaxy , 5 (1868), 540-547. An annotated edition of
this article appears in the appendix.

38
Personality ... I project the history of the future" 85
and, "I will he the bard of Personality." 86 He was Hegelian
in his philosophy, yet paradoxically, was a "typical" per-
sonalis t in the manner of Alcott or Bowne, rather than an
absolutistic personalist as Harris, Royce or Calkins. He
recognized the totality of the real, but defiantly advocated
"Individuality . . . Identity . . . Personal ism.
"
87 He
agreed with Alcott that the many are dependent upon the one,
and that the relationship between man and God is personal.
He united social responsibility and individuality into his
"typical" personalism, and proclaimed what has later been
called "organic-plural ism. " He spoke of "ensemble-Individu-
ality," 88 and chanted:
ONE'S-SELF I sing, a simple separate person,
Yet utter the word Democratic, the word En-
Masse. 8^
a. Personalism in Whitman's Life.
Whitman was born May 31, 1819, in West Hills, New
85. Whitman, LOG, 11.
86. Quoted by Shephard, WWP, 16.
87. Whitman, Art. (1868), 540.
88. Ibid., 542.
89. Whitman, LOG, 9. Miss Abbott, in an unpublished thesis
entitled "The Personalism of Walt Whitman," declares
that Whitman is a personalist in four respects. He main-
tains (1) that this is a personal world, (2) that the
self is social, but also separate, (3) that the world is
a function of intelligence, and (4) that the world is a
revelation of the cosmic activity of a Supreme Will—God.
See Abbott, PWW, 30-42.
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Huntington, Long Is land. 90 His father and mother were unedu-
cated, and seemingly had little concern for his education.
He left school at the age of thirteen, having learned only
reading, writing, arithmetic, geography, and grammar. Never-
theless, he became a school teacher in Queens and Suffolk
Counties at the age of eighteen, and in 1841 "began his liberal
journalistic work. As editor of the Daily Aurora in New York,
he supported the Tyler Administration and defended Dickens
(who was then on an American tour) for being a "democratic
writer" against an attack from the Washington Globe . A
few years later he became editor of the Brooklyn Eagle . He
lost his job about 1846, however, because "he opposed his
90. See any of the many biographies of Whitman for details
of his life. Bliss Perry's Walt Whitman
,
published in
1906, has been, and in many ways still is, the "stand-
ard." Not a biography but extremely pertinent is Sara
Abbott's above-mentioned unpublished Boston University
master's thesis entitled The Personalism of Walt Whitman
(1926). There are many recent biographies of consider-
able value. Louise Pound published an excellent sketch
in 1935. See her Walt Whitman , ix-xlvi. In 1937 Edgar
Lee Masters published his excellent study, Whitman . Two
years later there appeared Newton Arvin's Whitman , and
Esther Shephard's Walt Whitman's Pose . In 1941 Prances
Winwar published American Giant. Por an extremely criti-
cal review of this "provocative, seducing" biography,
see Purness, Art. (1942) 1
,
423-432. In 1942 Hugh l'Anson
Fausset published Walt Whitman : Poet of Democracy . For a
review of this book from the personalistic point of view
see Furness, Art. (1942) 2
, 557-560. A final biography of
significance i3 Henry Seidel Canby's recent Walt Whitman;
An American (1943) • The definitive book on Whitman will
perhaps be the one soon to be published by Furness. The
present writer is indebted to Furness for allowing him to
see the manuscript, especially Chapter 18, which is en-
titled "Personalism." — Whenever Specimen Days or Demo-
cratic Vistas are referred to, it will be to Pound's
edition.

employer on the question of the extension of slavery into
newly acquired territory." 91 It was said that he estab-
lished the Brooklyn Freeman in 1850 "to promulgate his fa-
vorite 'Free Soil,' and other reformatory doctrines." 92
Whitman published his first edition of Leaves of
Grass in 1855. Eight hundred copies were printed, but there
were practically no sales. Emerson praised it; Whittier
threw his presentation copy into the fire. 93 The second and
third editions were as unsuccessful as the first.
Whitman spent the years from 1863 to 1873 as a volun-
teer nurse in the hospitals for Civil War casualties and as
a clerk in Washington. An eye-witness gives an excellent
account of how the poet expressed through his life a regard
for the personality of the wounded and dying:
Never shall I forget one night when I accom-
panied him on his rounds, through a hospital
filled with those young Americans whose hero-
isms he has sung in deathless numbers. There
were three rows of cots, and each cot bore its
man. When he appeared, in passing along, there
was a smile of welcome and affection on each
face, however wan, and his presence seemed to
light up the place, as it might be lit by the
91. Pound, WW, xv. It will be recalled that a personalistic
friend of Whitman, Alcott, saw his Temple School in Bos-
ton close June 22, 1839, because he had admitted a negro
girl on the basis of respect for personality.
92. Quoted by Perry. WW, 49n.
93. Emerson wrote: "I find it the most extraordinary piece
of wit and wisdom that America has yet contributed. . . .
I greet you at the beginning of a great career." The
Boston Post
,
however, commented upon its "exulting au-
dacity of Priapus-worshipping obscenity. " Quoted by
Perry, WW, 99 and 101.
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Son of Love. Prom cot to cot they called him,
often in tremulous tones, or whispers; they
embraced him, they touched his hands, they
gazed at him. To one he gave a few words of
cheer, for another he wrote a letter home, to
others he gave an orange, a few comfits, a
cigar, a pipe and tobacco, a sheet of paper or
a postage stamp, all of which and many other
things were in his capacious haversack. From
another he would receive a dying message for
mother, a wife, or sweetheart; for another he
would promise to go on an errand; to another,
some special friend, very low, he would give
a manly, farewell kiss. He did the things for
them that no nurse or doctor could do, and he
seemed to leave a benediction at every cot he
passed. The lights had gleamed for many hours
that night in the hospital before he left it,
and as he took his way towards the door, you
could hear the voice of many a stricken hero
calling, "Walt, Walt, Walt! Come again, come
again!" 94
Whitman was a clerk in the Indian Bureau only a short
time before he was dismissed because he possessed Leaves of
Grass, which was "indecent literature." He was then a clerk
in the Attorney General^ Office until 1873, when he returned
to Camden, as a cripple. He died March 26, 1892, at the age
of seventy- three. The breadth of his personality is indica-
ted by the readings at his funeral. They were from "Whitman,
Confucius, Guatama, Jesus, the Koran, Isaiah, St. John, the
Zend Avesta, and Plato." 95
94. Quoted from Page, CAP, 688. This war experience gave
Whitman increased clarity of the social and political
relationship between the eternal "I" and the many. He
summed up the three years, saying: "It has given me my
most fervent views of the true ensemble and extent of
the States." SD, 97.
95. Perry, WW, 271.
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b. Whitman's Relationship to Other Personalists.
Whitman developed his personalism legitimately from
his own thought, the spirit of the day, and the views of
both German and American idealists. In fact, he also
learned from Plato, Socrates, and Christ. He wrote, in his
poem "The Base of All Metaphysics,"
. . . Having studied the new and antique, the
Greek and Germanic systems,
Kant having studied and stated, Pichte and
Schelling and Hegel,
Stated the lore of Plato, and Socrates greater
than Plato,
And greater than Socrates sought and stated,
Christ divine having studied long,
I see reminiscent to-day those Greek and Ger-
manic systems,
See the philosophies all. . . . 96
Whitman must have been partially indebted to Socrates, Plato
and Christ for his belief in the objectivity of the ideal,
the significance of self-activity, and the importance of per
sons as real. He gained some of his ethical personalism
from Kant, more confidence in the ego as the fundamental re-
ality from Pichte, and his poetic intellectual intuition
from Schelling. 9 ^ He was more deeply indebted to Hegel than
to any of the others. 98 In Democratic Vistas he predicted
96. Whitman, LOG, 101-102.
97. See Whitman's discussion in SD, 224.
98. Whitman knew only the English language, hence he read
only translations and magazine articles. He learned
Hegel chiefly from Gostwick's German Literature . See
Pulguhm, Art. (1941), Masters, WHI, 68, and Perry, WW,
264-265. Perry has written that Whitman "loved . . .
to brood upon the teachings of German philosophy. Even
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that America's poets would be "consistent with the Hegelian
formulas and consistent with modern science. "^9 In Specimen
Days he says that Hegel's system becomes "a coherent meta-
physical system . . . illuminating the thought of the uni-
verse, and satisfying the mystery thereof to the human mind,
with a more consoling scientific assurance than any yet."-*-^
Whitman transcended the German thinkers in his per-
sonalism by an appeal to the total personality rather than
to one of its component parts. As one might criticize modern
art for its barren appeal to only one or two factors of per-
sonality, so Whitman criticized the German thinkers.
While the contributions which German Kant and
Fichte and Schelling and Hegel have bequeath'
d
to humanity . . . are indispensable to the eru-
dition of America's future, I should say that
in all of them, and the best of them, when com-
pared with the lightning flashes and flights
of the old prophets and exaltes , the spiritual
poets and poetry of all lands, (as in the
Hebrew Bible,) there seems to be, nay certain-
ly is, something lacking— something cold, a
failure to satisfy the deepest emotions of the
in his early manhood he had projected a course of Sunday
evening lectures upon Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.
The misty grandiose outlines of the Hegelian philosophy
were particularly congenial to him." WW, 264. It is to
be noted, however, that Whitman was not a systematic phi-
losopher, nor a master of the systems of German philoso-
phy as was his personalis tic friend, Harris.
99. Whitman, DV, 324.
100. Whitman, SD, 225. In a footnote (226 n. ) Whitman says
that "It is strange to me that they /the formulas of
Hegel/ were born in Germany, or in the old world at
all. That is, Whitman felt, with members of the St.
Louis School and others, that Hegelian ideas were "an
essential and crowning justification of New World de-
mocracy. ..." SD, 226n.
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soul— a want of living glow, fondness, warmth,
which the old exalt es and poets supply, and
which the keenest modern philosophers so far
do not. 101
Whitman was related to the thought of many eminent
Americans. William Charming and Theodore Parker were two of
.the few purchasers of his first edition of Leaves of Grass
,
Charming having bought his copy on Emerson's recommenda-
tion. 10^ Whitman spoke in tribute of Thomas Paine on the
anniversary of the latter f s 140th birth- day. 103 He called
Jefferson the "greatest of the great."104 It is of particu-
lar significance to note here, however, that Whitman was a
friend in person and thought of Alcott, who has been dis-
cussed, and Harris, who will be considered later. Whitman
wrote, when on a visit in Concord to see Emerson and Alcott:
"Near by stopp'd at the house of W. T. Harris, the Hegelian,
who came out and we had a pleasant chat while I sat in the
wagon." 105 Whitman knew Harris well from his St. Louis vis-
it, and kept up his acquaintance by later correspondence.
The relationship between Whitman and Alcott is sig-
nificant. Whitman entitled a magazine article "Personal ism"
in 1868; 106 Alcott defined personalism in his Table Talk ,
101. Whitman, SD, 227.
102. See Perry, WW, 98.
103. See SD, 120-122. Also Masters, WHI, 266.
104. Masters, WHI, 266. Also 49.
105. Whitman, SD, 244.
106. This is the first known use of the term personalism as
applied to a philosophical system.
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published in 1877. Long before either of these dates, how-
ever, both men had exchanged ideas. Alcott visited Whitman
in New York after the first edition of the Leaves of Grass .
He wrote in his journal for October 4, 1856:
To Brooklyn, and see Walt Whitman. I pass a
couple of hours, and find him to be an extra-
ordinary person, full of brute power, certain-
ly of genius and audacity, and likely to make
his mark on Young America. ... I must meet
him again.
On November 10th of the same year he wrote: "This morn-
ing we /he was accompanied by Thoreau/108 called on Whit-
man. . . . "109 An entry on November 20th indicates that
Alcott not only visited, but drew from Whitman: "Swinton
comes and we cross to Brooklyn and dine with Whitman. I am
well paid for this visit, and bring home spoils for great
uses ." 3-10 On December 12th, Alcott wrote: "Today fair and
sunny, and I walk for two hours in the Park. Walt Vfliitman
comes, and we dine at Taylor's Saloon, discussing America,
its men and institutions." 111 An indication of the philo-
sophical nature of the discussions between these men and the
many with whom they associated is given in an entry in Al-
cott* s journal for December 28th, 1856:
107. Shepard, JOBA, 286.
108. Thoreau called Whitman "the greatest democrat the world
had seen." In a letter to Harrison Blake, quoted by
Perry, WW, 119.
109. Shepard, JOBA, 289.
110. Ibid., 291. The present author's underlining.
111. Ibid., 293.
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There is company /at the home of Samuel Long-
fellow/ in the evening and a Conversation,
Walt Whitman being the observed—he coming in
his Bloomers and behaving very becomingly,
though not at home, very plainly, in parlours,
and as hard to tame as Thoreau or any Sylvan-
us, or train in good keeping with the rest.
Longfellow, Maxwell, Rice, Mr. and Mrs. Good-
win, Miss Parmalee, Miss Sedgwick, and many
more are of the party, and the Conversation
is spirited and metaphysical . llg
Whitman, for his part, speaks of "My friend, A. B. Alcott." 113
He published an article entitled "Democracy" in December,
1867. 114 After Alcott read it, he wrote to Whitman:
The scope and spirit of your paper on Democracy
delight and satisfy me beyond all expectation,
and I write without compliment or reserve to
the man, the American Columbus, whose sagacity
has thus sounded adventurously the sea of our
Social Chaos and anchored his thought securely
in soil of the nev/ly discovered Atlantides
about which Grecian Plato died dreaming. 115
After Whitman published his "Personalism" article, 116 he
wrote to his mother on April 30th, 1868: "I received today
another letter from Old Mr. Alcott— I sent him the Galaxy
with Personalism— and he compliments me highly and speaks of
Mr. Emerson too and his friendliness to me. . . ."H* Alcott
wrote, in the letter Whitman referred to:
112. Shepard, JOBA, 294. Underlining the author's.
113. SD 242.
114. Galaxy , 4 (1867), 919-933.
115. From Concord, dated January 7, 1868. Quoted in Shep-
hard, WWP, 254-255. There may be some significance in
Alcott f s signing himself, "Personally, A. Bronson Al-
cott."
116. Galaxy , 5 (1868), 540-547.
117. CPWOW, Vol. V (or Vol. VIII. The printing is inaccur-
ate), 223.
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Yesterday came your noble paper on " Personal-
ism. "... Your thought is on the track of
empire and sees the route to Personal Powers
for the nation as for the individual, and
never a people needed more the Cosmic thought
to inspire and guide its action.
Both Alcott and Whitman were similar in disagreeing with the
hazy transcendentalism of their day. They recognized the re-
ality of the individual without losing the sense of social
solidarity. The concrete was not, to them, a nebulous ide-
alism tinged with Oriental impersonalism, but a precise per-
sonalism closer to Bowne's type than to absolutism or pan-
theism.
c. Chief Personal is tic Ideas.
It is evident that Whitman was personalis tic in his
concern for a person- centered educational system, in his
ceaseless struggle for the rights of labor and the abolition
of slavery, and in his passion for American democracy. He
wrote of slaves: "Where others see a slave, a pariah, an emp-
tier of privies, the Poet beholds what, when the days of the
118. Quoted by Clifton Purness in an unpublished biography
of Whitman, chp. XVIII, 28. Also in Purness, Art.
(1942), 559. It is important to know that both the
magazine articles, "Democracy" and "Personalism" were
later combined and changed so as to be more personal-
istic, to form Whitman's celebrated Democratic Vistas ,
first published in 1871. Not even the official ten
volume work of Whitman's prose contains these articles
in their separate and original form.
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soul are accomplished, shall be the peer of God." 119 Regard-
ing democracy, Whitman wrote: "To practically enter into
politics is an important part of American personalism.
"
120
Other areas of Whitman's thought also indicate his
personalism. Nature, an expression of God, is significant
only in relation to man. "Man, so diminutive, dilates be-
yond the sensible universe, competes with, outcopes space
and time, mediating even one great idea." 121 Further, in
the "Kosmos," "there is moral purpose:" 122 "The world, the
race, the soul— in space and time the universes, all bound
as is befitting each— all surely going somewhere." 123
So, too, his aesthetics was person- centered. "Ameri-
ca," he wrote, "demands a poetry that is bold, modern, and
all- surrounding and kosmical. ... It must place in the van,
and hold up at all hazards, the banner of the divine pride
of man in himself. 1,124 Every aesthetic experience must grip
the entire person; the object must reveal reality. "The
literature, songs, esthetics, &c, of a country," he wrote,
"are of importance principally because they furnish the ma-
terials and suggestions of personality. . . ," 125
119. Whitman, Ant i- slavery notes. Quoted by Purness, WWW,
83.
120. Whitman, Art. (1868), 544.
121. Whitman, DV, 322.
122. Ibid., 323.
123. Whitman, from "Going Somewhere," in LOG, 397.
124. Whitman, DV, 315.
125. Whitman, Art. (1868), 540. In a later footnote to this
sentence, when it became part of Democratic Vistas , he
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Whitman knew no religious training in his home; he
distrusted creeds and forms; yet he was deeply religious.
Religion develops the "whole man." 126 "Personalism fuses"
and "favors" the elevation of "one f s isolated Self" to "reach
the divine levels." 127 God is personal. Finite persons are
sacred, free, and immortal. Death is to be welcomed. "I
swear I think there is nothing but immortality," he wrote. 128
Finally, with great zest, he sang: "I will cling fast to
Thee, 0 God, though the waves buffet me, Thee, Thee at least
I know." 129
Whitman, more than any other personalist, identified
personalism with the genius of America. He is the poet of
democracy, 13^ the chanter of personal opportunity and respon-
sibility, the zestful proclaimer of a new humanism. 131 He
prophetically sings:
The New World, including in itself, and, In-
deed, founded upon, the all-levelling aggregate
added: "After the rest is satiated, all interest culmi-
nates in the field of persons, and never flags there."
Whitman, DV, 293n. This would indicate that Whitman's
personalism was continually growing.
126. Whitman, DV, 319n.
127. Whitman, Art. (1868), 544.
128. Whitman, in "To Think of Time," LOG, 337.
129. Whitman, in "Prayer of Columbus," LOG, 324.
130. It has been pointed out that "Whitman is the announcer
of a democratic metaphysics . His democracy means a
cosmic democracy, far surpassing the merely political
meaning." See Beck, Art. (1942), 20.
131. Flewelling, thinking of the increased recognition of
personality through Bowne. called him "the morning star
of this greater humanism." Flewelling, Art. (1922),
379.
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of Democracy, we show it also including the all-
varied, all-permit ting, all-free theorem of In-
dividuality, and erecting therefor a lofty and
hitherto unoccupied framework or platform of
Personalism
. . . Religious, possessing the idea
of the Infinite
. . . realizing, above the rest,
that known humanity, in deepest sense, is fair
adhesion to Itself, for purposes beyond— and
that, finally, the theme, great as it is, of the
Personality of mortal life is most important
with reference to the immortal, the Unknown, the
Spiritual, the only permanently real, which, as
the ocean waits for and receives the rivers,
waits for us each and all. 132
5. Thomas Davidson (1840-1900).
Thomas Davidson, called a modern Socrates by William
James, and one of the twelve most learned men of the world
at the time of his death, 135 advocated pluralistic idealism,
a form of personalism. He was a masterful scholar and rig-
orous thinker, having been thoroughly trained in philosophy,
the social sciences, and literature, as well as possessing
unusual skill in using "all languages." His pluralism,
although greatly influenced by Rosmini, 134 is strikingly
similar to Howison 1 s. In fact, Howison, who knew him per-
132. Whitman, Art. (1868). 547.
133. Bakewell, Art. (1901), 440, and Moore, Art. (1925), v.
134. Davidson wrote, in a letter to Howison from Rome, "I go
up to the Simplon Pass, or rather to Domo d'Ossola, a
little place on the side of it, where I shall spend at
least two months, studying the philosophy of Rosmini
with the learned fathers there. . . . You could not do
better than join me there. ... I believe I have dis-
covered the philosophy of the future, that of Ros-
mini. . . . Rosmini is your man above anything." Quoted
in Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 94-95.
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sonally as well as through his writings, said they agreed in
their pluralism, and Charles M. Bakewell, a friend of both,
classes them together as personal idealists. 135
a. Davidson 1 s General Thought and Life.
Davidson opposed both materialism and supernatural ism.
He advocated the metaphysical reality of every person, and
saved his uncompromising pluralism from chaos by postulating
a divine community of eternal selves. He wrote: "The world
consists of a multitude of sentient individuals or atoms,
whose unity is their sentience. nl36 His concern for the in-
dividual self is further evidenced by his statement, "The
only thing of spiritual value is self-possession." 13,7 Again,
he wrote that "the immanent purpose of evolution is the
realization of free individuals, that is, moral personali-
ties." 13^ Those who knew Davidson and his ideas corroborate
the view that he was a personalis t in spirit and in thought.
William Knight wrote:
Davidson's philosophy was both individualistic
135. See Bakewell, Art. (1940), 623, and Howison, LOE, 420.
136. Davidson, Art. (1899), 30.
137. In a letter to Havelock Ellis, quoted in Knight, MOTD,
42.
138. Davidson, HOE, v. This is precisely the thought of
Howison and is somewhat akin to the view of Bowne.
Davidson strenuously opposed all pantheism, or absolu-
tism, including Hegel ianism, and hence is contrary in
thought to the view of personalism expressed by Calkins.
These three thinkers will be discussed later.
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and pluralistic. When experience is analyzed
we find a unity within the plurality; and in
that unity is found, and out of it may be de-
duced, a theism of which the evidence is clear
and the outcome stable. 139
Again, Knight wrote, in referring to the psychological, meta-
physical, and ethical teaching of Davidson:
Very early in life he saw that "man's chief
end" (as his Scottish catechism put it) was
the attainment of knowledge, insight, and
freedom,— the realization of what is true,
and beautiful, and good; but he also saw that
this had to be conjoined with the realization
of an equally supreme good or "chief end" by
others, that is to say, by the community. It
was this double or twin conviction, more than
anything else, that dominated his whole life. 140
Morris Cohen wrote in the same vein of Davidson's philosophy:
"He regarded the individual man as a holy temple, and be-
lieved that nothing in the universe was holier." 141
Davidson's life was as interesting and individualis-
tic as his thought. 142 He was born October 25, 1840, in
Aberdeenshire, Scotland, of humble parents who were sturdy
peasants of deep piety. He went to school in his native
town, and at the age of sixteen entered King's College, Aber-
deen, on a four-year scholarship which he had won. He was
fond of books from the first, and soon developed the careful
habits of exact scholarship. After his student days he
139. Knight, MOTD, 7.
140. Ibid., 7.
141. Morris R. Cohen, Art. (1907), 87.
142. See Charles M. Bakewell, Art. (1901), and also Art.
(1930).
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taught as rector of Old Aberdeen Grammar School for three
years. From there, he went to London, then taught in Canada
at the Collegiate Institute of London, Ontario, and finally
came to the United States. He spent some time in Boston,
but then made his way to St. Louis where he joined that dis-
tinguished St. Louis group of philosophers under the leader-
ship of William T. Harris. It will be recalled that this
early center of American philosophy had influenced, and had
been influenced by, many personalists
,
viz., Harris, Alcott,
Whitman, and Howison. Bakewell writes of Davidson's rela-
tionship to the St. Louis philosophers, "The influence of
this group was profound and lasting, although Davidson could
never find anything in Hegel."143
Davidson 1 s relationship to the personalists did not
cease when he left St. Louis for Boston. In fact, one can
think they may have been strengthened, among other influ-
ences, by his relations with Borden Parker Bowne. William
James wrote in a letter of reminiscences after the death of
Davidson, that he had first seen Davidson in Boston in 1874.
At that time I saw most of him at a little
philosophical club which used to meet (often
at his rooms in Temple Street) every fort-
night. Other members were W. T. Harris,
G. H. Howison, J. E. Cabot, C. C. Everett,
B. P. Browne,^44 an(j sometimes G. H. Palmer. 145
143. Bakewell, Art. (1930), 96.
144. He means Borden Parker Bowne. See Moore, Art. (1925),
ix-x.
145. James, Art. (1907), 111.
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Davidson also associated with some of these men at the Con-
cord Summer School, which met in Alcott's barn, and later in
his own school at Parmington, Connecticut.
This eminent thinker has been called a wandering
scholar for the simple reason that his mode of life was to
travel and study six months out of every year. He lectured,
wrote, and taught privately to earn his livelihood, but su-
premely enjoyed liberty and "the life of a free lance." In
fact, he would have been invited to the chair of Greek phil-
osophy at Harvard University had he not offended the Greek
department by a criticism of its methods just as James was
to advocate his cause. 146 Davidson might not have fitted
into an academic mold, however, for he was distrustful of
"mediaeval ism" in universities and preferred to work with
students who were concerned with knowledge and wisdom rather
than those whose chief desire was academic credit. Always
practical, he was particularly happy to teach the "bread-win-
ners in the East Side of New York." He took an active inter-
est in the London Fabian Society and founded the Fellowship
of the New Life in London and then in New York. He was al-
ways an individualist, a "born dissenter" who "could not and
would not fit into any niche."147 How then can he be termed
a personalis t? The answer has been partially suggested. To
146. James, Art. (1907), 111-112.
147. Bakewell, Art. (1930), 96.
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answer it more fully, his philosophy will be further consid-
ered.
b. The Real.
Reality, for Davidson, is to be thought of as an ideal
world of sentient individuals, interrelated through rational-
ity, feeling, and action. His strong emphasis upon "feeling"
was a result of both the influence of Rosmini and his reac-
tion against the importance of reason in Hegelian absolutism.
Individuality was lost in universalized thought; consequent-
ly, to maintain a rigorous pluralism, feeling was emphasized
as the basic fact in experience. To avoid the charge of sub-
jectivism to which this view might lead, Davidson suggested
first, that individuals act upon each other through desire,
and second, that a moral social ideal exists which gives di-
rection and purpose to individual activity. That is to say,
knowledge is not completely individual. If it were, it
would be a "series of individual impressions, indistinguish-
able from hallucinations." Knowledge is, rather, built out
of universal human experience. Each individual creates his
own world in harmony with all other selves. Davidson ex-
pressed it, in part: "I am the sentient unity of a sensible
world. "148 He went on to indicate that the many "I's n or
148. Quoted by Bakewell, Art. (1901), 450.
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selves are individuated realities eternally formed in rela-
tion to the Supreme Individual, God, He says:
You and I are eternal forms, whose inexhaust-
ible taste with reference to each other is to
penetrate each other through inexhaustible love
and knowledge.
. . . God is the loving, knowing
interpretation of eternal forms ... He is the
ideality of which we are the reality ... He
is the *law of being, f and in that law we live
and move and have our being. 149
In this pluralistic system, God and man are not placed
over against each other; they are correlates. "There cannot
be a man without a God; and man is as necessary to God as
God is to man. "I50 Both, or all personalities, are essen-
tial to each other in a pluralistic personal universe. Man
is man "because he has in him that divine form." Hence he
is free, but not in the usual sense of actual freedom. 'Man
is potentially free, i.e., he is free so long as he actual-
izes the divine form in himself. He is free, then, only in
so far as he frees himself. By so freeing himself man par-
ticipates in a moral order, a world of eternal beings who
have "their root and origin in one Eternal Being of infinite
perfection" who is "at once their deepest form and necessar-
ily, therefore, their goal. 111^
Man is also immortal. The process of achieving per-
fection is an everlasting one, for the goal cannot be
149. Davidson, in a letter to Havelock Ellis, quoted in
Knight, MOTD, 41.
150. Daley, Art. (1907), 78.
151. Davidson, Art. (1907), 207.
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reached in time. In a letter to Morris R. Cohen, Davidson
wrote:
You must come to see that there is no world at
all without you . . . you have existed from all
eternity. You are not conscious in deep sleep;
yet you are and feel , else you couldn't be
waked.
. . . 'Before Abraham was, I AM' said
Jesus of Nazareth. It is a great satisfaction
to be thoroughly convinced of one's immortali-
ty; and one may easily be so who thinks logi-
cally.
That this was an abiding conviction with Davidson is attest-
ed by the fact that he wrote, in a letter to some of his
young friends when he faced death in 1899, "Death is but an
incident in an eternal career. "153
c. Social Philosophy.
Davidson, as previously suggested, was preeminently
practical. His speculative thinking, therefore, was for the
primary purpose of elevating society to high levels of social
experience. The individual which is sacred and eternal must
be served by all existing institutions, rather than serving
them. Davidson was a champion of democracy, as were the per-
sonalists Alcott and Whitman before him, for the simple rea-
son that democracy expressed his pluralistic philosophy by
placing authority in the individual, while at the same time
recognizing that the highest values are achieved by social
152. Quoted in Knight, MOTD, 143-144.
153. Davidson, EAWB, 57.

58
co-operation, Davidson wrote regarding this:
Progress in social life is proportioned to the
number of persons whose claim to be considered
ends in themselves, and to share in all the
fruits of civilization, is acknowledged and
furthered by each member of society; progress
in political life to the number whose claim
is supported by the state, and the former
progress is the condition of the latter. It
follows that Democracy, in which the claims of
all to the dignity and inheritance of humanity
are sustained, is the perfect form of politi-
cal life,— the ideal after which it must con-
tinually strive. 154
One can readily believe that Davidson spent his life plead-
ing for economic justice, political freedom, and equality of
educational opportunity. His social philosophy began and
ended with the supreme importance of every person. It was
for this reason that he distrusted status quo educational
institutions, opposed German imperialism, and was dissatis-
fied with Victorian England. 155 It was also due to his so-
cial concern for persons that he organized the Fellowship of
the New Life in London and in New York, and lectured to the
•bread-winners" in New York. Davidson advocated in one of
his lectures to the Fellowship of the New Life the need of a
sounder political economy based on the recognition of man's
spiritual nature. He based his entire thought on two assump-
tions. First, human life does not consist of material pos-
sessions. Second, life consists of free spiritual activity,
154. Davidson, Art. (1896), 460.
155. See Davidson, Art. (1897
)
3
.
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of which, in this world at least, material possession is an
essential condition. 156 He went on to say that the remedy
for both present and future evils lay in enlightening the
public. The first step in doing this is the
casting-aside of our present immoral and self-
ish political economy, our present views re-
garding the nature and uses of wealth, and the
replacing of them by an economy which places
in the foreground the moral aspects of every
economic question, and considers wealth sole-
ly as a means for the advancement of man as
man, in all virtues and perfections. 157
As a world traveller, Davidson was familiar with the
social conditions of many nations of the v/orld, and was out-
spoken in denouncing desecration of personality, and in laud-
ing the enthronement of man wherever either occurred. He
caustically criticized the authoritarianism of the Holy Ro-
man Empire under the control of the Popes and the attempts
of Germany to emulate its pattern of autocratic power.
He welcomed the "democratization of England" while pointing
out that the nation still needed
a firm, impregnable conviction of the worth,
independence, and eternity of the individual
soul, with such a view of man's destiny as
shall make the things of this material v/orld
assume their true position, certainly impor-
tant enough, as mere means to the end of an
immortal personality. 159
When "plucky little Greece" was under the heel of "barbarous"
156. Davidson, MAEQ,, 1.
157. Ibid., 23.
158. Davidson, Art. (1897) 1 .
159. Davidson, Art. (1896), 469.
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Turkey and "despotic" Russia, Davidson pleaded for the in-
tervention of the United States of America. One can well
imagine his position today in regard to the nation in which
the teachings of Plato are forbidden by the Nazi, 160 for he
wrote in 1897:
We can give Greece our moral and material sup-
port. V/e can rouse the free spirit that ani-
mates our people and let it find expression
through the press, through public resolutions,
through motions in the national Senate and
House of Representatives, and finally, in for-
mal encouragement and protest expressed through
the chief of the Executive and his foreign min-
isters. ... If v/e follow this course, which
is our simple duty to humanity, we shall find
a warm response from the great popular heart
of the elder continent, and rouse a healthy
public opinion that will cow tyrants, paralyze
bullies, and wipe out the ignominy of Europe
ere she have to blush in the light of a new
century. 161
Finally, Davidson criticized the whole structure of "civili-
zation" in the "present epoch" because it inhumanly uses man
as a tool rather than as an end. In an article entitled
"Aristocracy and Humanity," Davidson summed up his entire
social philosophy by denouncing the aristocratic spirit of
selfishness and barbarism and pleading for a new humanity.
The task of "our epoch," he wrote, is to place the human
world "upon the broad basis of simple humanity, whose apex
160. Dr. Andre Michalopoulos, Greek minister of information,
has stated: "Under the Germans it is forbidden to teach
the philosophy of Plato in the land of his birth."
Quoted in The Kansas City Star , November 2, 1942.
161. Davidson, Art. {1^91)^7^^*
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is moral worth. " 16<J
d. Philosophy of Education.
Education was the method by which Davidson hoped to
attain the "chief good" for each member of the pluralistic
universe, and thereby, the summum bonum for all. He "spent
his life in the effort to uplift men by supplying a sound,
aimful education"; 163 he was convinced that it was through
education that one attained moral freedom, social justice,
and the higher values of spiritual life. He felt that socie
ty was "unspiritual, " "ignorant," and "frivolous," and hence
he attempted as did his close friends, Alcott, Harris, and
Howison, to overcome these shortcomings with "missionary
zeal." He was specific in his requirements for the content
of education, 164 but it suffices to say here, that he be-
lieved every person ought to know the summit facts of human
experience, possess "healthy, well-distributed affections,"
and possess a will that is loyal to such knowledge and affec
tions.
Education ought to aim at producing free, self-direct
ing persons who are "ready and able to act intelligently,
nobly, and strongly in all the affairs of life." 165 It
162. Davidson, Art. (1887), 165.
163. Bakewell, Art. (1701), 452-453.
164. See Davidson, Art. (1894), 575-581.
165. Ibid., 580.
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should enable one to realize in himself the "free humanity
which has been the aim of the 'travail of the ages.'" When
one reaches this ideal by training his intelligence, his af-
fections, and his will, he "places himself in a normal rela-
tion to himself and the universe," and he finds "himself in
the persistent attitude of love and worship which alone con-
fers consecration and blessedness on life." 1^6
Several things are involved in developing a personal-
istic system of education suitable to "eternal spirits."
Davidson is quite specific here also. Such education in-
volves first of all the recognition that the child being edu-
cated is "eternal," "superior to time, space, and causation,
and, therefore, free." Second, the aim of education must be
a "Weltanschauung . " The teacher must impart the whole, and
"the whole regarded as one, coherent universe-process of in-
teracting spirits advancing to ever higher attainments."
Third, one must learn that the universe is "knowable, lov-
able, modifiable."-1-6 ''' Fourth, the national government ought
to be a "central seat of learning," for "Education is surely
as important as Agriculture." Fifth, education must be
broad and deep for the masses; one must learn to earn both a
livelihood and to attain civic culture. Finally, teachers
166. See Davidson, Art. (1894), 581.
167. At this point Davidson is attacking naturalistic educa-
tion that teaches men to feed their bodies, but starve
their souls so that they "hanker after the husks that
the swine eat."

63
must be better educated and possess a more unselfish inter-
est in teaching. 168 It is Davidson 1 s profound conviction
that if those who educate the young were cognizant of the
metaphysical worth of each individual personality and the
relationship between them as "interacting spirits,"
poverty, vice, and degradation would, in large
measure, disappear, giving place to well-being,
virtue, and nobility. There is no more patri-
otic work than this; for it is not amid the
thunders of the battle-field, where men slay
their fellowmen, that the noblest civic lau-
rels are won, but in the quiet school-room,
where devoted patriots, men and women, combine
to slay misery, meanness, and corruption.
Davidson thus adds much to the cumulative deposit of
personalistic philosophy in the history of American thought.
He held to the metaphysical reality of the individual and of
God, was concerned to build a society that enthroned "spir-
itual" man, and advocated a personality- centered educational
system as the instrument by which to achieve such a goal.
He was not the churchman that Samuel Johnson and Jonathan
Edwards were, yet he had a distinct philosophy of religion
in which he held to the sacredness of the individual and the
ideality of a personal God. He was broader in background
than either Alcott or Whitman, yet at one with them in plead-
ing for a person- centered civilization. He held, with both
of them, to what has later been called an organic pluralism,
168. These six factors and direct quotations regarding educa-
tion are taken from Davidson, HOE, 254-276.
169. Davidson, HOE, 275-276.

although he was perhaps closer to Whitman in his fervor for
democracy. Of the five men considered thus far, he was in
many ways the most learned. His close relationship to the
St. Louis Group, the Concord School of Philosophy, and the
philosophical circles of Boston make him a strong connecting
link between Alcott and Whitman on the one hand, and on the
other, William Torrey Harris, the next thinker to be consid-
ered, George Holmes Howison, and Borden Parker Bowne.
6. William Torrey Harris (1835-1909).
William Torrey Harris contributed to the growth of
personalism in America by opposing the developing naturalism
of his day, by maintaining that self- activity is a presuppo-
sition of all experience, and by holding that Reality itself
is cosmic self-activity. An extremely able thinker, Harris
became a man of great influence in American philosophy and
education. It has been said of his influence, however, that
"hardly any American philosopher was more widely acclaimed
in his own time; hardly any is so little read today."170
Harris was born on a farm near the village of North
Killingly, Connecticut, in 1835. His education was not very
thorough nor systematic. He was dissatisfied with the
schools in Providence, Rhode Island, hence attended acade-
170. Bates, Art. (1932), 330.

65
mies at Woodstock, Connecticut, Worcester, Massachusetts,
and Andover, Massachusetts, as well as two lesser ones. He
entered Yale in 1854, but left dissatisfied after his junior
year to teach in the public schools of St. Louis, Missouri.
Great importance, however, may be attached to one event in
his life at Yale; he heard Alcott lecture there in March of
1857 on Plato and Plotinus. This experience was "the turn-
ing point of his intellectual career," and he became "the
most ardent" and "the ablest interpreter of Alcott ! s
thought." In fact, he had Alcott come to St. Louis to
"share views" with his new-found philosophical friends the
next year. 1
*71 Harris rose rapidly in St. Louis to become
the city superintendent of the schools in 1868.
It was in St. Louis that Harris developed his philos-
ophy. There he met Henry C. Brokmeyer, a believer in the
idea of "self-determination as the ultimate principle of the
universe, 1,1,72 Thomas Davidson, who held to pluralistic ideal-
ism, Denton J. Snider, a philosophic "neutral," and later,
George H. Howison, who became a vigorous exponent of person-
171. See Shepard, PP, 466-467, 472, and 502. Shepard has
also written: "Alcott . . . was a main influence in the
intellectual awakening of William T. Harris . • . Al-
cott was partly responsible for the fact that by the
year 1900 there was a philosophy dominating the Ameri-
can universities and colleges which he himself had been
quite unable to understand." PP, 484.
172. Quoted from Brokmeyer »s diary by Perry, Art. (1936),
30.
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al Idealism. 173 Harris was the moving spirit of the group
which founded the St. Louis Philosophical Society although
Brokmeyer was its originator. The Society began with a sys-
tematic study of Hegel and shared his spirit. The influence
of Harris is evidenced by the fact that he kept the "commun-
ity stirred up over philosophy." The group he headed "prac-
tically inaugurated the philosophical movement in the United
States."174 In 1867 Harris founded the Journal of Specula-
tive Philosophy , which was "the first philosophical periodi-
cal in the English language and is probably more significant
in the annals of American philosophy than any other publica-
tion." 175 The Journal continued until 1893, when it was
succeeded by the Philosophical Review .
Harris continued his work in St. Louis until 1880,
when he became identified with the Concord School of Philoso-
phy. Nine years later he was appointed United States Commis-
sioner of Education, a position he held with distinction
until 1906. Along with lecturing, writing, and administra-
tive work, Harris edited Appleton f s International Education-
al Series, Webster 1 s New International Dictionary of the
English Language , and was assistant editor of Johnson 1 s New
Universal Cyclopedia . He was a man of many pursuits, one
173. See Perry, SLM, for an able treatment of the St. Louis
School.
174. Evans, Art. (1936), 5.
175. Townsend, PIUS, 120.
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whose "life and works are a precious inheritance to which
the American people • . . can profitably appeal."176
a. Psychology.
Harris began his psychology with the idea that self-
activity is the "great central fact to be kept in view in
the study of the mind," 17,7 a view that was also held by
Jonathan Edwards. Self-activity is necessary in order to
explain feeling and thinking. Further, imagination and fan-
cy, memory and anticipation, and freedom and volition all
depend on the self. "The self is the principle of the proc-
ess of reaction against the environment and of the activity
of reproduction and synthesis." 17^ The mind-body problem
resolves itself into a relationship between mechanical ac-
tion and "vital" action. The latter "originates and guides"
the former. 17^ The question of freedom solves itself, for
"self-activity is freedom." 1^0 Finally, the importance of
the will is seen in the fact that it is a
self-determining power, uniting itself with the
intellect in the ascending series of attention,
analysis, synthesis, reflection, and insight,
/and/ approaches at each step nearer and nearer
to an adequate knowledge of itself. 181
176. Perry, Art. (1936), 48.
177. Harris, PFOE, 23.
178. Ibid., 205.
179. Ibid., 91.
180. Ibid., 118.
181. Ibid., 246-247.
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b. Epistemology.
Harris suggested that philosophy must deal with "the
forms of sense perception, of reflection, of speculative
knowing, and the very forms which condition being, or exist-
ence itself." 182 One of the most important of these ques-
tions is that of knowledge. Here again the factor of self-
activity is basic; it is "the most important conclusion
reached in this higher kind of knowing."183 Harris arrived
at what seems to be his theory of knowledge in dealing with
the "psychology of science and philosophy." He reached the
conclusion that there are five intentions of the mind.
First, there is sense perception, the rudimentary form of
knowing. In this stage there is union of the pure ego and
the sense-object. The second intention "contemplates the
universals, classes or genera." Third, the mind utilizes a
first principle to discover the unity of all universals.
The fourth intention of the mind is scepticism. It breaks
the connection between the mind and truth, and reveals the
inadequacies of the third stage. The fifth step follows the
dialectical movement, by refuting the sceptical fourth, to
establish philosophy, or knowledge, on the firm basis that
"consciousness presupposes an absolute ego or person." The
fifth intention "sees that reason is absolute person, includ-
182. Harris, SOP, 12.
183. Harris, PFOE, 243.
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ing subject and object." 184 Harris recognizes his indebted-
ness to Hegel by pointing out that this was Hegel's "Voyage
of Discovery." One begins with empty being and ends "with
ethical personality as the absolute." 185 His epistemology
thus led to his metaphysics of the Absolute.
c. Metaphysics.
Harris defined philosophy as "not a science of things
in general, but a science that investigates the presupposi-
tions of experience, and discovers the nature of the first
principle." 186 This first principle is "Self-Activity,
"
often spoken of as "Absolute Reason," "God," the "Creator,"
an "absolutely universal ego." It is self-activity as con-
sciousness and will that is necessary to explain causality,
motion, change, space, time, and the existence of the physi-
cal world; it makes "the existence of the world possible." 18
Harris wrote:
In causality there is absolute unity— self- cause
being the source of both matter and form in the
world. Self- activity is an a priori condition,
not only of all changes, but also of time and
space themselves. 188
184. Harris, PFOE, 397.
185. Ibid., 399-400.
186. Harris, SOP, 11.
187. Harris, Art. (1883), 310.
188. Ibid., 305. It follows that man is a self-active indi-
vidual. Harris indicated how important he thought the
subject to be by devoting two hundred and thirty-one
pages to it in SOP.
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d. Philosophy of Education.
Harris began his educational career when he was twen-
ty-two years of age, in St. Louis, and spent the last seven-
teen years of his life, save the three he lived after retire-
ment, as the United States Commissioner of Education. During
these years he was especially related to the progressive edu-
cational ideas of Alcott and Davidson, and with Whitman and
Howison put persons at the center of the educational process.
He was not necessarily an "educational pioneer, hut he was a
great expositor of the best that was already known and
thought in his field." 189 He defined education broadly
enough to include the "four cardinal institutions of civili-
zation—family, civil society, state, and church." He is
specifically credited with having correlated the various
studies into five of equal value, a step forward in the uni-
fication of all instruction, and also with being the first
to make the kindergarten a part of the public school system
of the United States. He inaugurated the latter into his
system in St. Louis in 1873. 190 The eminent American educa-
tor, Nicholas Murray Butler, has written of Harris:
For a long generation before 1904 the dominating
force in American public education was William
Torrey Harris. ... On the platform of the Na-
tional Education Association, before the Nation-
al Council of Education and the Department of
189. Eates, Art. (1932), 329.
190. See Munroe, HOE, 636 and 673. Also Cubberley, HOE, 426.
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Superintendence, before state and local meetings
and teacher f s institutes without number, for
nearly forty years Dr. Harris poured forth, with
pen as well as by voice, in forms that teachers
could understand and apply, the results of his
experience and of his sustained, his subtle and
his exceptionally powerful thinking.
. . . He
was the one real, inspiring force in American
public education with an influence and an au-
thority that were truly nation-wide. 19!
Harris maintained that philosophy is basic for educa-
tion; it alone "discovers Personality in the Absolute, and
immortality and freedom in men," ideas which in turn "make
possible our civilization." 192 The key to his theory of edu-
cation was, therefore, the idea of self- activity, or the ob-
jectification of the self until it finally becomes related
to the absolute self. The finite self is causative, crea-
tive, and self-conscious. It recognizes its own individu-
ality, and goes on to recognize ideals, as brutes do not.
Then by means of a combining and organizing power man con-
structs "for himself another set of conditions than those in
which he finds himself."193 Education is, consequently, the
process by which one elevates himself from sense perception
to "insight into the personal nature of the absolute."194
e. Aesthetics.
Man attains communion with the highest life through
191. Quoted by Perry, SLM, 51.
192. Harris, Art. (PCU), 102.
193. Harris, PFOE, 307-308.
194. Ibid., 9.
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art, which "makes the invisible visible"; 195 assumes reason
to be ultimate, and reveals the "Personal Creator." "Mat-
ter becomes a work of art when made to manifest self- activi-
ty. " 196 The lowest form of art is that which appeals merely
to the senses; the highest is that which aspires to the " su-
per sensuous . " Sensuous elements are evidenced in regularity,
symmetry, and harmony. Elements of the supersensuous are
discovered as the art transcends time and space. The arts,
therefore, ascend a scale as follows: architecture, sculp-
ture, painting, music, and poetry. Poetry "unites in itself
all the others"; 19 ''' it most perfectly transcends the sensu-
ous, expresses self-activity, and reveals the absolute per-
sonality.
f . Philosophy of Religion.
Harris was essentially religious. "The philosophy of
religion," he wrote, "must be acknowledged on all hands as
the most important work of the human intellect." 198 Further,
"the only way to bring more harmony between human actions
and the teachings of religion is to associate religion with
philosophy." 199 God, for Harris, is a revealed God, a con-
195. Harris, SOP, 233.
196. Harris, PFOE, xxxiii.
197. Ibid., 373.
198. Harris, SOP, 239.
199. Harris, quoted by Schaub in Art. (1936), 56.
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scious, intelligent being. 200 "The divine Being is perfect
in form, and its influence gives a tendency in the universe
toward the survival of whatever reaches personality.
"
201
Men are created to participate in the self-activity of God,
and they "have the possibility of infinitely growing into it
by their own free activity." 202 It follows that nature re-
veals infinite goodness, and "man must have a divine desti-
ny." Finally, "human consciousness is self-activity in the
form of free and immortal personality." 203
Throughout Harris 1 fruitful life in positions of edu-
cational leadership he exerted great influence for idealism
which was essentially personalistic. Influenced by Alcott
and enriched by friendships and an interplay of thought,
among a host of others, with Davidson, Whitman, and Howison,
Harris was a voice for personalism in the St. Louis Group,
the Concord School, and, as the United States Commissioner
of Education, the entire nation. His emphasis upon self-ac-
tivity in all fields of philosophy enabled him to strengthen
the central position of the self in psychology, epistemology,
metaphysics, philosophy of education, aesthetics, and phi-
losophy of religion. As an educator he was especially con-
cerned with directing individuals to mastery of the arts and
200. Harris, SOP, 240.
201. Ibid., 170.
202. Ibid., 171.
203. Ibid., 166.
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sciences and, beyond that, to "insight into the personal na-
ture of the absolute."
7. Josiah Royce (1855-1916).
Josiah Royce made a contribution to personalism by
maintaining that reality is an Absolute Person including the
community of all the individuals and nature within its expe-
rience. This distinguished thinker, who has been called the
"most brilliant American idealist," was closely related to
many personalis ts of the United States. He counted Whitman
among those "who glorify personal initiative,"204 wrote for
Harris* Journal of Speculative Philosophy and called Harris 1
Hegel f s Logic "a scholarly exposition," 205 exchanged views
often with Howison, was the beloved teacher of Calkins, and
wrote of Bowne: "I suppose that our agreements were rather
on the increase toward the end of his work. I always prized
him much."206 Cell has indeed accurately written: "Royces
System ist als personalistischer Absolutismus zu bezeich-
nen.
"
207 It is significant that as Howison, a personalist
204. Royce, POL, 98.
205. Royce, SOMP, 479.
206. Quoted by Brightman, Art. (1922), 370.
207. Cell, Art. (1928), 385. Cunningham agrees with this in-
terpretation of Royce. He has written: "The development
of the idealistic argument speedily led to a personalis-
tic emphasis. . . . Royce . . . tends to emphasize the
integrity of the finite individual more explicitly than
do his absolutistic British colleagues. ..." Cunning-
ham, IA, 302. See also Knudson, POP, 32-33, and McCon-
nell, BPB, 132-133.
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to be considered in some detail later, dedicated his chief
book "to all who feel a deep concern for the dignity of the
soul," so a group of eminent idealists dedicated Contempo -
rary Idealism in America : "To the memory of Josiah Royce who
proclaimed the dignity of the human spirit."208
Royce was born in 1855 in Grass Valley, a California
mining town. His parents, English by birth, had crossed the
continent during the "gold rush" days of 1849. Royce was
brought up amid the hardship and uncertainty of a frontier
community. His early schooling was at the hands of his
mother, who organized and taught a small school. He went to
San Francisco to grammar school, took preparatory instruc-
tion in Oakland, and matriculated at the then young Univer-
sity of California at Berkeley, where Howison later enjoyed
a fruitful career. No formal philosophical instruction was
given there in those early days, yet Royce received some
philosophical stimulation from Joseph LeConte, the geologist,
who was later a close friend and admirer of Howison. Royce
spent the next year in Europe listening to Lotze, Wundt, and
Windelband, as well as studying Kant, Schopenhauer and
others. He was considerably influenced, as were the person-
alists Ward, Ladd, Howison, and Bowne, by Lotze. After his
return to America, he received his Ph.D. in 1878 at Johns
Hopkins University. There he was influenced chiefly by
208. Barrett, CIIA, v.

76
Charles Pelrce. He then taught English at the University of
California for four years. Under the influence of William
James he came as a teacher to Harvard University in 1882.
There he remained the rest of his life exerting a profound
influence upon American philosophy, and especially upon a
later personalist, Mary Whiton Calkins. 209 The personal is-
tic elements in Royce's thinking are seen mainly in his meta-
physics and his philosophy of religion, the two fields in
which he was chiefly interested, and the areas of thought in
which he did his most creative work.
a. Metaphysics.
It will be well to note, before stating Royce f s idea
of the absolute, nature, time, and selfhood, that he makes a
sharp distinction between two types of human knowledge, the
"descriptive" and the "appreciative." The former relates to
knowledge of the physical world and the latter to knowledge
of facts of experience for a Self. The human self becomes
aware of itself by its relationship to other selves. Royce
is continually concerned with this problem of the individual
within a larger whole, a greater community, the absolute.
For him this is basically a social universe, yet the individ-
209. For succinct and scholarly statements of Royce »s life
and works see Perry, Art. (1935), 205-211, and Palmer,
Art. (1932), 3-9.

ual has reality. It has been said, because of Royce f s idea
of community, that his philosophy "must be called a social
metaphysics of religion." 210 The world of description is
never the whole truth; it must be "interpreted in terms of
the World of Appreciation."
Royce 1 s central metaphysical idea is that reality is
Absolute Personality. In an essay on "The Implications of
Self-Consciousness" he wrote, "the Infinite is unquestion-
ably a Person, and this Person is as unquestionably the
world-possessor." 211 Part of this possessed world is physi-
cal nature. For the Absolute, nature is merely phenomenal,
yet it has meaning for finite selves in that it is used for
the development of "human arts" and "the predictions of sci-
ence." Nature is real for us "in precisely the sense in
which our fellow-men are real," i.e., as an object of expe-
rience. 212 The problem of time is solved on the basis of
selfhood; time is transcended by an "Eternal Consciousness."
The self attempts complete expression in time, yet wins it
finally only in its eternity of oneness with the Divine.
The self, however, maintains its eternal individuality and
freedom as a moral agent. "We have no other dwelling-place
but the single unity of the divine consciousness."213
210. Paul E. Johnson, in his unpublished dissertation,
Josiah Royce ' a Philosophy of Religion , 146.
211. Royce, GE, 141
.
212. Royce, WAI, II, 236.
213. Royce, WAI, I, 427.
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b. Philosophy of Religion.
Royce is concerned, in his philosophy of religion,
with the "progressive realization of the Universal Community
in and through the longings, the vicissitudes, the tragedies,
the triumphs of this process of the temporal world."214 Es-
sential personalistic ideas in Royce 1 s philosophy of reli-
gion are: God is a Person; man is a free moral agent living
in a moral order; personalities struggle with evil; and man
experiences Immortality.
Despite Royce 1 s absolutism he is a theist who views
God as personal. To be sure God is all in all, and man be-
comes one with God, yet Royce argues for the Individual iden-
tity of each personality. He is partially indebted to Howi-
son for maintaining this position; he had come off second
best at the hands of Howison in the discussion concerning
the nature of God before the Philosophical Union of the Uni-
versity of California with Howison, LeConte, and Mezes.
Howison had pointed out that Royce did not make enough allow-
ance for individuality. Royce felt the weight of this plu-
ralistic criticism and some years later, in his Gifford Lec-
tures, emphasized individuality as he had not heretofore.
The conclusion of the entire series of his lectures deals
with the relationship of God and man. He wrote:
214. Royce, POC, II, 387.
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Despite God f s absolute unity, we, as individ-
uals, preserve and attain our unique lives and
meanings, and are not lost in the very life
that sustains us, and that needs us as its own
expression. 215
Closely related to this idea of individuality is that of
freedom. The finite self exerts its own will; it creates
its own purpose, its own "way of expressing God ! s will . " It
is compelled to be free for it is unique. Its purpose, or
life plan, fills a place that cannot be filled by any other
self. "Our theory of the Self assigns to it the character
of the Free Individual. . . ."216
Agreeing with other personalists, Royce says the fi-
nite self faces the problem of evil, yet lives in a moral
order. The self seeks to know the real. It contrasts it-
self with the absolute will and becomes conscious of the
"Ought." It attempts to fulfil the absolute will. In this
moral order it has its place, its task, effectiveness, free-
dom, and individual worth by virtue of its "unity with all
Being, and with God." 217 The struggle with evil is solved
by the Absolute Person transcending all the imperfections of
the finite space- time world. In the temporal world there is
evil; in the Eternal, there is triumph. "These glories are
the treasures of the house of God."
A final question in Royce 1 3 philosophy of religion is
215. Royce, WAI, II, 452.
216. See Royce, WAI, II, 293-294 and 336-337.
217. Royce, WAI, II, 375.
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that of immortality. He dealt with this idea specifically
in his Ingersoll Lecture of 1899, arguing for it in the fol-
lowing way: (1) The world is a rational whole wherein the
divine will is uniquely expressed. (2) Every aspect of the
absolute is unique and gets individual expression. (3) The
present life does not allow completeness. (4) Our life must
receive significant expression. (5) We experience hints of
real individuality in ourselves. (6) We, therefore, gain
final conscious expression in an eternal conscious life. 2 -1-^
Here, as elsewhere, Royce is consistently personalistic;
eternal life is individual and conscious. 219
The absolute idealism of Royce was less rigorous than
the intellectualistic idealism of some of his German anteced-
ents and British contemporaries, a fact which enabled him to
make a momentous contribution to American personal ism. His
thought revealed the effects of the influence of Lotze, the
personal-pluralistic criticism of Howison, and the "Individ-
uality" as well as the "En-Mass e" of Whitman. He continued
his thought through Calkins, a more consciously personal-
istic thinker, and gladly recognized his "agreements" with
Bowne, the "systematizer of personalism. " Although pragma-
tism and new realism temporarily obscured his importance, he
will be remembered as one of America^ preeminent thinkers
218. Royce, COI, 78-80.
219. Royce, COG, 326.
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and as having made a permanent personalist ic contribution to
the developing philosophy of America.
8. Howison, Calkins, Bowne.
A recognition of the wealth of personalistic ideas
throughout the entire history of American philosophy, as in-
dicated by this survey, has prepared for a treatment of the
chief representatives of the three distinctive types of per-
sonalism. It will be recalled that Johnson and Edwards ex-
pressed personalistic views in the early colonial period,
that Whitman was the first one to publish an article enti-
tled "Personalism" and was probably the first one to use the
word in America, that Alcott was the first philosopher to
call his thought personalism, and finally, that Davidson,
Harris, and Royce were essentially personalistic. Although
the word "personalism" was not widely used until relatively
late in the development of American philosophy, 220 the vigor
220. The word "personalism" did not appear in Baldwin's Dic-
tionary of Philosophy and Psychology (1902), nor in the
first edition of Webster 1 s New International Dictionary
of the English Language ( 1909 ) . It appeared, however,
in The Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics (1917), in
the second edition of Webster ' s New International Dic-
tionary of the English Language (1934), and in Runes 1
The Dictionary of Philosophy (1942). After the earlier
use of the word by Whitman and Alcott, "personalism"
was used by James (1902), Calkins (1907), and Bowne
(1908). With the publication of the first book in Eng-
lish entitled Personalism (1908), by Bowne, the word
came into general philosophical use. For further in-
formation regarding the use of "personalism" in Germany,
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ous personal ism of Howison, Calkins, and Bowne was possible
only because it flowed from a vast reservoir of accumulated
personal is tic thought.
Howison, the pluralistic personalist, Calkins, the
absolutistic personalist, and Bowne, the plural-monistic
personalist, brought to conscious expression the full import
of a rich native heritage. Theirs is a philosophy with an
authentic American ring. It embodies not only the achieve-
ments of European and ancient thought into which they so
thoroughly delved, but also sprang indigenously from the cul-
ture of a new continent. Its large dimensions and heroic
proportions reveal it to have been a major productive force
of the most worthful in American civilization. Personalism
has, from the colonial period to the present, concerned it-
self empirically with the elemental problems of a growing
nation and has held before every cultural advance the vistas
of eternity.
Prance, and elsewhere, see Brightman, Art. (1922)^,
Art. (1927), and Art. (1943) 1 ; Flewelling, Art. (1917)
and Art. (1942); Knudson, POP, 17-21; and Murray, NED.

CHAPTER III.
PLURALISTIC PERSONALISM.
1. The Life and Influence of George Holmes Howison (1834-1916).
George Holmes Howison is the chief exponent of plu-
ralistic personalism, the first type of personalism in the
United States to be considered. He was born in Montgomery
County, Maryland, of old Maryland and Virginia stock. He
was always a lover of the East, and especially New England,
yet he spent the most fruitful years of his successful teach-
ing career at the University of California in Berkeley.
There he inspired and stimulated young minds. His biogra-
phers, John Buckham- and George Stratton remark: "He saw him-
self as a teacher of persons possessed of power to observe,
to think, to enjoy beauty, to devote themselves to the great
community of persons, of which the greatest of all is God."-1'
He was an impressive personality, dignified in dress and man-
ner. He showed a keen sense of discipline, humor always
within the bounds of propriety, and above all, pugnacity in
defense of truth. Hocking, who for a time was a member of
Howison 1 s department in California, said of him: "Howison
comes as near to Elijah the prophet, and in some ways to old
1. Buckham, John, and George Stratton, GHH, 15.
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Simon Peter, as any human being I expect to meet in my
time."2 Without doubt he was at his best in the classroom.
It is said that at times he would lose sight of his stu-
dents or the occasion and would speak with the passion and
eloquence of a poet. Yet he was quite human. An interest-
ing story is told of his absent-mindedness:
One day the home dinner waited for him a half
-
hour beyond the usual time; an hour. Nine
o'clock and no George Howison. At ten Mrs.
Howison began to be alarmed, and by eleven she
was inquiring by telephone at all his favorite
haunts. None of his friends, who in their turn
grew alarmed, could give her a clue to his where-
abouts. At one o'clock in the morning, in he
sauntered, quite unconscious of the hour and of
Mrs. Howison 1 s anxiety. It appeared that he had
crossed the Bay to San Francisco, had there met
a friend, and the two had for all these hours
been lost to the world in their discussion of
high philosophy.
3
He was slow in achieving prominence. As in the case
of Thomas Eobbes, his formative period was of long duration.
It was not until 1884, when he was fifty years of age, that
he went reluctantly to his permanent position in philosophy
at the University of California. The preceding years were
not without value, however. When he was four years old his
family had left its Maryland farm and moved to Ohio. The
vicinity of Marietta offered excellent educational facilities,
and while there, Howison attended Marietta and Harraar Acade-
mies, and Marietta College. His first taste of philosophy
2. Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 13.
3. Ibid., 26.
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came from the president of the college, Dr. Henry Smith, D.D.
After graduating, he studied in Lane Seminary in Cincinnati,
Ohio, a Presbyterian school, but probably never served a
full-time pastorate. Instead he became a teacher and princi-
pal of schools in Marietta, Chillicothe, Portsmouth, and
Harmar in Ohio, and Salem in Massachusetts. It was in Salem
that he met and married Lois Caswell, the lovely teacher of
English who possessed a keen mind and a radiant personality.
She was the "niece of President Caswell of Brown University;
was related to the Angells of presidential fame, and had in
her veins the blood of Miles Standish and Peregrine White,
celebrated in stories of colonial New England.
At the age of thirty, in the last year of the Civil
War, Howison became a professor at Washington University in
St. Louis. He was disappointed upon arrival, for, having
expected to teach English literature, he was informed that
an older man had been employed for that purpose, and that he
was to assist in mathematics, and later in political economy.
He used his time profitably, however, and wrote his first'
4. Dr. Smith was also Professor of Moral and Intellectual
Philosophy. No specific descriptions of courses are
given in the catalogue, but the work in the field of phi-
losophy listed in the program for the senior year was:
Intellectual Philosophy, Wayland 1 s Moral Science and
Whately's Logic. The author is indebted to Miss Lillian
R. Spindler, registrar of Marietta College, for this in-
formation. Dr. Smith championed the Baconian method as
over against German apriorism .
5. Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 44.
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"book, Analytic Geometry
, which was acclaimed by authorities
as a masterful piece of work. Along with this his interest
in philosophy continued to grow, for he came under the in-
fluence of Harris, Brokmeyer, Snider, and others of the St.
Louis school. He participated in the discussions of the
Society and became its vice-president. The group was occu-
pied with Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit when Howison first
became affiliated with it; the Hegelian influence upon him
was great even though he eventually championed pluralism,
like the British Hegelian McTaggart. It was here, also, that
Howison first came under the influence of Bronson Alcott and
Emerson, both of whom lectured frequently to the St. Louis
company. Howison, in turn, met them later when he taught in
the East, and especially when he lectured at the Concord
School of Philosophy which had been organized in Alcott 's
library.
Howison 1 s lack of opportunity to teach in his fields
of interest, along with his desire to go East, led him to re-
sign from Washington University. This is how he came to
teach at Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1872 to
1878 as professor of logic and the philosophy of science. 6
6. At first, Howison taught Rudiments of Logic, Systematic
Logic, and Philosophy of Science (which included twenty
lectures on the theory of induction, fifteen lectures on
the classification of the mathematical sciences, and ten
lectures on the theory of calculus). The 1873-74 cata-
logue lists, for the first time, philosophy as one of the
ten regular departments of the institution. Howison also
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His excellent work there was widely acclaimed, yet another
disappointment awaited him; he found it necessary to leave
because of the institution's financial straits. As if to
compensate for this experience, however, he had a delight-
ful time the following year lecturing on ethics at Harvard
Divinity School. From that position he went to Europe. He
remained there for two years and enrolled as a student in
the University of Berlin. Among the men under whom he stud-
ied were Du Bo is ^.Raymond, Ebbinghaus, Paulsen, Gizycki,
Lasson, Zeller, and Michelet, the pupil and friend of Hegel.
From that enriching time of travel and study Howison re-
turned to two unsettled years in America, the first being
spent giving private instruction in Boston and the second
lecturing on philosophy at the University of Michigan. 7
added that year to his course offerings: Critical History
of Systems, Ethics, and Elements of Philosophy. The ob-
ject of the philosophy department, which must have been
written by Howison, was stated to be: "The specific ob-
ject of the department is to furnish the basis for a
sound general education, in such a study of philosophy
as, gathering within its scope the solid products of the
modern mind, will bring its idea into immediate connec-
tion with the Conduct of Life." P. 41 of the 1873-74
catalogue. Howison later gave various free lectures in
series, such as: The System of John Stewart Mill, Modern
Philosophy from Descartes to Hegel, Kant's Kritik der
reinen Vernunf
t
, and The Philosophy of Government. Howi-
son also served as secretary of the faculty.
7. Howison is listed in the University of Michigan catalogue
as Lecturer on Psychology, Logic, and Speculative Phi-
losophy. He taught courses entitled Empirical Psychology,
Speculative Philosophy, Formal Logic, and Real Logic.
The year after he left John Dewey taught his psychology
course.
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It was during this latter year (1884) that Howison
was invited to the Mills Chair of Philosophy at the Universi-
ty of California. The dispirited teacher was reluctant to
accept the offer, however, for he was expecting a call from
Johns Hopkins University, and presumably hoped to be called
to Harvard. There was justification for the latter expecta-
tion, since Howison had been close to many of Harvard's lead-
ing men. J. Elliot Cabot wished him to be there, as did
William James, even though he had committed himself to Royce.
In a letter to Thomas Davidson, James wrote:
When I see the disconsolate condition of poor
Howison, looking for employment now, and when I
recognize the extraordinary development of his
intellect in the past four years, I feel almost
guilty of having urged Royce' s call hither. . .
He /HowisonT" gave the best philosophical lec-
ture, in point of form and impressiveness, I
think I ever heard, the other night at the Con-
cord School.
Howison finally decided to accept the offer from California.
There he spent the last thirty-two years9 of his life happy
in the work he loved, teaching students. In a congenial at-
mosphere he built up a strong department and became a vital
part of the university and community. On one occasion he
was largely responsible for determining who the new president
8. Quoted by Buckham and Stratton in GHH, 70. James is re-
ferring to Howison' s lectures on Hume and Kant given in
August, 1885.
9. He became Professor Emeritus in 1909, after having taught
for twenty- five years.
10. Bates, Art. (1932), 311.
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of the university was to be. His pet interest was the Union,
which he established to teach philosophy beyond the walls of
the classroom. The policy of the Union was to discuss a spe-
cific book once a month during the year, and at the end of
the year the author himself addressed the group. The public
attended in large numbers. One of the most brilliant of the
yearly meetings was the occasion when Royce, LeConte, Mezes,
and Howison all took part in discussing "The Conception of
God," the lectures appearing later in book form. The New
York Times referred to the meeting as "the great debate" and
"a battle of the giants," while the New York Tr ibune called
the meeting "the most noteworthy philosophical discussion
that for many a day had taken place in this country. "H Dur-
ing these years in California Howison became more independent
in his thinking and developed his pluralistic and idealistic
form of personal ism.
Not only did Howison bring to his new opportunity "a
maturity of thought and experience which carried him rapidly
forward,"-1-2 but he continued to study and discuss philosophy
with the greatest philosophical minds of his day. His first
trip to Europe had been rewarding; from California he
returned thither twice more. At Oxford he came to know,
among others, Caird, Rashdall, Schiller, Josephs, Carman,
11. Quoted in Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 80.
12. Bates, op. cit., 311.
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Fairbrother, Conybeare, Stout and Baldwin. It was partially
the encouragement of Stout and Schiller that led him to pub-
lish his essays in the form of what was to become his most
significant piece of work, The Limits of Evolution and Other
Essays Illustrating the Metaphysical Theory of Personal
Idealism (1901). He became a fast friend of James 7/ard, the
pluralist, who had studied, as had Bowne, under Lotze. To
the group of Howison's earlier German friends must now be
added Vaihinger, of Halle, and Eucken, of Jena. It was with
the latter "that Howison had perhaps the fullest and hearti-
est of his G-erman friendships." 13 After reading The Limits
of Evolution , Eucken expressed joyous approval, saying, "I,
too, stand fully and without reserve on the platform of 'Per-
sonal Idealism.'" 14
The influences that led Hov/ison to personalism are
three-fold. First, he developed his interest in philosophy
while among the vigorous thinkers of the St. Louis School,
all of whom were dominated by G-erman idealism. At the St.
Louis meetings he exchanged ideas with Harris, among others,
and met Alcott, both of whom have been considered personal-
is ts in their essential philosophical views. Second, Howi-
son' s thorough scholarship enabled him to draw personalistic
concepts from the mighty thinkers of the historic stream of
13. Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 119.
14. Ibid., 120.
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philosophy. His own personalistic pluralism relative to
Aristotle was, he said, an "attempt to carry out the indi-
vidualistic tendencies in Aristotelianism to a conclusion
consistently coherent."15 While departing from Leibniz in
some respects, he maintained that his own personalism "cer-
tainly does approach to the Leibniz ian monodology more
closely than to any other form of idealism that has preceded
it." 16 Howison departed from Berkeley's "theocentric" ideal-
ism, but agreed with him in asserting that "nothing really
exists but 'spirits and their ideas.'"1 ''' Howison accepted,
from Kant, "the a priori character of all the connecting and
inference-supporting elements in human consciousness," and
also the removal of "the centre of the permanent order in
Nature from the Divine mind to the human." 18 Further,
Like Kant's, the present system finds the basis
for its theory of knowledge in the native spon-
taneity of the human mind,—of all minds not
divine; and again like Kant's, it provides for
the 'transcendental' efficacy of this spontan-
eous intelligence, for the power to go beyond
past experience and judge of the future in
erpetuum with unreserved universality, by the
ypothesis that Nature is a system of experi-
ences, the 'matter' of which is sensation, while
the 'form' or fixed order of it is determined by
the elements— Space, Time, Cause, and so forth—
15. Howison, LOE, xxvi.
16. Howison, LOE, xxiii. Howison rejects Leibniz's isola-
tion of the monad in favor of a social consciousness,
his idea of gradation, which involves a "system of
caste," and the Leibnizian illusory character of exten-
sion and duration. LOE, xxiii- xxv.
17. Howison, LOE, xviii.
18. Howison, LOE, xix.
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that the self-active consciousness supplies.
Finally, Howison built his personalism, in part, upon Hegel-
ianism, for there he found "the strongest affirmations of
personal reality and individual freedom, "^0 Even though he
dissented keenly from monism, Howison acknowl edged his in-
tellectual debt to Hegel, referring to him as one "to whom I
owe many years of light and guidance, and who must always
remain for me one of the world's great minds. "^ Howison
made an original synthesis of the "new insights" of these
philosophers in erecting his personalistic system, and
sought, in terms of Aristotle, Leibniz, and Kant at least,
"to continue the pluralistic apercu , which undergoes a grow-
ing clarification in the thinking of these great minds, on-
ward toward its proper fulfilment. "^ Finally, Howison must
have been led to personalism, in part, by his philosophical
friends and teachers of later years. He was closely associ-
ated with the aforementioned Harris and Alcott through the
years, met with Davidson and Bowne, among others, when in
Cambridge,^5 was keenly familiar with the thought of Royce,
19. Howison, LOE, xix. Plowison differs from Kant, however,
by not restricting the application of a priori princi-
ples to the world of sense; he attempts to break down
the barrier between the "practical 41 and "theoretical"
consciousness; he differs with Kant on the question
of the origin of the "contents" in experience. See
LOE, xix-xxii.
20. Howison, LOE, xxviii.
21. Howison, LOE, xxvi-xxvii.
22. Howison, LOE, xxvi.
23. See reference by William James,
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knew the Oxford personalists (although he maintains indepen-
dence of thought from them), was a fast friend of James V/ard,
and among other German philosophers, was a close friend of
Eucken's, who stood on the "platform of 'Personal Idealism.'"
It thus appears that Howison's personal ism can be traced to
his original synthesis of the rich deposit of thought ob-
tained at St. Louis, from his thorough knowledge of philo-
sophical literature, and from his lasting friendships with
thinkers who advocated personalism or ideas in harmony with
it.
Howison's influence as a philosopher was significant,
yet he did not establish a school of thought; he never gath-
ered a professional following. Kis greatest excellence was
OA
his power as a teacher. ^ The students under his scholarly
guidance who did not become philosophers "found their lives
lastingly impressed." When Franklin K. Lane, one of his
students, became a member of President Wilson's Cabinet in
1913, he wrote in response to a letter from Howison: "No
letter that I have ever received has given me more real
pleasure than yours, and no man has been more of an inspira-
tion than you." 25 Those students of Howison who devoted
themselves fully to philosophy, Hezes, McGilvary, Rieber,
24. It was remarked in The University Chronicle soon after
his death: "The University of California has lost its
greatest teacher." Quoted in Ferrier, ODUC, 468n.
25. Quoted in Lane and Wall, LFL, 2.
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Stuart, Henderson, Lovejoy, and Bakewell, * came to assume
leading places In American philosophy even though they did
not become his disciples. This lack of a following did not
please Howison, so confident was he of the truth of his own
view. He is said to have replied to congratulations upon
his success as a teacher for having so many distinguished
students: "Yes, but not one of them teaches the truth." 2,7
Howison f s influence, however, was felt by these men, and is
seen in others. The thought of Arthur Kenyon Rogers and
Joseph A. Leighton can be traced, at least in part, to him.
James Vfard paid him high tribute when he wrote in reference
to The Limits of Evolution : "It was your book that emboldened
me to try to work out pluralism as fully as I could, & to
start from the Many & not from the One. 1 '' 28 Joseph LeConte,
a distinguished colleague and friend of Howison, wrote in
recognition of his indebtedness to him: "I never knew a more
acute thinker. .
.
; I never knew anyone who had so thorough-
ly in mind the whole literature of philosophy; I never knew
anyone who could compare with him as a dialectician." 2^
Howison did not write a great deal. This is probably
due to his great popularity as a speaker, his vigor as a
teacher, and to the influence of the nine years that he had
26. Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 11.
27. quoted in Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 13.
28. Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 116-117.
29. LeConte, AJL, 261.
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spent in "rather desultory secondary school teaching." What
he did publish was weighty. He was a contributor to the
Journal of Speculative Philosophy as well as a close friend
of its founder, Harris. He was a member of the editorial
board of the Psychological Review when it began its career,
and also of that of the Kantstudien , in Germany, and of the
Hibbert Journal , in England.
Howison was slow to arrive at his full stature, yet
his ability and sincerity gave him an important place in
American philosophy. He was honored with LL.D. degrees by
Marietta College in 1887, the University of Michigan in 1909,
30
and the University of California in 1914. No one can read
him today without catching his moral earnestness, his breadth
of vision, his eager concern for truth. His mature thought
was that reality is a system of infinite^ persons, that the
individual has everlasting reality in the "Eternal Republic,"
and that this pluralistic universe is bound by reason into
30. The registrar of Marietta College and the assistant to
the President of the University of Michigan are unable
to find the exact citation under which Howison was
granted the honorary degree from their respective insti-
tutions. In those "more informal days" the records were
kept, but "without any supporting detail." The registrar
of the University of California, however, has supplied
the information that he was granted the honorary Doctor
of Laws degree from that institution with the citation:
"A masterful teacher gifted to establish the ideal as the
veritable real, and make it a saving power in the lives
of men.
"
31. By infinite, Howison means distinct, eternal, self-exist-
ent, self-active, or free. In fact, all these terms are
interchangeable to him. See LOE, 422.
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harmonic union.
2. The Significance of Mind.
Howison called his metaphysical system "personal
idealism," thus distinguishing it from typical monistic
idealism. He pointed out that historically idealism had been
just as monistic as materialism and that Leibniz had been
the only thinker from Plato "to the present 1901 " who had
"distinctly and systematically" broken from the monistic
tradition. By personal idealism, Howison meant an idealis-
tic system that, while thoroughly personal, was pluralistic.
This pluralism was not intended in the "bad sense," i.e., it
was not anarchic. The public and universal character of
every mind was asserted at the same time with its individu-
ality. All minds, according to this view, are held together
by reason. While retaining the idealistic emphasis on mind,
Howison' s personal idealism laid far more stress on the in-
dividual separateness and personality of mind than had any
previous thinker other than Leibniz. Whenever the word
"mind" is used, then, in reference to Howison' s thought, it
is to be understood as equivalent to self, or personality,
for each mind possesses "personal initiative, real self-di-
rection. "
In the process of knowing, the human mind functions
spontaneously. It brings to the act of experience its own
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self-activity; it alone makes the perception of objects pos-
sible. Experience is not constituted out of sensations or
impressions; rather, self-active consciousness organizes and
forms them into intelligible experience. Sensation is not
"an unfathomable datum" nor is it produced "by some foreign
agent acting as an efficient cause;" 32 it is constructed by
the self. Howison has been charged with irrationalism at
this point, for how does he account for a uniform body of
' knowledge?33 He seemingly overlooks interaction, and re-
jects the preestablished harmony of Leibniz. His doctrine
of "Spontaneous Harmony" or "spontaneous objective cognition"
would indeed seem to make uniformity of knowledge a pure co-
incidence. To remedy this he calls in "a world of efficient-
causal communication between individuals other than G-od" 3^
based on the space-time aspect of self-consciousness. In
the last analysis, however, he appeals to a purely ideal
"social consciousness" and a "communal system of experience,"
rather than to efficient- causal communication. This would
appear to be more easily accomplished on the basis of abso-
lutism, which Howison thoroughly rejects, than on his own
system of pluralism, but he is able to appeal to "social
32. Howison, LOE, xxi.
33. See Borden Bowne Kessler's unpublished Boston University
dissertation, PMVP, 33-35.
34. Howison, LOE, xxiii. This communication between selves
is interaction, yet Howison denies the idea of interac-
tion. He writes: " No mind can have an efficient rela-
tion to another mind." LOE, 74.
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consciousness" by employing the doctrine of final cause as
"the sole causal relation between minds." 35 The communal
system is an ideal for it is the self-awareness of each mind
in its correlation with the total system of other minds that
is constitutive of sensible objects and the human intelli-
gence that perceives them. 56 Each mind, or self, has an
"inner initiative," or "native contemplation of the same
Ideal." The world of minds becomes the final cause, the Ens
realissimum , the foundation of knowledge.
The metaphysical function of mind is to be "the meas-
ure of all things." It makes self-awareness possible in the
cognition of a community of eternal infinite selves, and
thereby becomes basic for existence, or experience. All ex-
istence is to be thought of in terms of mind, or speaking
more specifically, "the assemblage of individual minds is
the cause or ground of all that exists. This assemblage is
an ideal; minds are related to their own acts and life, or
toward the phenomenal world by efficient causation, but they
are related to each other only on the basis of final causa-
tion, or ideality. Howison wrote: "All existence is either
(1) the existence of minds , or (2) the existence of the
items and order of their experience . . ," 38 Mind is the
35. Howison, LOE, 74.
36. See Howison, Art. (1884), 6-7.
37. Howison, Art. (1905), 179.
38. Howison, LOE, xii.
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whole in contrast to the* part, the subject in opposition to
the object, and reality as distinct from appearance; but the
part, the object, the appearance exist only in and for the
mind, the subject, the reality.
^
It follows from such a view that physical nature is
dependent upon and an integral part of mind. In fact, it is
the sum of organized sensory experiences of the total commu-
nity of minds, and as such is an ideal. The content of the
experience of nature is not given, as it is for Kant; rather,
sensation is constructed out of the resources of each indi-
vidual mind; it is "a product of the individual's efficient
causality." The form or fixed order of nature "is determined
by the elements—Space, Time, Cause, and so forth— that the
self-active consciousness supplies."^0 Thus nature, as a
passive effect, is dependent for its existence upon its con-
stitutive principle, the mutual recognition of all minds.
Time and space, the most universal aspects of Nature,
are therefore a priori conditions of all "sensuous" con-
sciousness. Sensuous experience does not bring them into
existence for such experience presupposes them; they are not
produced by evolution for they are the presupposition of any
evolving process. Evolution relates to the phenomenal world
39. See Howison, Art. (1905), 178-132. Minds are "necessa-
rily federal." The "whole" is a pluralistic harmony
rather than a monistic relationship between the whole
and its parts.
40. Howison, LOE, xix.
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in which events or items follow each other successively,
whereas time and space are the media through which seriality
is perceived or thought. Time and space, consequently, "owe
their entire existence to the essential correlation and co-
existence of minds. "^1
God, too, is to be conceived of in relation to mind.
He is the Divine "Type," the "perfect self- fulfilment in
eternity , " the "Unchangeable Ideal," the "central member" of
the divine society of spirits. He is the bond of union in
the community of minds, and reigns in it by reason, by "final
causation, --that is, simply by being the impersonated Ideal
of every mind."^2 The significance of mind in Howison's
system is clearly evident from such an exposition; a society
of minds, human and Divine, constitutes all of reality.
3. Nature.
It is plain that, in Howison's view of Nature, every-
thing phenomenal is dependent upon the "assemblage of indi-
vidual minds." Personal individual and social intelligence
is the cause of everything that exists outside its own noume-
nal reality. Selves, then, are logically prior to time and
space, two concepts that need more attention than they were
given in the discussion of mind. Selves are also prior to
41. Howison, LOE, xiii.
42. Ibid., xiv.
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and directive in the process of evolution. Let us, then,
turn to these basic ideas in order to understand Howison*
s
philosophy more fully.
First, consider physical nature. Is it the result of
an unknown force, or cause, as held by Spencer? Is it ulti-
mate in its own right as Democritus and all materialists
since him have held, so that it is the cause of mind or per-
sonality? Is nature the activity of a divine Being, as held
by most idealists? Let us look at Howison 1 s answer to such
questions. His mature thought is: (1) Nature, in essence,
is the sum of the organized experiences of minds. The "mat-
ter" of the experiences is sensation, while the fixed order
of the experiences is determined by space, time, cause, etc.
that are supplied by the self-active consciousness. 43 (2) It
follows that nature is not the creation of God, nor his ac-
tivity; it is created corporately by a society of minds,
other than God. Its origin lies in the self-definition of
each individual. "We conclude to the dependence of Nature
upon us, ... instead of our derivative dependence upon Na-
ture."44 (3) This means that knowledge of an order of nature
43. Howison, LOE, xii-xiii, and xix. His view resembles
McTaggart's. Calkins calls attention to the fact that
Howison and McTaggart are similar in teaching that ulti-
mate reality is the complete community of selves. See
PPP (1st. ed. ), 378.
44. Howison, LOE, 306. Howison means that the total society
of minds creates the tiger and the apple tree, the dive-
bomber and radium, and he thereby represents extreme men-
talism, for in his doctrine of "corporate" creativity he
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is conditioned by knowledge of transcendent realities, viz.,
awareness of one's own person and all the persons of the
total universe. 45 (4) Nature is not properly a cause; it is
only a transmissive effect or aggregate of such effects.
Throughout Nature, as distinguished from ideal-
izing mind, there reigns, in fine, no causation
but transmission. As every phenomenal cause is
only a transmissive and therefore passive agent,
so Nature itself, in its aggregate, is only a
passive transmitter. But because of its origin
in the Pinal Causation of intelligence, its whole
must conform to the ideal that expresses the es-
sential form of intelligent being, and all its
parts must follow each other in a steadfast logi-
cal ascent toward that ideal as their goal. 46
(5) Nature is a result of both efficient and final causation
although, as indicated, the latter is the more important.
Howison abandons the Kantian idea that the content of experi
ence is given. Nature is produced wholly from the resources
of the individual mind4
"7 in terms of efficient causation; it
is produced corporately by reference beyond the individual
to the whole world of minds in terms of final causation.
"The mutual recognition of all minds. . .becomes. .. the consti-
tutive principle in the world of Nature."48 The final cause
which will be seen later to be the only causation in the
lacks even a Berkeleyan God to experience the object
when the finite mind is not present to do so.
45. Howison, Art. (1884), 4-5.
46. Howison, LOE, 39.
47. Howison 1 s confusion is evidenced here, for is sensation
a product of my will? Obviously not, but that is his
idea. How can it be the product of a society of minds?
48. Howison, LOE, xxii.
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moral world, according to the view held by Howison, is here
seen to be the chief cause in the world of Nature. (6) Na-
ture is the scene of ceaseless conflict between the actual
and the ideal, for the natural is partial and fragmentary.
As a product of man's efficient causation, nature is the
self-activity of the self striving for the ideal, not the
ideal itself. The conflict is between nature in its present
form and the ideal form of spirit. It follows that Nature is
not sin or guilt in itself, as existent, it merely carries
the "risk" of sin by admitting the negative principle of de-
fect into its being. 49
Stated succinctly, Howison 1 s view is that nature is
the experience of all minds; it is created corporately by
all minds rather than by G-od; nature is known only because
the mind first knows itself and the society of persons; it
is an effect rather than a cause; and finally, it is the
scene of endless conflict for it contains defect and can in-
hibit the self from attaining the perfection of the ideal
type. This is not the place for criticism, yet one is
forced to ask, how can the fragmentary phenomenal world be
held together by persons, who, though public and social, are
yet distinct experiencing individuals? This view has the
same defects as Berkeley's mentalism. 50 Howison points out
49. See Howison, LOE, 564, 366, 367.
50. Among these defects are Berkeley's idea that universals
are not real for particular minds, God is not clearly
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that his theory is not to be confounded with Berkeley's. It
is different, to be sure, in its socio-centric nature as con-
trasted to Berkeley 1 s theocentric or theological idealism.
But there the difference ends, and in favor of Berkeley, for
he called in one mind to hold the physical world together in
the absence of the individual's consciousness of it, whereas
Howison has no one principle of rationality other than a fed-
eral republic of experience. Howison faces this question,
and solves it in the following way. The incoherent and frag-
mentary becomes all-coherent in the unity of its inevitable
reality as a thinking self. The self declares the isolation
and fragmentariness to be only apparent, and
so places the phenomena in a real system that
takes it /sic/ out of the category of illusion
by giving it a continual and endlessly ascend-
ing approximation to unqualified reality. 51
This is a lame effort to save the day, and actually sacri-
fices idealism by implying the reality of phenomena.
What does Howison have to say of time and space?
Again, as with nature, they are dependent upon the society
of minds. They are not the individuations of the pluralis-
tic universe, for the "associative assemblage" of individu-
als is not placed and dated in the fleeting world of phenome-
na. It is only in terms of the phenomenal world that the two
related to finite persons, and knowledge is impossible
on the basis of epistemological monism.
51. Howison, GOG, 103.
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sense-forms are necessary, as suggested when dealing with
the problem of the significance of the mind, time and space
condition all "sensuous" consciousness, but they are not
brought into existence by such consciousness. Rather, they
are presupposed, and owe their existence to the total assem-
blage of minds.
It follows that time and space are not capable of pro-
duction by the process of evolution. Rather, evolution pre-
supposes them, for phenomenal change is thought of in terms
of succession in time and movement in space. Here Howison
criticizes Spencer with the thought of Kant, that time and
space cannot be generalized from experience since they are
already operating in the experience from which the generali-
zation is made. Time, especially, is presupposed even in
"figuring to ourselves the process of evolution."
It is interesting to note Howison 1 s distinction be-
tween time and space on the basis of objective and subjec-
tive principles. Time cannot be made out of space, and space
cannot be made out of time for each is completely distinct
from the other. Space coordinates the public experiences of
the individual, i.e., it is the a priori principle by which
the individual conscious self "comes into actual sensuous
commerce with other selves of that species, or, in short,
shares with them in a real located and physical world." 52
52. Howison, LOE, xxxix.
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This is the objective aspect of public experience. Time, on
the other hand, coordinates the private experiences of the
self. It is because of this peculiar function of each that
space and time are not only the necessary sense- forms, but
the only ones. By means of them the society of minds dis-
tinguishes between the privacy of each and the public life,
which is common to all, between individuality and social com-
munication.
Indeed, as from this attained point of view we
can now clearly see, the real ground of the
difference between Time and Space, and hence
between subjective perception and the objec-
tive existence of physical things, is in the
fact that a mind, in being such,—-in its very
act of self-definition, -—correlates itself
with a society of minds, and so, to fulfill
its nature, in so far as this includes a world
of experiences, must form its experience so-
cially as well as privately and hence will piit
forth a condition of sensuous communication,
as well as a condition of inner sensation.
Thus the dualization of the sense-world into
inner and outer, psychic and physical, subjec-
tive and objective, rests at last on the in-
trinsically social nature of conscious being;
rests on the twofold structure, logically
dichotomous, of the self-defining act; and we
get the explanation, from the nature of intel-
ligence as such, why the Sense-Forms are neces-
sarily two, and only two.°^
Howison thus escapes the sensationalism of Hume and Spencer,
the objectivity of space and time as held by the physical
scientists from the beginning of the sixteenth century to
Einstein 1 s recent theory of relativity, and the idea of
53. Howison, Art. (1906), 187.
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space and time as abstract concepts. He also avoids the re-
ality of time as held by Bergson and the space-time continuum
of Alexander and Whitehead, yet he gets into the same diffi-
culty as did Kant. His difficulty is in postulating a di-
chotomy of experience, one public the other private, for
space and time are both private experiences and also public
or universal conditions of all experience. To deal with
space as one form and time as another is to deal with each
abstractly. Could one not hold to a space-time continuum on
a personalis tic basis as well as on a realistic one? That
is, all thought or activity is on the basis of a space- time
continuum, but a space-time continuum is meaningless except
in terms of conscious personality. In that event, however,
it would be necessary to revise Howison 1 s pluralism to the
extent that nature is not the product of all selves, but the
activity of One, although it is experienced objectively by
all. Howison argues for the objectivity of space and the
subjectivity of time. Can not each be objective for the
"assemblage" of minds and subjective for the experient?
One of Howison 1 s chief concerns in regard to nature
was the limits of evolution, for he was a constant critic of
not only absolutism in all forms, but also the naturalistic
philosophies of the nineteenth century. Howison gave a lec-
ture entitled "The Limits of Evolution" at Stanford Univer-
sity, October, 1895. It was printed in the New World , June,
1896, and later appeared as the first chapter in his book of
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the same title. Just what are the proposed limits of evolu-
tion? In the celebrated debate previously referred to be-
tween LeConte, Royce, Mezes, and Howison, LeConte pointed
out that evolution was to be understood in terms of its
end. 54 Howison heartily accepted this, but went on to add
that evolution is limited to the phenomenal realm.
How does Howison defend this view? He points out as
the first limitation of evolution that there is a chasm be-
tween the phenomenal and the noumenal which evolution cannot
cross. The agnostic and naturalistic evolutionary thinkers
who cannot account for real persons, individual moral re-
sponsibility, or a personal God, do not sense this as do the
technical scientists. The problem of evolution is not one
for sciences, which are limited to specific fields of inves-
tigation, but rather a problem for philosophy. Science,
then, cannot cross the chasm between the phenomenal and the
noumenal. A second limitation of evolution is the break in
the physical world between the inorganic and the organic.
Agnosticism appeals to the Unknowable in accounting for
this; Howison appeals to an "Unseen Power" that is a change-
less noumenal principle. Third, evolution is limited by the
break between physiological and logical genesis. The mind
does not originate out of non-mind. The fourth limit is that
evolution can reach the unknowable but not explanation; only
54. LeConte, Art. (1902), 74.

philosophy can reach the latter. Fifth, evolution is limit
ed in crossing from "nature in general to human nature
viewed as essentially reason." Human reason, instead of be
ing a result of evolution, is required by it, hence the phe
nomenal world with its evolutional law is strictly ideal in
character. The proof of this is seen in several ways: (l)
Time and space are merely media through which evolution is
perceived and thought. (2) Change and progression are dy-
namic in terms of increasing fullness and richness of life.
Lifted to cosmic proportions progression transcends the
special sciences. (3) Causation as a "nexus " between phe-
nomena issues from the mind itself. (4) Logical unity re-
sults from the intrinsic coherence of self- consciousness.
(5) Final causation is the only genuine cause; it results
from intelligence whereas phenomenal cause is merely a pas-
sive agent. Phenomena are, thus, ideal. In view of these
limitations, "Man the spirit, man the real mind, is not the
offspring of Nature, but rather Nature is in a great sense
the offspring of this true Human Nature." 55 It follows tha
idealizing thought is the only thing that can overspan all
the breaks which evolution must pass to become a cosmic
principle. Evolution is seen, in its true light, to be lim-
ited to the realm of phenomena.
What, then, is Howison's philosophy of Nature? It i
55. Howison, LOE, 43
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simply that the phenomenal world is created, not by God, nor
by efficient causation, but by the final causation of a soci-
ety of minds experiencing themselves and each other in quest-
ing for the "Eternal Ideal." Space and time, force and energy,
motion and matter, and all similar concepts pertaining to the
physical world are subservient to mind, deriving what phenom-
enal reality they have from the pluralistic society of minds.
Evolution, too, finds its source in man, "the cooperating
Cause and Lord of that world where evolution has its course. "56
Man is sovereign of the whole realm of nature. And where is
God in the process? He is the "Ideal," perfection, the "in-
spirer of an endless progress in moral freedom." Before con-
sidering Howison' s idea of God, however, let us see what he
means by an "Eternal Republic" of minds,
4. The "Eternal Republic."
Howls on *s central idea of an "Eternal Republic" of
infinite persons involves several important concepts, viz.,
reason, moral aims, freedom, and immortality. It is reason
that relates all persons to each other. On such a basis
each is morally obligated to the others. Morality is possi-
ble only on the basis of freedom. "Any doctrine incompatible
56. Howison, LOE, 55. See, also, McTaggart, who denies the
existence of God (and consequently divine creativity)
while holding that "the harmonious system of selves is
the fundamental fact of the universe." SDOR, 248. Mc-
Taggart lauds Howison for having "brilliantly expounded
and defended" the conception of a non-creative God,
SDOR, 221.
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with the freedom of the individual," write Howison' s biogra-
phers, "was for him intellectually intolerable." 57 And
finally, the society of persons is eternal, each member expe-
riencing immortality.
A self cannot be except as a member of a reciprocal
society; each self exists only as it is grounded in a social
universe. How that society is held together according to
Howison has been previously mentioned, i.e., by reason. It
was seen in the discussion of mind that Howison' s position
raises many questions, so here let us examine reason further.
Its importance to Howison is seen in his statement, that by
means of it "we have a noumenal Reality that is properly to
be described as the eternal Federal Republic of Spirits." 58
The ultimate reality is a society of persons; persons are
united by reason as an ideal. This new concept of reason is
used by Howison to attack the agnostic denial of knowledge,
the method of natural science by which reason gives mastery
of the sense-world, and pantheistic idealism's "undue arrest
of reason." Reason is not only a tool or method; it is not
merely natural; 31 it is also spiritual; it is itself, when
come to itself, the true divine revelation." 59
This leads to a consideration of Howison' s conception
of the relation of reason to religion, for "essential reason"
57. Buckham and Stratton, G-HH, 24.
58. Howison, Art. (1905), 179.
59. Howison, LOE, 225.
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is directed to religion. Religion, he suggests, has used
several invalid methods to arrive at truth, the most abusive
being authority. He therefore takes up the cudgel of reason
as a method to supplant it, pointing out that the method of
authority is invalid for several reasons. First, it is
"logically unreal ," i.e., it rebukes reason and therefore
contradicts the mind of God. God is a spirit, and is to be
known in spirit, not in terms of external evidence received
by the senses. Second, the method of authority is invalid
for it is unintelligible. The Romanist places his authority
in the church; the orthodox Protestant lodges his in scrip-
ture, both appealing to the "miraculous communication of the
Divine Will." This rests upon a "stupendous Declaration" to
some select few, but in as much as testimony, ear-witness,
and declaration tend to be untrus tworthy over the years, the
reasoning mind comes not to God but to vacancy. God is
supersensible, and he therefore does not present himself
directly to man's senses, as is implied in the doctrine of
authority. Further, the principle of authority contradicts
the spirit of Christ. His central ideas were that God is
boundless in His love and that all souls are related to Him
as an ideal society of minds in which each individual pos-
sesses moral freedom and is "guided by the contemplation of
its perfect fulfilment in the Supreme Soul." 60 Religion,
60. Howison, LOE, 251.
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under the Christ, changes from a worship of an unapproach-
able authoritarian Sovereign to a "joyful communion" with a
Guide and Friend. Such a Supreme Person is the God of the
living, not the authoritarian God of the dead. He is an
"active member in a society where all alike strive to recog-
nize the infinite worth, the boundless possibilities, of all
the others." 61 Along with such a noble idea of God, Jesus
pointed out that the soul is immortal and free. All three
doctrines, i.e., the idea of God, immortality, and freedom,
are opposed to the method of authority. Reason alone, then,
is the only real method of determining religious belief and
practice. Even those who discredit reason, in their final
appeal, utilize reason to maintain their position. There is
at the basis of authority the implied power of the human
mind to judge spiritual things. Reason has been employed by
the Christian Apologists of the Roman tradition, so too by
contemporary liberals of Protestantism. In describing per-
sonal experience on the adaptation of Christianity to ration-
al programs, the latter appeals not only to the reasoning
process, but also to the rational nature of personality.
The conclusive argument for the view that reason is
essentially religious and that religion is essentially
rational lies in the scientific method of induction itself.
The logic of science erects its laws on the basis of care-
61. Howison, LOE, 255.
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fully ascertained particular facts. Using the same method,
one arrives at the conclusion, says Howison, that existence
at its core is the existence of conscious minds or spirits,
and that material things are purely phenomenal, as held by
Berkeley and Kant. The method of induction leads one, there-
fore, "to a rational nature everywhere present and regula-
tive." The rational nature, then, in turn leads to "the re-
ality of a universal rational society." Evolution itself
bears this out for it is nothing more than the increasing
reasonableness of things; those things which survive are more
reasonable than those things or forms of life which perish.
Howison concludes:
Human reason is not a circumscribed power, con-
fined to judgments within the world of sensible
experience alone, but is as wide in its scope
a3 all possible reality, and in fact has for its
supreme and most appropriate object the world of
the spirit, the society of all spirits, and God
as central therein.
It is reason, then, that not only holds the "eternal repub-
lic" together as an ideal bond of union, but is also the
method whereby each individual within the "city of God" de-
fines himself, knows God and all other minds, and aims to
achieve "the perfection and bliss of all." 6^
62. Howison, LOE, 267.
63. This paragraph illustrates several things. First, Howi-
son draws heavily from Hegel and Kant—from Hegel the
idea: "Was verntinftig 1st, das ist wirklich, und was wirk-
lich ist, das ist verntinftig," and from Kant the idea
that the practical reason is more significant than spec-
ulative reason, which is limited to sensible experience
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Morality has an important place in Eowison ! s idea of
the "eternal republic." In fact, Buckham and Stratton point
out that "the pivot of all Howison' s later thinking, at least
was the moral responsibility of the human person." 64 That
idea is what disturbed Howison 'when he thought of absolute
idealism. How, he argued, could one talk of a moral order,
when there is only one mind, one person? It is also sheer
nonsense, he thought, to talk of a moral order on the basis
of typical theism based on efficient causation. Immortality
operates on the basis of an ideal. A moral choice is not
made on the basis of coercion. One is moral only in terms
of an ideal, the final cause. Morality presupposes a world
of minds as a Kantian realm of ends. To refuse the claims
of morality, then, is not only an act of irrationality, but
also a denial of the mind's own existence. Morality becomes
the first principle of knowledge, and is "itself an act of
knowledge not simply a sentiment of obligation." 6 ^
alone. Also to be noted is the fact that a rationalis-
tic definition of religion is implied (see Brightman,
POR, 192 and 192n) . Finally, the achievement of "the
perfection and bliss of all" is obviously a self-reali-
zation theory of value that leads to a personalistic and
perfectionistic view of morality that has, in this form
at least, found expression in such diverse thinkers as
Hegel, T. H. Green, B. Bosanquet, F. H. Bradley, James
Seth, Friedrich Paulsen, Borden Parker Bowne, V1/. M.
Urban, John Dewey, Edgar S. Brightman, and William E.
Hocking. See especially Brightman, ML, 287n, 294-295,
and Titus, EFT, 87-88.
64. Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 24.
65. Howison, LOE, xxxvii.
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Howison points out the difference between his origi-
nal view of God acting as the moral goal and all other his-
toric systems that have based themselves on creationism. He
distinguished four groups, (l) post-exilic Hebraism, and
those systems' influenced by it, as a dualism between Creator
and creature, (2) the theories of those who hold to a monis-
tic creator and lead to pantheism, (3) the systems of those
who make matter the producing source of every form of con-
sciousness, and (4) the views of those who "repudiate the
search into causes as baseless and futile," i.e., the posi-
tivists. Howison dispenses with the third and fourth views
for they make no pretense of providing for freedom, and lead
only to an egoistic, trivial hedonism as a system of morali-
ty. The second group of thinkers, represented by Hegel, T.
H. Green, Royce, and Calkins, are dispensed with almost as
summarily, for the self-determination of the individual is
cancelled; he is merely part of the larger Whole, or Abso-
lute. This leaves only the dualism of the first group, but
here, suggests Howison, one is little better off than under
monism. The creature must register the will of the Creator
and is without freedom. So also, N. Hartmann argues against
theism.
Howison reveals insight here in terms of the total
goal of the "eternal republic;" but one could charge him with
the same moral determinism which he alleges against creation-
ism. How, one might ask him, can one be morally free if he
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is automatically, upon his first cognition or self- awareness,
a part of the republic moving in the direction of perfection?
One is conditioned in advance of his self- awareness to move
toward the ideal. God*s final causation becomes efficient.
Howison T s system would seem much more deterministic than the
mediating position of Bowne's in which one can make a choice
whether or not he wants to cooperate with the Divine will
and achieve the Kingdom of Ends. Beginning with Howison's
final cause, however, one must follow him logically to a mor-
al order in which each individual reciprocally relates him-
self to all others in terms of the perfect Ideal. God, as
the ideal, draws all members of the republic to a moral end.
In this eternal pluralism of causal minds each possesses
moral autonomy.
This system of Howison's adjusts itself to the prima-
ry conditions of the moral life in the following ways: (1)
His system maintains that not a single individual is deter-
mined by any efficient causation. (2) The Kantian gap be-
tween morality and intelligence is closed, for self-active
consciousness is objective by virtue of its social and feder-
al character. (3) Only on this basis of organic pluralism
is one certain of individual immortality as everlasting per-
sonal continuance. (4) There is hope of real and lasting
improvement of the present world by moral endeavor in that
Howison ! s system maintains an indivisible union of the eter-
nal and the temporal worlds. (5) One can solve the problem
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of evil without placing its responsibility before God. The
minds other than the perfect Ideal cause evil, and it can
therefore be "cured" "through the immanence of each being's
eternal principle of good and the presence to it of the di-
vine Friend and Savior." (6) Organic pluralism validates be-
lief in God as the absolutely perfect Person who transcends
all others and is immanent in none except as an ideal before
each mind. Such a God is concerned with the spiritual suc-
cess of every person, and hence each member of the republic
turns to the Absolute Conscience in every moral disaster for
renewal of moral courage and strength. This is the function
of prayer. 66 A moral order is assured on the basis of each
member of the republic striving for the perfection of the
ideal Type.
The question of freedom holds a prominent place in
Howison's eternal republic, and as such, is Howison ! s answer
to the above- suggested "determinism" argument. Having estab-
lished the moral life, freedom is demanded. Persons "think
their own thoughts, originate their own decisions," and
choose their own ideals. Moreover, freedom is grounded in
the very nature of the self. Selves have a mutual influence
upon each other, even though there is no interpenetration
among them any more than there is immanence of God in any of
66. Howison, as reproduced in Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 147-
151.
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them. Both interpenetration and Immanence would be viola-
tions of personality. Each self is completely autonomous,
hence completely free in its actions relative to other human
minds, to God, and to the natural world.
Howison 1 s attempt to harmonize determinism and freedom
parallels his solutions to other problems, i.e., in terms of
the definite rational nature of each self, and the final cau-
sality of God. By freedom he does not mean caprice or
chance, rather "action spontaneously flowing from the defi-
nite guiding intelligence of the agent himself
.
n6r7
The natu-
ral world, in terms of God, is subject to his mind and will.
If that is true for God, argues Howison in taking the thought
of typical theists, it is also true for all persons. If
every self is coexistent in eternity with God, then men are
logically prior to nature as its source rather than its out-
come, in the same ideal manner in which God is. It is not
God alone who conditions nature, but the entire society of
free minds. In fact, God conditions nature only remotely as
the ruling ideal, whereas human minds condition it "directly
and productively" in reference to the Ideal. Man is exalted
over the natural world as an eternally self-directing activi-
ty. He is, therefore, not a creature, as held in "elder"
theology, but infinite and free in his own right.
Such a view of man conflicts with the usual creative
67. Howison, LOE, 320.

120
office of God. The ultimate solution to the question of
freedom, then, demands that one find a substitute for the
older idea of creation as efficient causation. If that can-
not be done, one must "in all honesty and good logic" "travel
penitently back to a Calvinism, a Scotism, an Augustinian-
ism. "^8 Inasmuch as a being efficiently caused cannot be
free, God must be a final cause of all free activity.
Final cause, then, or the Ideality at the logi-
cal heart of conscious life,— to that we are to
look for release from the perplexity about the
determinism in Divine supremacy and the self-
determinism in human or other non-divine free-
dom. 69
Howison anticipates the charge that his uncompromising
pluralism becomes atheism in making every person his own cre-
ator, or polytheism in making every person a God. He answers
the first charge by pointing out that every self needs God as
its ideal, a view compatible with freedom, and eliminates the
second by maintaining that every self posits itself as not
God in that it possesses defect.
Thus every soul, though indeed, in the unifying
whole of its nature, of the divine kind , and of
inextinguishable free- infinity, nevertheless
carries in its being an aspect of negation to
its divine nature, and simply by the operation
of its self-thought idea must realize its eter-
nal freedom in a way that differs from God's
way in kind.^0
68. Howison rarely sees a mediating view; here it is either
complete freedom or predestination.
69. Howison, LOE, 348.
70. Ibid., 363.
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The free system is not, then, polytheistic any more than it
is atheistic. All except God provide in their own being the
"liability" of sin. And further, one experiences freedom in
the act of wrong-doing. The ideal of freedom becomes two-
fold, eternal apprehension of the Ideal in God and recogni-
tion of one ! s ideal self as thoroughly individuated from God.
In short, for Howison, freedom means self-direction toward
the Ideal, and power on the part of infinite beings in the
sense world to bring their "temporal life" into conformity
with the Ideal.
The pursuit of the ideal is an eternal process, i.e.,
human selves, as coeternal with God achieve immortality.
Howison is not concerned with the various forms of imperson-
al immortality, viz., the doctrine that the indestructibili-
ty of matter assures one of immortality on scientific as-
sumptions, or that one is biologically immortal through his
offspring, or sociologically immortal through influence, or
that he achieves metaphysical immortality by returning to
the "mother sea of mind" or the "World Soul" of Flotinus,
Emerson, and Royce. It is personal, self-conscious Individ-
ual immortality based on an idealistic doctrine of an "eter-
nal Pluralism" that Howison champions. Here he is closer to
Bowne than he is to Calkins.
Consider how Howison arrives at such a view. He
first disposes of the objection of "cerebral materialism" by
an appeal to a more rational philosophy than the empiricist

122
tradition and to a more thorough interpretation of modern
psychology than James, whom he criticizes, has made. Philo-
sophically, brain- function materialism rests upon the idea
that (1) the brain is the creation of some assumed "Mind be-
hind the scenes," (2) the creation of "many minds behind the
scenes," or (3) self-existent as an "unintelligible mystery
in being." All these he denounces as unintelligible. Psy-
chologically, the problem of parallelism arises. Is the
mind a concomitant variation of the brain? If so the brain
is not logically prior to the mind, nor vice versa, hence
parallelism is inadequate. Interactionism is more coherent
with all of experience. But on what causal basis can there
be interaction? Only by connecting the two streams of joint
effects to a "primordial and actively conscious self as
their real cause. "^ That is, Howison' s solution rests upon
an a priori self-active consciousness. He agrees with Kant
that for anything to be perceived or experienced at all, it
must be brought by the mind to the act of experience. The
roots of all knowledge and experience are part of the spon-
taneity of the personality.
In proving this, Howison declares that time and space
and force and cause, as well as all sensory experiences, 72
are a priori or spontaneous forms of consciousness. Human
71. Howison, LOE, 296.
72. He does not mean, however, that time, space, force, and
cause are sensory; they are a priori conditions of sense
experience as well as a priori forms of consciousness.

selves are not dependent upon nature, rather nature is depen-
dent upon them. Death, then, becomes simply a "point of
transition" from one form of experience to another in the
eternal life of the individual. The eternal republic of
minds is
the world of primary causes, and every member
of it, secure above the vicissitudes of Time
and Space and Force, is possessed of a super-
temporal or eternal reality, and is therefore
not liable to any lethal influence from any
other source. Itself a primary cause, it can
neither destroy another primary cause nor be
destroyed by any. "73
Howison does not stop here. One does not continue to live
merely in a world of sense-perception. The self not only
conditions nature, but also the entire spontaneous mental
life including all its guiding ideals of truth, beauty, and
good, which in turn are constituent parts of its being. The
self, then, posits ideals spontaneously in its recognition
of the society of minds as it becomes conscious of itself.
Persons transcend the world of sense-perception in their im-
mortality, and also continue to increase value. The ideals
posited will "reign everlastingly" for the self and the to-
tal society of selves.
Howison' s eternal republic is seen to be a society of
self-conscious individuals who are both infinite and coeter-
73. Howison, LOE, 307-308. A primary cause is "self-causa-
tive life," "spontaneous cognition;" it is not primary
in the sense of efficient causation.
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nal with God. Their infinity means their self-activity,
distinctness, self-existence, freedom. The entire pluralis-
tic system is held together in complete harmony by reason,
that is, by reason as an ideal. Each individual, moreover,
possesses moral integrity and freedom to pursue moral aims.
Finally, the entire republic is eternal inasmuch as each per-
son is immortal. In arriving at these conclusions, Howison
depends upon his idea that selves are logically prior to na-
ture and all of supratemporal experience. The total society
of selves is corporately the source of nature and ideals in
terms of the final cause, God. It will be well, then, to
consider more closely Howison' s idea of God.
5. The Idea of God.
Howison views God as an infinite, self-existent, self-
active being who "is the way of absolute perfection." 74 This
perfection is unique among all the minds, or persons of the
universe, for all other minds include defect. God alone is
the "ideal Type," the central member of the total society of
persons, the Aris totelian final cause making possible the ex-
istence of all other persons. As such he is the "Perfect
Guide and Friend."
God is not a creator, however. As a final cause (and
74. Howison, LOE, 423.
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in Hbwi son's system efficient cause always gives way to final
cause), God can not create another self-active intelligence;
he is the goal of every self, the ideal. Each human self de-
fines itself in terms of the entire system of selves, but
more particularly in terms of the ideal of itself, or God.
The Supreme Self becomes an impersonated ideal of all the
selves in the entire system. There is thus a logical origin
of each self in terms of God, but not a newly created self
by the will of God. What the origin of the entire system is
Howison does not say, other than to maintain the view that
every self in his pluralistic system is eternal and infinite.
It is therefore invalid to speak of creation of selves in
terms of space or time; spontaneous cognition is self-causa-
tive life. One cognizes himself only in terms of the total
society of selves for whom the ideal is God, hence creation
is logical relationship to an ideal, God.
This view of God as merely one in a pluralistic sys-
tem, and all selves being infinite, is in opposition to both
the pluralistic monism of Bowne and the Absolutistic view of
Miss Calkins. Bowne maintains that finite selves are cre-
ated by God; Miss Calkins holds that finite selves are part
of the Absolute. Howison points out that neither of these
positions is ideal enough. In the celebrated debate between
Royce, Mezes, LeConte, and Howison at the Philosophical Union
in Berkeley, Howison attacked the Absolutistic view in chal-
lenging Royce, Miss Calkins' teacher. Howison argued that
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Absolute Idealism leads not to theism or monotheism, but to
universal theism or to the pantheism of the Orient. 75 In
both a system where God is absolute and where God creates
other persons, man is indeed finite; man, for Howison, is
infinite, even as God. Not only do both the above systems
lessen the dignity of man, but further, says Howison, the ab-
solutistic position denies freedom and immortality, and des-
troys the moral order.
In determining the actual existence of God, Howison
holds that he emphatically rejects the " thrice-buried Onto-
logical Proof." He seems to use precisely that argument,
however, if not from the point of view of an individual,
then on a pluralistic basis of all selves corporately postu-
lating Him, for Howison maintains that every mind in the
universe defines itself ultimately only in terms of God.
Because many minds exist, God necessarily exists. This can-
not be the cosmological argument, for in Howison 1 s system
there is no efficient cause of a cosmos. The existence of
any mind or self, says Howison, carries with it all that the
self "synthetically involves," and the individual self in-
volves God. This is stretching the point, yet Howison sharp-
ly denies McTaggart's criticism that he assumes the ideal
Type as a possible being. The denial is not convincing. One
does not seem justified in saying that a mind defines itself
75. See Howison, COG, 89-100.
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as actually existing on the basis of an ideal Type, which
therefore ipso facto exists also. "if he is real," writes
Howison, of individual persons, "then God is real; if God is
not real, then neither can he be real." 76 This argument does
not even prove the existence of the idea of God, for belief
in God is not an immediate inference from belief in self.
All individuals do not have an idea of God. Howison is sat-
isfied, however, that it proves the existence of God.
An interesting concomitant of the idea that God is a
final cause rather than an efficient one is that God is
thereby relieved of all responsibility for evil. God is the
creator or author of nothing in terms of efficient cause; how
then can he be the author of evil? This view is not to be
misconstrued as making God finite, for it must be remembered
that all persons are infinite in Howison' s system. In regard
to evil, Howison writes with insight:
To present God as the responsible cause of the
enormity of suffering simply in natural exist-
ence . . . and, at the same time, to present
Him as the rightful object of our adoring de-
votion because He is the perfect impersonation
of Justice and of Love, should by this time be
seen to involve a hopeless contradiction. . . .
True, it is not eternal love or goodness that "scorches and
suffocates," that by means of a volcanic eruption engulfs
tt
a whole civil community in indiscriminate annihilation."
76. Howison, LOE, 355.
77. Howison, Art. (1902), 117.
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Thinkers have dealt with the contradiction over the years,
arriving at such views as Zoroastrian dualism, the idea that
evil is a just judgment, the view that evil is good in dis-
guise, and the idea that evil is not eliminated because God
is finite. Howison is aware of these views, although not of
the latter concept in its most recent expression. He emphat-
ically rejects them, pointing out that all such views either
beg the question "by denying that there _is any evil" or else
attempt to make God finite in a world in which all selves are
infinite. There is nothing particularly striking in this
idea of Howison 1 s, but he is original in being so completely
pluralistic that he avoids creationism and efficient causali-
ty, thereby making God purely an ideal who is not responsible
for any of the evil of the world. The real source of the
problem of evil, to Howison, "is the traditional form of our
theism, and its burden comes from attributing to God the au-
thorship of Nature. . . . The solution to the whole prob-
lem of evil, then, is simply a "new idealism," a philosophy
in which nature and all its evils are derived from minds to
be sure, but minds other than God. Inasmuch as God stands in
a final-causal relation to all other minds he is exonerated.
This is really no solution. It merely saves God by shifting
the responsibility from the central Person in the "Republic"
to the entire "Republic" exclusive of the perfect Ideal.
78. Howison, Art. (1902), 115.

129
One is forced again, in dealing with the component
aspects of Howison* s idea of God, as he is in discussing any
of Howison' s thought, back to the concept of final cause.
One is certain that God exists, for there must be an ideal
by which each individual person defines itself. God is
good, for the ideal must be perfect, and for the same rea-
son, He is not the author of evil. Howison is concerned
with making a strong case for theism, but so restricting is
his narrow concept of final cause that he never arrives at a
theism of the breadth and depth of that expounded by either
Calkins or Bowne. He suggests that the views they represent
are not ideal enough. Rather, one is tempted to conclude
that his God is but a primus int er pares or less, for if
God does not share in the creation of anything, as final
cause, He is not of the same order of persons with man even
though He may be their Ideal in other respects.
6. Howison's Place and Influence in American Philosophy.
Howison, a significant American thinker, was one of a
company of men in his day who made philosophy an important
part of the newly evolving American culture. He was a mas-
terful teacher, and will continue to be recognized for his
79. See Wahl, PPEA, 226.
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original form of personalism. Before dealing with these spe-
cific factors in his influence, however, consider the recog-
nition given him in recent philosophical literature.
Howison is not referred to very frequently in the
philosophical journals, but he is given considerable atten-
tion in some of the important books. Two excellent articles,
however, have appeared. John W. Buckham published "The Con-
tributions of Professor Howison to Christian Thought" in The
Harvard Theological Review in 1916, and Charles M. Bakewell
gave a scholarly treatment to "The Personal Idealism of
George Holmes Howison" in The Philosophical Review in 1940. 80
The chief book dealing with the life and thought of Howison
is George Holmes Howison by Buckham and Stratton. 81 Refer-
ence is made to Howison in several standard textbooks: Mary
Whiton Calkins devotes considerable discussion to him in her
book, Persistent Problems of Philosophy . 82 G. Watts Cunning-
ham devotes a chapter to him in The Idealistic Argument in
Recent British and American Philosophy . 85 George Stuart
Pullerton speaks of his "eloquence and feeling" in An Intro -
duction to Philosophy . 8^ Gamertsfelder and Evans refer to
80. These articles, and the books mentioned that follow, ap-
pear in the bibliography.
81. Professor emeritus, Charles Henry Rieber, in a letter
dated January 10. 1943, calls this "an outstanding book."
82. See PPP (1st ed. ) , 378, 407, 412-416, 422n, and 558. She
favors his personalism, but rejects his pluralism.
83. See 302-314.
84. See 205.
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him in Fundamentals of Philosophy . 85 His system is referred
to by David R. Major in An Introduction to Philosophy
,
86 by
G. T. W. Patrick in Introduction to Philosophy
,
87 by Arthur
Kenyon Rogers in his English and American Philosophy Since
1800
,
88
and by Frank Thilly in A History of Philosophy . 89
Howison's system is considered, or alluded to, in several
other important books. They are: William Ernest Hocking's
Types of Philosophy
,
^0 Albert C. Knudson's Philosophy of Per-
sonalism
,
9
-*- Joseph Alexander Leighton's Man and The Cosmos
,
9^
Douglas Clyde Macintosh's The Problem of Knowledge
,
95 Ralph
Barton Perry's Present Philosophical Tendencies
,
94 and S.
Radhakrishnan' s The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philos -
ophy . 95 Howison is also recognized in several notable books
on religion. Rannie Belle Baker critically evaluates "Howi-
son's Theory" at some length in The Concept of a Limited
God. 96 Edgar S. Brightman mentions him in A Philosophy of
85. See 237 and 430.
86. See 262-263, 270n, and 329.
87. Patrick puts Howison's Limits of Evolution in a list of
books which be says "should be carefully read by every
student in philosophy. Their wholesomeness and their
ethical Idealism insure their lasting value." ITP, 222.
88. See 303.
89. See 562.
90. See the first edition, 42 and 246.
91. Howison's view of God is treated critically by Knudson.
See POP, 53-61, and also 19-20, 75, and 83n.
92. See 186 and 197.
93. See 189 and 190.
94. See 306.
95. For this critical discussion of Howison's system, see
384-392.
96. See 87-97.
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Religion
,
97 as does William Ernest Hocking in The Meaning of
God in Human Experience
.
98 A. Seth Pringle- Pattison treats
Howison f s views in The Idea of God . 99 Finally, reference is
made to Howison by William Kelley Wright in A Student ' s Phi-
losophy of Religion
.
100
The first thing to be said of Howison 1 s place and in-
fluence in American philosophy is that he was a distinguished
thinker, who, with his contemporaries, made a profound philo-
sophical imprint upon American culture. Duping the transi-
tional nineteenth century, America was expanding, growing,
and arriving at her full stature. Howison, along with his
friends and fellow philosophers, Alcott, Emerson, Erokmeyer,
Snider, Harris, Davidson, Palmer, James, Bowne, and Royce,
helped to mold America politically, religiously, education-
ally and socially. He was an important member of the St.
Louis Group, which was, for a time, the leading philosophical
voice of the nation. His was a forceful influence in the
East, especially at Massachusetts Institute of Technology
and at the Concord School of Philosophy. During his later
years, spent at the University of California, he made a last-
ing philosophical contribution to the West. Hocking, who
97. See 300n.
98. See 290 and 503.
99. See 315-321, 386, and 412n.
100. See 337. For a somewhat more complete (although not as
recent) list of references to Howison in philosophical
publications, see Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 389-390.
»
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knew him well, wrote that Howlson "took his philosophy like
a religion,"101 and Montague adds:
He preached it with fiery and unflagging earnest-
ness, and so great was the force of his personali-
ty that people all over the Pacific Coast began
and have continued to study the philosophy of Ger-
man Idealism. The spirit at Berkeley was very
different from that at Harvard. Under Howison,
philosophy was not a fencing-match in which friend-
ly gentlemen exchanged playful thrusts and courte-
ously applauded their adversaries. It was a grim
thing of life and death for the soul, a veritable
religion in which either you were orthodox (Howi-
sonian) , or you were damned. 102
J. Elliot Cabot, to whose lectures Howison had listened at
Harvard, concurs regarding Howison 1 s influence, for he wrote
in 1897:
I think often of your activity & influence there
on the other side of the continent as a very im-
portant factor in its history—not at all cal-
culable but certain to be far-reaching & in the
highest matters as time goes on. 10^
Cunningham, too, says that Howison "exerted a marked influ-
ence on the cultural development of the Pacific Coast during
the years (1884-1909) of his professorship at the University
of California. 1,104 So forceful was Howison' s leadership that
James Ward wished him to come to Cambridge, England, saying:
"No one from your side of the v/ater would be so welcome."105
Indeed, during the last half of the transitional nineteenth
101. In a, letter to the author dated January 12, 1943.
102. Montague, Art. (1930), 141.
103. quoted by Buckham and Stratton, G-HH, 101.
104. Cunningham, IA, 302.
105. Quoted by Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 116.
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century, Howison helped to establish philosophy prominently
in the newly developed America. He hoped that philosophy
would prepare "the superstructure of a national life at once
Second, as already stated, Howison will be remembered
as a great teacher. This is his weakness as well as his
strength, however, for he did little important writing. He
wrote only one philosophical book of significance, The Limits
of Evolution
. Even that was not a complete exposition of his
system; it was a reworking of previously published essays.
As a writer, he lacked the warmth and strength which were ap-
parent in his lecturing and speaking; nor did he always write
clearly. This lack of clarity and systematic exposition may
account, in part, for his lack of a philosophical following.
Be that as it may, his prominence as a teacher was recognized
even in England. In a letter from Oxford to a "young and in-
timate friend," Howison wrote:
Dr. Stout
. . . has been very attentive to me,
and says he likes the Univ. of Cal. philosophers,
from Royce on (he has seen Bakewell, and read
McG-ilvary), because they really seem to have
some convictions , and feel as if they ought to
get others to share them.-LU '
As previously mentioned, Howison numbered among his students
Mezes, Rieber, Stuart, McGilvary, Bakewell, Henderson, and
Lovejoy. Through these men, as well as through his many
106. Howison, Art. (1934), 379.
107. Quoted by Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 115.
genuine and devoted." 106
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lecture and speaking engagements, "he exercised a wide influ-
ence on American philosophy. "108
Finally, Howison will continue as an influence in Amer
ican philosophy because of his pluralistic form of personal-
ism. He was in the center of many philosophical crosscur-
rents, from which he evolved, in part, his system. He drew
the "best from German idealism in his early days at St. Louis
and in his later study abroad. He knew the historic litera-
ture of his field, the significant British philosophy, and he
was thoroughly steeped in his own genteel heritage. Against
this background, and through his sympathetic exchange of
ideas with such men as Alcott and Davidson, Harris and Royce,
he worked out his system of thought. Philosophy was for him
a way of life. He attempted, therefore, to vitalize the gen-
teel tradition by developing a pluralistic personalism that
was more concrete and more inclusive of the many factors of
experience. His personalism "was in refreshing contrast to
the anthropophagous absolute of Royce and Bradley. . . . "109
It was a forerunner of the pluralism of James. In one way
at least, his system was a logical synthesis between the
semi-pantheism of Calkins and the alleged "monarchotheism"
of Bowne. 110 His was a pioneering philosophy, a distinct
108. Bates, Art. (1932), 311. See also Buckham and Stratton,
GHH, 11.
109. Montague, Art. (1930), 141.
110. Hocking credits Howison with checking Absolutism, and
puts him in the company of Hegel and James for saying
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personalistic pluralism that will continue to stand out promi-
nently in American philosophy.
7. Summary.
Howison, a vigorous spirit with a well-trained mind,
is the chief representative of pluralistic personalism in
American philosophy. He developed his particular system
through an original synthesis of the ideas of Aristotle,
Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel, through an interchange
of thought with such distinguished contemporaries as Alcott,
Davidson, Harris, James, Palmer, Bowne and Royce, and through
his deep concern that every person be recognized as an inte-
gral part of the eternal society of persons.
His personalism is a definition of reality as a uni-
versal society of persons, who, although held together by
reason, are completely individual and eternal. Mind, on this
basis, functions spontaneously to make perception possible.
Nature is dependent upon the "assemblage of individual minds,"
and is created, not by God, but by the final causation of a
society of minds experiencing themselves and each other. In
the "eternal republic," the individual person achieves moral
the world is a place where the spirit can never be
naturalized. See MGHE, 290, 503. Radhakrishnan in-
cludes him in the distinguished company of James Berg-
son, Ward, Schiller, Balfour, Eucken, and Rashdall for
opposing Absolutism. See ROR, 46-47.
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goals in terms of the ideal, G-od, experiences free choice,
and attains immortality. God is the "ideal Type," "the way
of absolute perfection." He is not a creator, but a final
cause, the goal of every self.
Howiso^s life and work may be appraised in the light
of his forceful personality and his philosophical position.
His life spanned an important period in the development of
American culture. With clarity of purpose, vigorous scholar-
ship, and deep religious faith, he made a permanent contribu-
tion to that developing culture, and to the progress of
thought. (1) He helped to give philosophy an important role
in American life. (2) He was a superlative teacher who, al-
though he did not develop a following, stimulated students
to become more noble persons in all walks of life. He so
aroused the interest of some of his students that they became
philosophers themselves, and have assumed responsible posi-
tions in American education. (3) He turned from traditional
idealism to become the champion of a more vigorous and con-
crete personal idealism. It is to him that future philoso-
phers v/ill turn for the ablest American expression of plural-
istic personalism.

CHAPTER IV
ABSOLUTISTIC PERSONALIS!!
Mary Whiton Calkins, a student and disciple of Royce,
is an exponent of the second distinctive type of personalism
in America, viz., absolutistic personalism. ^ Her central
idea is that the Absolute Self shares, but transcends tempor-
al consciousness, and experiences what every finite self ex-
periences. The finite self, on the other hand, is an express-
ion, an integral part of the Absolute Self, not a separate
and distinct eternal infinite entity as in Howison's system.
The "Great society of mutually interrelated selves" is held
together, not by desire or sentience, as for Davidson, nor
by reason as for Howison, but by rationality within the con-
scious personality of the Absolute itself. By personality,
Calkins means "spirit," "soul," "self," "person," "I." 2
The distinctiveness of Miss Calkins' absolutistic view
in American personalism may be seen in her own reference to
personalistic thinkers. In pointing out those who hold that
"consciousness is not mere idea or series of ideas," but "the
unique subject of ideas," she refers to Descartes, Locke,
Berkeley, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Lotze,
1. Knudson calls her the "most conspicuous representative" of
this form of personalism. See POP, 33. It must be recog-
nized that although Calkins did not attain the superior
greatness of Royce , she was more consciously personalistic.
See pages 80, 142, 268, and 269 of this study.
2. Calkins, PPP (1st. ed.), 75n.
138
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Renouvier, Howison, Ward, Royce, "and a great company of
philosophers. 1,3 The only Americans in the list are Howison
and Royce, both personalists, but diametrically opposed in
terms of pluralism versus absolutism. Calkins does not sug-
gest the possibility of a mediating position such as held by
Bowne and others, hence one can conclude that she herself
views her monistic personalism as distinctive in contrast to
Howison* s pluralistic personalism. 4
1. The Life and Influence of Mary Whiton Calkins (1863-1930).
The dynamic personality of Mary Whiton Calkins enabled
her to become a beloved teacher, a venerated colleague, and
a distinctive leader in both American philosophy and psychol-
ogy. Although she spent her academic career at Wellesley
College, she "exercised an influence far beyond its walls. "°
She was born in Hartford, Connecticut, March 30, 1863,
c
the daughter of Wolcott Calkins and Charlotte Whiton Calkins.
Her family background on her father 1 s side was of Welsh stock
3. Calkins, PPP (1st ed. ) , 407.
4. Calkins' treatment of "Personal Idealism" in her book,
Persistent Problems of Philosophy , is, in fact, divided
into only two parts, pluralistic personal idealism and
monistic personal idealism. See pp. 406-455. Her chief
references are to Howison and Royce.
5. Brightman, Art. (1931), 35.
6. For a discussion of the salient features of Miss Calkins 1
life see her brother's article, which was read at a
memorial service for her in the Wellesley College Chapel
some six weeks after her death: Raymond Calkins, Art.
(1931), 1-19.
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that migrated to America in 1638, and on her mother's side
was of Mayflower descent, John and Priscilla Alden and
Richard Warren being numbered among her ancestors. Her fa-
ther was a teacher and then a clergyman who had taught at
Worcester Academy, Worcester, Massachusetts, was graduated
from Union Theological Seminary, and had studied and trav-
elled in Europe. 7 He remained in Hartford only two years,
then served the Calvary Presbyterian Church in Philadelphia
until 1867, when he went to Buffalo, New York, as minister
of the North Presbyterian Church. Miss Calkins spent her
childhood in Buffalo. There she went to the public schools
and studied German privately under* Prau Veldt. When her par-
ents moved to Newton, Massachusetts in 1880, she entered the
Newton High School and "at once showed unusual intellectual
ability." 8
She received her advanced academic training at Smith
College, Radcliffe College, Clark University, Harvard Univer-
sity, and also travelled in Europe. In 1882 she entered
Smith College, where she studied chiefly Greek and philoso-
phy. She graduated with the class of 1885, after being out
a year because of sickness in the family. She spent a year
at home following her graduation, reading widely, and devel-
oping strong social interests that later came to be a
7. For more information about him see Thomas Cole Richards,
Art. (1929), 422.
8. R. Calkins, Art. (1931), 3.
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vigorous social philosophy. She travelled the next year
with her family in Europe. Besides her general travel and
study, she made a special trip with Miss Abby Leach, an in-
structor of Vassar College, to Greece, where she broadened
her knowledge of the Greek Classics and learned to read mod-
ern Greek. 9 After returning to America, Miss Calkins became
tutor in Greek at Wellesley College, a position she held for
two years. She served another year as instructor in Greek,
and then became instructor in psychology in 1890. Pour years
later she was made associate professor of psychology, and in
1896 became associate professor of psychology and philosophy.
For the first time she was able to teach in the field of her
major interest, philosophy. She was made a full professor
of philosophy and psychology in 1898, and held that position
until 1929, when she became research professor of philosophy
and psychology.
Before teaching in the fields of psychology and phi-
losophy, however, Miss Calkins studied further at Clark Uni-
versity 10 and Harvard. In the meantime she had received
9. How like Thomas Davidson, who read both ancient and mod-
ern Greek, spoke modern Greek fluently, and who was,
through wide travel there, familiar with the total life
of modern Greece. Throughout her teaching career,
Calkins regretted, as had Davidson, the fact that stu-
dents were so uncultured as to pay little attention to
reading the original Greek.
10. The vigorous, pioneering personality of Miss Calkins is
illustrated in a letter dated November 30, 1942, from
Mrs. Lydia C. Colby, recorder of Clark University, who
wrote in answer to my request for a transcript of
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her master of arts degree from Smith College in 1888. At
Clark University her psychology was studied under Professor
Edmund C. Sanford. At Harvard University she specialized in
philosophy, and studied under the illustrious professors,
Royce, Munsterberg, and James. She was most deeply influ-
enced by Josiah Royce, whose general philosophical views she
later championed herself.
H
Returning to Wellesley in 1891, after this preparation
for her new work, Miss Calkins established a psychological
laboratory that "was one of the first eleven laboratories to
be founded in the United States, and the first to be founded
in any college for women." 12
Even though Miss Calkins taught psychology, wrote two
textbooks on the subject, An Introduction to Psychology (1901)
and A First Book in Psychology (1909), and was elected
Calkins* work there: "During the first few years of the
University, women were not supposed to be admitted to
its sacred confines, so that those who were brave enough
to enter its doors had no official standing, and appar-
ently no records were kept of their work."
11. These three professors declared Miss Calkins to be one
of their most brilliant pupils. She took the oral ex-
amination for the Ph.D. degree in 1895, and passed it
with distinction. William James said that it ranked
above any he had previously heard. She was refused the
degree, however, simply because Harvard University did
not award degrees to women. Later, Harvard repented and
offered her the degree, but she declined the belated of-
fer. Radcliffe College still later offered her the doc-
tor^ degree, but she declined because her work had been
done at Harvard rather than at Radcliffe. See Raymond
Calkins, Art. (1931), 9-10.
12. R. Calkins, Art. (1931), 10.

143
president of the American Psychological Association, her
primary interest was in philosophy. Professor Thomas Hayes
Procter, one of her colleagues, has suggested that it was
"through philosophy she fought her way to a real integration
of life.... Her largeness of soul was essentially philosoph-
•I <z
ic." Another colleague, Miss Mary S. Case, has written of
her philosophy that her course in modern philosophy "became
one of the outstanding features in the academic life of the
College." 14
During these forty-three years at Wellesley, Miss
Calkins was revered as a teacher and admired as a colleague.
She was unwaveringly loyal, kind, and considerate. Professor
Procter has remarked in conversation that one of the worthi-
est of her characteristics was her ability to work long hours
day after day, doing much of her writing and studying on the
bus between her home in Newton and the College in Wellesley.
An incident that took place at an informal departmental party
well illustrates this ability for work and also her concern
for the students:
An appreciative and humorously inclined graduate
student presented Miss Calkins with a sign which
read: "Professor Calkins. Office hours daily
from 7 a. m. to 10 p. m. , and at other times by
appointment.
13. Procter, Art. (1931), 31.
14. Quoted by R. Calkins, Art. (1931), 10-11.
15. Helen Cook Vincent, Art. (1931), 22.
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A student has further said of her: she "was the most per-
fectly integrated personality I have known." 16 A colleague
wrote: "She inspired us with her sense of the thrilling im-
portance of the work of the scholar and teacher." 17 And
during all these years of writing, lecturing, and teaching
as a scholar and teacher, "her most passionate interest" was
"that personalism should prevail both in psychology and in
philosophy."18
It was suggested at the outset that the influence of
Miss Calkins went far beyond the walls of Wellesley. Sever-
al pertinent facts about her life corroborate this. She was
elected to the presidency of the American Psychological As-
sociation in 1905, the American Philosophical Association in
1918, and in 1928 was made an honorary member of the British
Psychological Association. 19 She was honored with the degree
on
of Doctor of Letters by Columbia University in 1909, and
16. Quoted by Vincent, Art. (1931), 24.
17. Procter, Art. (1931), 29.
18. R. Calkins, Art. (1931), 11.
19. She was the first woman to be the president of the Ameri-
can Psychological Association, the only woman until 1941
to be president of the American Philosophical Associa-
tion, and the British Psychological Association "had
never before conferred such an honor upon any woman."
See R. Calkins, Art. (1931), 12. Only two other think-
ers ever held the presidency of both American Associa-
tions, William James and Munsterberg.
20. Miss Calkins was the first woman to receive an honorary
degree from Columbia. In conferring the degree, Presi-
dent Nicholas Murray Butler used the phrase: "Professor
of Philosophy and Psychology in Wellesley College; an
acute and clear-minded student of the problems of mental
life." From a letter by Philip M. Hayden, secretary of
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with the degree of Doctor of Laws by Smith College in 1910. 21
She was invited to many places to lecture. During the first
semester of 1916 she lectured on the Mills Foundation at the
University of California, giving a graduate seminar and a
lecture course on the Fundamental Problems of Philosophy that
was open to students and the public. 22 She also lectured at
the University of London, in 1927, on the subject "Concep-
tions of Meaning and Value,"23 and at Harvard Summer School
of Theology in 1910 on the subject of Prayer. It has been
well stated that Miss Calkins "was the first woman in the
entire history of philosophy to achieve distinction." 24
The source of the leadership and influence of Miss
Calkins lies in her life itself. She "lived her own beauti-
ful philosophy." Her students say "she taught us how to
Columbia University, dated December 10, 1942.
21. In October, 1910, at the inauguration of President Burton
at Smith College, Miss Calkins was given the degree of
Doctor of Laws with the following citation: "Mary Whiton
Calkins—Bachelor and master of arts of Smith College,
doctor of letters of Columbia University, professor of
philosophy and psychology at Wellesley College; learned
and eloquent, clear and profound, her many and important
contributions to philosophy and to psychology have won
the recognition of scholars and institutions at home as
well as abroad and secured for her a unique place among
the students of those subjects in our time." Quoted in
a letter from Miss Joy Secor, registrar of Smith College,
November 30, 1942.
22. R. Calkins, Art. (1931), 12. Also the Smith Alumnae Quar-
terly . It will be recalled that it was the Mills Chair of
Philosophy at the University of California that Howison
accepted when he first went there to teach philosophy.
23. R. Calkins, Art. (1931), 12.
24. Brightman, Art. (1931), 35.
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live." 25 Deeply religious, she integrated her philosophy and
religion into a constructive pattern for life, supported the
church, gave liberally to many causes, and believed sincere-
ly in prayer and immortality. Professor Brightman has char-
acterized her superlative traits of mind as: (1) clarity of
thought and expression, (2) demand for proof, (3) a fundamen-
tal fairness, (4) a keen sense of social justice, (5) anima-
tion "both by a high sense of duty and by a human kindness
and loyalty mellowed by humor," and (6) religious faith. 2^
Indeed, when one views the richness and range of her life,
one can conclude with Professor Procter that such a life
"cannot be lost," and that "she who sought truth, willed the
good, and loved the Great Community may still continue to
unfold the possibilities of her soul in the activity of cre-
ation. "27
2. The Absolute Self.
Miss Calkins 1 central philosophical idea is that the
Absolute constitutes the whole of reality. She agreed with
Howison, and other personalis ts, that "the universe is com-
pletely mental in nature, and that every mental existent is
either a self, or else a part, aspect, phase, or process of
25. Vincent, Art. (1931), 24.
26. Brightman, Art. (1931), 38-42.
27. Procter, Art. (1931), 33.

a self,"^8 yet she differed from him and many other person-
alists by maintaining that all selves are part of the Abso-
lute Self. She agrees in this point of view with Hegel and
Royce, saying in fact that "the idealistic critic may • . .
never reject Hegel's proof that ultimate reality is an Abso-
lute Self." 29 Personality is, thus, ultimate, but all ex-
istence must cohere in one Absolute unity, an absolute self.
Even though finite selves experience themselves as individu-
al unities, they are merely parts of the greater whole.
Calkins has pointed out that
Personal absolutism is the doctrine that all
existent realities are selves of one sort or
another; that these selves are not wholly in-
dependent beings but rather members of an all-
including conscious being in somewhat the fash-
ion in which a student self, a business self,
and a domestic self may be said to be parts of
me; and finally that this all- including self
is no mere aggregate or society of persons but
a unique individual which perceives, thinks,
feels, and wills as an individual. It follows
that every last fact in the universe is ulti-
mately a fact of the absolute self's experi-
encmg. ou
The absolute self is, thus, a complete self that is supra-
temporal, supra- spatial, and conscious of the experience of
finite selves as parts of its own experience.
Calkins arrives at several conclusions regarding the
nature of the absolute self. First, regarding consciousness
28. Brightman, Art. (1931), 46.
29. Calkins, Art. (1903) 1 . 24.
30. Calkins, PPP (5th ed.), 449

(1) The absolute self has all varieties of elemental sense
experience inasmuch as he is conscious of all that is experi-
enced by human selves. (2) The absolute not only perceives,
he also thinks, not in the slow syllogistic method of gain-
ing truth by degrees, but by " thought- intuition. " "He u-
nites the directness of human perception with more than the
completeness of human thought," and hence "his must indeed
be the only really necessary and complete consciousness."^
(3) The absolute is effectively conscious, that is, he en-
tertains an emotional consciousness toward each finite
self. 32 (4) The absolute self affirms, i.e., he actively
experiences will. 33 Second, regarding the nature of the ab-
solute self, he not only knows, feels, and wills, he is also
conscious of himself as good. The absolute cannot be both
good and bad, and inasmuch as badness is only "partlalness"
according to Calkins, he is good. "The fully personalistic
absolutist seems constrained to attribute goodness to the
Absolute Self." 34 Calkins 1 conclusion, regarding conscious-
ness of the absolute, is that "the absolute self has all the
elemental experiences ... of human selves; that he is con-
scious of himself as actively related to finite selves, in-
cluded within himself; that his experience is utterly
31. Calkins, PPP (1st ed. ) , 427.
32. It will be recalled that Davidson held his pluralistic
system together largely on the basis of sentience.
33. Calkins, PPP (5th ed. ) , 461.
34. Ibid., 434.
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complete. n
3. The Finite Self as an Expression of the Absolute Self.
The Absolute Self individualizes itself into distinct
conscious finite selves that represent different purposes,
emotions, or thoughts of its own being. Finite selves are
partial and fragmentary; they express various aspects of ab-
solute experience. Calkins insists that human individuality
is not lost on this basis, as her pluralistic opponents main-
tain. She wrote:
You and I, so far from being swallowed up in
the absolute self, so far from being lost or
engulfed in the ultimate I, find the guarantee
of our individual reality precisely herein that
we are essential and unique expressions of this
absolute self. 36
The essential factor, for both psychology and philosophy,
then, is the experiencing self. 37
Calkins arrives at awareness of a self by introspec-
tive experience. She agrees with Kant and Berkeley in
35. Calkins, PPP (1st ed. ) , 434.
36. Ibid., 439.
37. See Calkins 1 unpublished lecture entitled "An Essential
Factor of a Radical Empiricism" written some time after
1927. In another unpublished manuscript entitled "The
Self- Psychology of Psychoanalysts," Calkins said that
her purpose in writing it was "to show that the psycho-
logical doctrine of the psychoanalysts is essentially
personalistic psychoanalysis." P. 1. The present
writer is indebted to Professor Thomas Hayes Procter of
Wellesley College for allowing him to examine all of
Miss Calkins' unpublished manuscripts.

asserting that all knowledge is the function of a knower, 38
and that idealism must he based "on the one unchallengeable
assertion: what I directly know, and all that I directly
know, is a self (myself) experiencing."39 One knows the ab-
solute through the same process of relationship between know-
er and known. "I directly know myself; I directly know the
absolute since I am identically the same as part of him. "40
In a challenge to the realists who bow to the authority of
the physical scientists whose "hypothesized realities . . •
are one and all reducible to the negligible unknown or else
to a complex of sensible quality and relation," Calkins
says:
Do not talk about vortex-ring, and electron,
and ether, and energy, until you have first
discussed the terms to which these reduce; the
sensible qualities and complexes—-extensity,
resistence, motion—and the relations—-cause,
multiplicity, oneness, and the rest. You can
give no unchallenged account of these quali-
ties and relations, except as distinct ways of
experiencing, that is, of being conscious. 41
Calkins enumerates the characteristics of the self in her
article, "The Case of the Self against the Soul." (1) The
38. See Calkins, Art. (1925), 22, and Art. (1908), 280.
39. Calkins, Art. (1929), xl. See also her unpublished
"Radical Empiricism in Philosophy," especially the
conclusion, 48.
40. Calkins, PPP (5th ed. ) , 472.
41. Calkins, Art. (1911), 458. Calkins is criticizing
science as a philosophy, not as a method, or body of
knowledge. In fact, she points out elsewhere that
science favors "an upgrowth of personalistic doctrine."
Art. (1919) 2 , 146.
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self persists. (2) The self also changes. (3) Every self
is unique, individual. "There is only one of me. " (4) Every
self is complex, "a unity of present with past,
. . . with
future,
. . . self and a totality, also, of many different
experiences." Finally, (5) every self is related to the
world in which it is placed. All of these characteristics
are immediately experienced, hence the self is not merely in-
ferred; it is observed. 42 This finite self, as known through
experience, is ultimate, "a self who is conscious, a perceiv-
ing, thinking, feeling, or willing self."43
One must also consider Calkins 1 idea of the freedom of
finite selves inasmuch as this question seems to be a crucial
issue between the personalistic pluralist and the personalis-
tic absolutist points of view. The pluralist charges the
monist with failure to harmonize the claims of human freedom
of choice with the idea of an absolute self. 44 Calkins has
recognized this charge, yet defends freedom within her sys-
tem on the basis of two considerations: "First that we are
often conscious of freedom, • • • second, the alleged impli-
cation of freedom in moral consciousness."45 The first ar-
gument is psychological. Every normal self believes it is
42. Calkins, Art. (1917), 279-280. See also James Bissett
Pratt's use of these characteristics in Matter and
Spirit , 177-178.
43. Calkins, Art. (1919), 128.
44. Howison, for instance, maintains that on the basis of
monism individual "freedom would be swamped." LOE, 411.
45. Calkins, PPP (1st ed. ) , 449.
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free. This is not a conclusive argument, however. It is
similar to the one used by Spinoza that a falling stone com-
ing to consciousness while in motion would attribute freedom
to itself. The second argument is Kantian and Jamesian; one
experiences the categorical imperative. The experiences of
self-respect or regret imply that one has moral freedom, for
they indicate that one may espouse either good or evil. This
argument is not conclusive, as Calkins admits, hence one must
return to the nature of the absolute self in defining the
freedom of the finite selves. The human self is eternally
the "expression of the will of the absolute self."46 The ab-
solute is unutterably richer in experience than the finite
self. Nevertheless, the finite self is "the self of the mo-
ment," the self of the now , and as such, is different from
the absolute self. "In so far as a human self is a now- self,
it is different from the Absolute; and in the degree in
which it differs from the Absolute there may be room for
freedom."4^ The "momentary self" may thus determine its
"own next moment." Such freedom is superficial from a stand-
point other than the monistic position, yet it is consistent
for the monist. The finite self is part of the Absolute;
its freedom is only the freedom of the moment. This is a
cautious conclusion that neither affirms nor denies freedom,
46. Calkins, PPP (1st ed. ) , 451.
47. Ibid., 451.
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but rather "opens the way for the consideration of those
facts of the moral life on which the doctrine of freedom is
based.
"
48
The finite self, while a part of the absolute, is
unique and individual. It is persistent and complex, active
and assertive, particularizing and social, and is capable of
perceiving, thinking, feeling, and willing. 49 It is free to
make moral choices, but metaphysically free only within the
structure of an absolutistic monism. All freedom, to be
sure, is within limits.
4. Philosophy of Nature.
The physical universe is to be understood as the ex-
periencing and willing of the cosmic person in the same man-
ner in which every finite self is part of the experience of
the absolute. The total universe is completely mental, or
personalistic. For subscribing to this view, Calkins has
often been incltided in the group of panpsychists such as
Paulsen, Pechner, and James Ward. 50 This interpretation of
Calkins is based upon her presidential address to the Ameri-
can Philosophical Association at Harvard University, December
48. Calkins, PPP (1st ed. ) , 452.
49. For a complete account of each of these detailed aspects
of the self, see Calkins, FBIP.
50. See especially Gamertsfelder and Evans, FOP, 476, and
Joseph A. Leighton, MATC, 248-249.
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27, 1918, in which she discussed "The Personalistic Concep-
tion of Nature." She attempted to "trace the metamorphosis
of vitalism into personalism and to show that this psycho-
logical vitalism antagonizes no justified claim of mechan-
ism,"51 and also to establish "the fully personalistic con-
ception of the universe as consisting in innumerable selves,
or persons of different levels and degrees, more or less
closely related to each other." 52 Calkins is not reverting
to animism or phenomenalism; she is simply attempting to
point out that there are different levels of personality,
from the minimal to the maximal, i.e., from the non-human
(the selves of inorganic nature, the one-sidedly communica-
tive, and the intercommunicative of the higher vertebrates)
through the human to the absolute, which is the complete,
the supreme self. She argues that she has the support of
science in this view, especially in the newer dynamic theor-
ies of physics and the elimination of biological vitalism in
favor of psychological vitalism. Although Calkins never des-
ignates herself a panpsychist, her non-communicative selves
are surely monads. She is chiefly interested, however, in
pleading for a recognition of the claims of personalism as
soon as scientists and metaphysicians can be persuaded that
it involves "neither animism, phenomenalism, nor crass in-
51. Calkins, Art. (1919), 115
52. Ibid., 122.
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determinism.
"
53
5. The Great Society of Selves,
It has been pointed out that the idea of an absolute
self does not vitiate, for Calkins, the individuality of the
human self. Another aspect of the relationship between the
absolute and the finite selves that is of capital importance
in the absolutistic personalistic system is that the total
society of selves is mutually interrelated. Calkins indi-
cates her faith in the idea that this is a social universe,
in language similar to that used by her teacher Royce. She
speaks of "loyalty to the universal community of selves, "^4
"the great universe of selves, "^5 "the totality of conscious
beings, "^6 "community of experience,"^ and "the Great Socie-
ty. "58 jn contrasting her position with that of the plural-
ist, she has written: "The personal absolutists universe
is richer, not poorer, than that of the pluralistic personal-
ist. He, too, conceives the world as a Great Society of mu-
tually interrelated selves, human and extra-human.
"
59
The social universe of selves is thus held together
53. Calkins, Art. (1919), 146.
54. Calkins, GMAG, 51, and Art. (1916), 293.
55. GMAG, 49.
56. Ibid., 49.
57. FBIP, 179.
58. GMAG, 50, and 59.
59. PPP (5th ed. ), 467.
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by the consciousness of the Absolute. Everything in the uni-
verse is either a self or part of a self, and all selves are
part of the absolute self. The human self is aware of other
selves only indirectly; it is aware of the absolute directly.
The human self shares with his fellows who are distinct from
him whereas the absolute shares his experience with those who
are "included within him." Each human self has its own "in-
dividual point of view," yet each is "organically related to
the rest and aware of them not merely as single individuals
but as a related society." 60
Loyalty to the "Great Society 1* is both psychological-
ly possible and metaphysically tenable, suggests Calkins.
She illustrates the first conclusion in several ways. First,
social groups are personified and individuated, as in the
business world. Second, national groups are personified so
that "a man's country is . . . felt and treated as if a
self." 61 Third, one is loyal to the Christian church. One
speaks of the "communion of saints," or calls the church the
"Beloved Community," as did Royce. While these facts are
common to human experience, devotion to a community of selves
that is truly universal is much more. The dialectic of loy-
alty, however, is such that "loyalty tends constantly to
overflow its boundaries so that its object is progressively
60. Calkins, PPP (5th ed. ) , 473-474.
61. GMAG, 53.
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widened." 62 The individual, then, relates himself to an ever-
enlarging society. This psychological argument that one can
have an object of loyalty "unbuilt by human hands," is only
one of Calkins* answers to her critics. Her second conten-
tion, which does not necessarily prove an absolute self, is
that the individual can be loyal to the greater community and
also remain true to himself. Calkins points out that "indi-
viduality means not separateness , but uniqueness." 6^ Every
individual self is inextricably bound up with other persons,
and each self discovers richness and enlargement only as he
relates himself to social ends. 64 When loyal to the commu-
nity, the individual "is loyal to himself, but to himself as
related member, not to himself in isolation from the Great
Society." 65 The individual maintains his own identity with-
in the universal society, but because he is organically and
vitally related to it as part to whole, he realizes his full-
est completeness only in his "entire loyalty to it."
6. Social Philosophy.
If one believes in a metaphysical society of interre-
62. Calkins, GMAG, 55.
63. Ibid., 64.
64. Calkins serves as an excellent check upon those who hold
to a superficial individualism that leads to metaphysical
as well as social anarchy. It was Howison's recognition
of this truth that made him endeavor to hold his plural-
ism together by reason rather than allowing it to degen-
erate into an incoherent universe of anarchic selves.
65. Calkins, GMAG, 66.

lated selves, each of whom possess sacred uniqueness, one
must consistently hold to a vigorous social philosophy.
Calkins did this. In every area of thought or of human re-
lationship, she championed social justice. She counselled
her Wellesley colleagues and students, in a controversy over
freedom of speech, in the stirring words: "A college commu-
nity should be aflame with social and political interest. 1166
She addressed herself to clergymen, in the controversy over
an individual or social gospel: "I believe . . . that the
message of the minister is both individual and social."^ 7
Regarding a strike on the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy
Railroad "which delayed the traffic of a continent, and in-
volved an incalculable loss," she pleaded as early as 1888
for a reform which would "remove the very principle of the
discord between capital and labor." 6 ** Of great importance
is the fact that Calkins not only held to a progressive so-
cial philosophy, she also lived it. She supported the Con-
sumers 1 League, was a member of the Fellowship of Reconcili-
ation, a member of the Civil Liberties Union, often voted
the Socialist ticket, was an "uncompromising pacifist," and
was "radical in her views of present economic, industrial,
and international relations." She took the words of Jesus
66. Calkins, Art. (1918).
67. An unpublished manuscript entitled "The Minister's Mes-
sage: Individual or Social," for which there is no date,
2.
68. Calkins, STP, 4.
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seriously, "and witnessed for what she believed." 69
Two specific problems dealt with by Calkins, that fur-
ther illustrate her social philosophy, are the problem of an
economic system based on individual profits and the question
of war. She wrote a booklet in 1888, regarding the first,
entitled Sharing the Profits . It was an exposition of a
method designed to meet the crucial problem of the economic
and ethical needs of labor, while at the same time satisfy-
ing the demands of capital. Profit-sharing was therefore
advocated as a middle ground among labor reforms. Calkins
maintained that profit-sharing is ethically sound inasmuch
as material values belong to their producers, and laborers
are part producers of wealth. It is economically sound for
it would both increase and regulate production. Calkins il-
lustrated the strength of her argument with actual experi-
ments in industry, and said: "We must concede that at least
the possibility of the economic value ... is proved by the
experience of firms which have tested the theory."' 0 She
further pointed out that profit-sharing is associated with
such industrial reforms as (1) savings accounts for workmen,
(2) industrial education, (5) improved homes for working
people, and (4) distributive co-operation. Finally, although
she was cognizant of objections to profit-sharing, she con-
69. Raymond Calkins, Art. (1931), 16-17.
70. Calkins, STP, 20.
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eluded: "Theory and experiment alike meet the objections to
profit-sharing. By deductive and inductive reasoning its
position is strengthened." 71 Calkins was not misled into
the belief that this was a "panacea for industrial ills."
It was to her simply an "introduction" to more fundamental
reforms that were necessary, such as transformation of man's
mental and moral character. It was, however, a step in the
elimination of industrial evils by "rewarding care, fideli-
ty, and energy with a part of what they have helped to pro-
duce."'72
The second specific problem that illustrates Calkins 1
social philosophy is her view of war. In a trenchant article
written during the First World War, she advocated "Militant
Pacifism," maintaining that "war is not the inevitable re-
sult of unmodifiable instinct." 73 It is the result of "human
greed and sloth and cruelty." War will be eliminated when
"the fighting instinct of a virile people may be under the
control of its social instincts . . • when these social in-
stincts dominate pugnacity,"74 and when one sacrifices for
the "universal community of sentient beings." How keenly
Calkins spoke to her day when the Second World War was in
its formative stages! In an unpublished manuscript entitled
71. Calkins, STP, 58.
72. Ibid., 13.
73. Calkins, Art. (1917), 75.
74. Ibid., 78-79.
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"The Fighting Instinct," written between 1926 and her death
in 1950, she made a ringing plea for a spiritual war on war,
saying: "For this great spiritual warfare the time is over
ripe ,
"
75 There was no place for war in her "Great Society."
7. Ethics.
Miss Calkins made a contribution to the field of eth-
ics in her book The Good Man and The Good (1918). 76 A con-
sideration of the book logically follows a treatment of her
social philosophy, for although she began her ethical system
with the experience of a moral person, she devoted at least
half of the book to man as a social being, and found man's
greatest passion to be loyalty to the universal community of
selves, the kingdom of God.
Consider the chief points in Calkins* ethical system.
(1) The good man is one who acknowledges obligation. (2) The
good man is one who wills the good. (3) The good is to be
identified with the "all- including community." (4) Loyalty
to the universal community is compatible with true individu-
ation. (5) The good is not pleasure, as held by the hedon-
ist, although pleasure, or Kantian happiness, is part of it.
75. See "The Fighting Instinct," 74. Underlining not in the
original.
76. See also the paper she read at the Sixth International
Congress of Philosophy entitled "The Basis of Objective
Judgments in a Subjective Ethics." Art. (1927), 408-414.
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The good is "the fullest expression of every capacity, the
freest exercise of every activity of the whole universe of
selves." 7,7 (6) The virtuous man controls his instinctive
tendencies. He is thrifty, brave, prudent, and thoughtful.
(7) The good man is socially virtuous. He is truthful, just,
and generous. Finally, (8) the good man is a "lover of God."
Calkins 1 idea of aesthetics is that the beautiful is
ideal, valued, and unified, as is the good. "The beautiful
object, like the good, involves a subordination of part to
whole, a harmoniousness, a unification of detail." 7^ The
beautiful object, in contrast to the good object, however,
is impersonal, an isolated object, and an object of emotion.
One is engulfed, immersed, in the aesthetic
delight, one works and battles for one's moral
purpose. The lover of beauty opens his eyes
to see and spreads wide his arms to receive,
the lover of goodness bares his arm to toil or
to strike, and strains his muscles to press
forward. "73
While morality is similar to beauty in some ways, it
is different chiefly in that it finds its culmination in re-
ligion. The moral man finds his greatest self-expression in
relating himself to the great community of selves. He be-
comes transformed as he participates in the moral development
of the universe.
77. Calkins, GMAG, 79.
78. Ibid., 165-166.
79. Ibid., 167.

8. Philosophy of Religion.
Calkins was essentially a religious spirit. It has
been written that religion was the "motive and mainspring of
her life." 80 One of her students has said that "Her philoso-
phy, ethics, religion, psychology, and daily life were har-
monious; " 81 another, "As her philosophy was positively theis-
tic, so her living was essentially religious. 1,82 Brightman,
too, has suggested that one of the outstanding traits of
Miss Calkins 1 personality was her religious faith. He wrote,
regarding her ideas of religion:
Her empirical study of religion and her phi-
losophy alike prepared her for a sympathetic
attitude toward the teaching of Jesus that God
is father of men and that the universal socie-
ty is to he viewed as the family or kingdom of
God. 83
Miss Calkins wrote widely on such religious subjects as
prayer, the church, the social gospel, and immortality, al-
though not in any organized manner. She had planned upon re-
tirement to write a book that would express her integration
of philosophy and religion, 84 but ill health and death made
this impossible. A consideration of some of her ideas here
will reveal the essentials of her philosophy of religion.
Let us, then, state her ideas of God, prayer, the problem of
80. R. Calkins, Art. (1931), 24.
81. Quoted by Vincent, Art. (1931), 24.
82. Vincent, Art. (1931), 26.
83. Brightman, Art. (1931), 42.
84. Procter, Art. (1931), 32.

164
evil, and Immortality.
Calkins views God as a cosmic Person. She agreed on
a "Platform of Personalistic Idealism" with Professor Bright-
man on May 25, 1929, affirming that "the physical universe
may be regarded as the direct experiencing and willing of
one cosmic person." Such a "cosmic person" includes "both
the God of theism and the Absolute Person." God is, thus,
an Absolute Person who constitutes all existence, including
the various finite selves and physical nature, and also the
various experiences of the absolute self. The object of
one's religious experience is "a self, or selves, greater
than himself or than any other human self." 85 God is a "per-
sonal object,"**6 the "Greater Self who includes yet tran-
scends" human beings, but who "in one form or in another • . •
must belong to the world of selves." 8^ To such a God, the
"Father of all," one must be utterly loyal. This Calkins
believed and lived. It has been written that "Her life was
dignified because surrendered in absolute devotion to God." 88
Prayer is important in Calkins' philosophy of reli-
gion. It will be recalled that reference was made to her
lecture on prayer at the Harvard Summer School of Theology
in 1910. "So unusual and so gripping was her presentation
85. Calkins, GMAG, 171.
86. Ibid., 169.
87. Ibid., 173.
88. Procter, Art. (1931), 32.
\
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of the subject of prayer," wrote Raymond Calkins of the oc-
casion, "that her hearers crowded around her at its close
for further questioning.
"
89 Calkins pointed out on that oc-
casion that prayer does not presuppose "a metaphysical idea
of G-od as personal being," 90 although it is the "address of
spirit to spirit," "a personal attitude by which the divine
self is conceived to be affected in essentially the way in
which one person is affected by another." 9 -1- The answer to
prayer is God ! s awareness that the human self is turning to
him. Prayer is social as well as private; it is more than
the relation of the single worshiper to God. In fact, public
worship is corporate prayer; "consciousness of other selves
in common relation to God is the essential mark of public
worship." 9^ Whether viewed individually or socially, how-
ever, prayer is of necessity, a "reciprocal relation of spir-
it to spirit,"93 "the intercourse of the human spirit with a
reality, or being, realized as greater-than-human and either
conceived or treated as personal." 9^
Calkins 1 solution to the problem of evil is the one so
vehemently attacked by Howison, viz., that evil is simply in-
complete good. The absolute self is "all-real, all-powerful,
89. R. Calkins, Art. (1931), 15.
90. Calkins, Art. (1911), 489.
91. Ibid., 491.
92. Ibid., 499.
93. Ibid., 498.
94. Ibid., 489.

166
and all-knowing, but all-good." 95 Evil, on this basis, al-
though real, is an element of good, a subordinate factor. To
use Calkins 1 figure, evil is in isolation, but capable of
"forming part of a total good" as a musical discord may form
part of a larger harmony. It will be recalled from an earli-
er chapter that this view comes direct from Royce, who held
that the Absolute Person transcends all the imperfections of
the finite space- time world. The temporal becomes triumphant
in the eternal.
Calkins uses two Roycean arguments to support her view.
First, one is conscious of the fact that suffering and evil
nobly borne have greatly enriched personality and strength-
ened character, thereby revealing themselves to be "elements
of a wider good." One might ask why an "all-powerful" God
would use evil as a tool to build character. Calkins antici-
pates this query, saying only one reply can be made: Inas-
much as the absolute experiences all that finite selves ex-
perience, he shares in our sorrows, "is afflicted in our af-
fliction, /and/ knows our grief." This idea of a suffering
God reveals insight on the part of Calkins, but does not com-
plete her partial reasoning, for she merely transfers the
evil from the part to the whole without going to the inevita-
ble conclusion that if the "all-inclusive" experiences evil,
he must be either finite or not "good," and without showing
95. Calkins, PPP (1st ed.), 431.
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why we must be afflicted or grieved in the first place. Sec-
ond, Calkins suggests that although the absolute is conscious
of evil as bad, it is only in the sense that a good man is
conscious of temptation. The Absolute is, therefore, not
"morally defiled by his awareness of evil." He is conscious
of evil only by conquering it, not by "including" it. Calkins
recognizes the magnitude of the problem, for she wrote: "No
finite self, indeed, has ever probed this tragic mystery."^ 6
It is sufficient to point out here, that in understanding
Calkins 1 philosophy of religion, one must recognize that her
solution to the problem of evil is that "the absolute self
has willed his own evil, as well as ours; and would not have
affirmed it save as subordinated to a wider good."97
A final point in Calkins 1 philosophy of religion is
her view of immortality. One would assume, with the critics
of monism, that the finite self is swallowed up in the abso-
lute at death, but such is not Calkins T contention. Rather,
"the personalist, absolutist no less than pluralist, may hold
to the immortality of the moral self."98 Professor Procter
corroborates this interpretation of Calkins' view, writing:
"It is natural that one who in her philosophy placed so
great an emphasis on personality, and who in her life so dem-
onstrated the worth of personality, should have believed in
96. Calkins, PPP (1st ed. ) , 433.
97. Ibid., 434.
98. Ibid., 481.
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immortality."99 Brightman also addresses himself to this
point, in a statement regarding Calkins' view of immortality:
Notable among her contributions in this respect
is her proof that absolutism is compatible with
personal immortality and does not require the
view that the partial selves are "mere illusions
of personality" which "will succumb to the vicis-
situde of death. "100
Calkins based her view on the uniqueness of the moral
person. One may not realize himself as immortal, yet moral
consciousness leads one to awareness of "a specific duty,"
and "it is of the nature of duty to be endless. "I01 If one
is to fulfil his duty eternally, he must be immortal.
The philosophy of religion for personalistic absolut-
ism, as represented by Calkins, includes several significant
ideas. God is a cosmic Person. Prayer is a reciprocal re-
lationship of spirit with spirit. Evil is transcended by the
greater good. The moral self is individually and uniquely
immortal. The One "includes, without annihilating, the
many;" he "guarantees the individuality of the particular
selves;" and he assures the finite self "of an eternity which
transcends yet does not negate time." One gains the "vision"
of an immortality required by the deathless ideals of every
moral self." 102
99. Procter, Art. (1931), 32-33.
100. Brightman, Art. (1931), 47.
101. Calkins, PPP (1st ed. ) , 455.
102. Ibid., 455.
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9. Calkins' Place and Influence in American Philosophy.
Calkins occupies an important place in the development
of American thought. That she had considerable influence dur-
ing her lifetime was mentioned earlier, and established on
the basis of remarks of her students, by her writing and by
the honors that came to her. As previously stated, she was
elected president of the American Psychological Association
and of the American Philosophical Association, and was elec-
ted to the British Psychological Association, as well as be-
ing honored with doctoral degrees by Smith College and
Columbia University. She exerted great personal influence
in the numerous progressive programs with which she was af-
filiated.
While she is considered here chiefly as a philosopher,
it must be recognized that 3he also pioneered in the field of
psychology, where she made a permanent contribution. At Wel-
lesley she established the psychological laboratory which was
the first to be founded in any college for women. She pub-
lished two books in the field, An Introduction to Psychology
(1901) and A First Book in Psychology (1909), and contributed
particularly to the study of dreams, of time and space expe-
rience, and association. It was her study of dream-psycholo-
gy that "first brought her into prominence,"103 yet she is
103. R. Calkins, Art. (1931), 9
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particularly accredited with experiments in association.
Gardner Murphy suggests this in his masterful book, An His-
torical Introduction to Modern Psycho lop^y . He says that her
method of paired associates was later adopted by Jost in 1897,
Muller and Pilzecker in 1900, and by Thorndike in 1908. 104
Many leading psychologists speak of her general psychological
contributions with respect. The well-known elementarist
,
Titchener, has said she was influential in American psycholo-
gy # 105 Brett, the English psychologist, quotes her as au-
thority. 106 Boring, in his monumental book, A History of Ex-
per imental Psychology , refers to her work, 10 ''' as does Charles
Morris, in seeming agreement, in Six Theories of Mind, 108 and
also Allport, in his significant book, Personality . 109 She
is often grouped with the leading early psychologists of
America such as Angell, Thorndike, Woodworth, and Yerkes. 110
Her distinctive contribution to the field of psycholo-
gy, however, was her self-psychology. Murphy has pointed out
that her view of mental states and processes as being mani-
festations of a self (as indicated in the present exposition
104. Murphy, HIMP, 198-199. See also Woodworth, EP, 10.
Woodworth points out that Calkins was a leader in the
problems of recall. P. 61. Kantor also refers to this
aspect of Calkins* permanent contribution in SOS, 279,
as does Fliigel in HY0P, 204.
105. Titchener, LEPTP, 200.
106. George Brett, HOP, 117.
107. See 429, 593, 625, and 632.
108. See 165.
109. See 36, and 557.
110. See especially Murphy, HIMP, 220n, and Fliigel, EYOP, 154-
155.

of her thought) was always "defended with especial vigour, 11111
James Bissett Pratt and George Albert Coe also accredit her
with this distinctive contribution. The former has referred
to Calkins as a representative of the psychology that is "a
description of the way in which persons usually think and
act."112 The latter refers to her self-psychology as "psy-
chology par excellence
, because its data are the most con-
crete and the most distinctive."113
The view which Calkins championed was not so accept-
able in her day as it later became. Hers was a minority
voice in the early psychological atmosphere of elementarism,
behaviorism, and functional ism, and similar views as advo-
cated by Wundt, Pavlov, Titchener, Watson, James, Dewey, and
Angell. Present-day emphasis upon the "whole" view is in-
creasingly validating her contentions, for a host of leading
psychologists such as McDougall, Jung, Adler, Stern, Wert-
heimer, Ktihler, Koffka, and Allport have adopted a total,
purposive view as over against the older analytic views.
Personality as a concept is assuming increasing importance
in all areas of psychological research. 114
Miss Calkins enjoys a permanent place in American
111. Murphy, HIMP, 391.
112. Pratt, TRC, 456.
113. Coe, POR, 19.
114. Professor Allport, for instance, in the final chapter of
Personality
,
speaks of "The swiftly rising tide of inter-
est in the systematic study of personality ..." P. 549.
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philosophy for several Important reasons. Jfirst, she was
among the earliest thinkers who insisted upon the importance
of personality as the ultimate category for all reality.
She arrived at this view rather independently, although she
does recognize the influence of Charles Renouvier upon her
thought. 115 The degree to which personal ism was original
with her, however, is indicated by a letter from her brother,
Raymond Calkins, to the present writer. He wrote: "The
source of her own personalism lay in her thorough explora-
tion of the various types of metaphysical theory plus her
deep religious intuition." 116 Miss Calkins was familiar,
too, with Thomas Davidson, through Josiah Royce, was per-
fectly familiar with the views of Howison, and not only
gained much from Borden Parker Bowne "intellectually and pro-
fessionally," but also "admired him deeply." 117 Miss Calkins
will be long remembered as a brilliant exponent of personal-
ism. H8
Second, Calkins is assured a permanent place in Ameri-
can philosophy as "the most prominent disciple of Royce, "H^
who has been designated "the most brilliant American ideal-
115. See Brightman, Art. (1931), 43.
116. Dated November 28, 1942.
117. Prom the above-mentioned letter by Raymond Calkins.
118. Knudson has written of Calkins in this regard: "Indeed,
so prominently has she espoused the 'personalistic'
cause that she may properly be regarded as the most con-
spicuous representative of personalism in the form of
absolute idealism." POP, 33.
119. Rogers, EAAP, 298.
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lst. nlei0 She is not a lesser thinker than Royce, however.
Rather, she espoused much of his philosophy because it so
admirably coincided with her own intellectual background,
views, and interests. That is to say, she held Roycean views,
not merely because she studied under him, but because of her
original research and study. 121 She was an absolutist and
personalist not only because of Royce, but also because of
"her thorough exploration of the various types of metaphysi-
cal theory."
Finally, Calkins will continue to exert influence in
American thought because of "her particular combination of
personalism and absolutism." 122 Her view was, in some ways,
the result of a search for a position that would do justice
to the truths of the older monisms of Hegel, the British
idealists, and Royce on the one hand, and to the pluralisms
of such thinkers as Davidson, Howison, McTaggart, and James
120. See Wright, HOMP, 485.
121. Thilly, for instance, mentions her as one of the company
of great American philosophers who were influenced by
Kant, the post-Kantians , and kindred German thinkers.
HOP, 562. Leighton speaks of her and Royce with equal
respect. See FOP, 260 and 297. In his book, Man and
the Cosmos , he implies that as far as self-psychology
is concerned, he is in essential agreement with Miss
Calkins, p. 294. Henry Nelson Wieman puts Calkins on
a par with eminent independent thinkers when he says
"The influence of Hegel is evident in Royce, Calkins,
Dewey, and Hocking. ..." APOR, 321. This is further
expressed by Brightman, POI, 32 and 184; POR, 220; and
ITP, 73n, 88n, 138. See also Gamertsfelder and Evans,
FOP, 439; and Wilson, SAIW, 167.
122. Brightman, Art. (1931), 44.
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on the other. Also, she was aware of the necessity, demanded
"by her psychological investigations, for a more adequate ac-
count of the variability and complexity of conscious experi-
ence than had been given by the older idealism. Thoroughly
empirical and scientific in her approach, she was in quest
of a philosophy that would account for all factors of experi-
ence.
Her recognition of a need for reconciliation of the
numerous conflicting points of view led her, in fact, to a
more mellow and melioristic position as the years went by. 12 ^
Among her unpublished manuscripts is a paper that was writ-
ten some time after 1925, entitled "A Point of Convergence
in Differing Philosophical Systems." In it she maintains
that most systems agree to the existence of selves and to
the awareness by the self of a world other than itself. One
of the two main purposes of writing an article in 1920 was
"to show the compatibility of the pluralistic conception of
society with the monistic ( absolutistic) philosophy of the
universe. "124 she concluded an article that was written
some time after 1926, and that was published in 1930, with
123. In an exchange of statements with Brightman regarding
a "Platform of Personalistic Idealism" (previously men-
tioned), Brightman had crossed out her "Absolute" and
inserted "Supreme" before "Person." Calkins agreed,
but effected a further compromise, for the final word
adopted was "Cosmic" to "include both the God of theism
and the Absolute Person." See her unpublished manu-
scripts, 2.
124. Calkins, Art. (1920), 682.
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the words:
I urgently Invite all such realists as assert
the existence of mental beings to make common
cause with idealists of every type against the
materialism which, under different names, pre-
sumes to deny the experienced reality of the
mental life. 125
It was this keen analytical ability of Miss Calkins to see
the merits of opposing systems that led her to advocate the
uniqueness of the individual person within the Absolute so
that it experienced freedom and immortality. 126
American thought has been greatly enriched by the life
and work of Miss Calkins. She pioneered in the field of psy-
chology and will be remembered particularly for her superla-
tive exposition of self-psychology. It was in philosophy,
however, that she was most conspicuous. In that area of
thought she will remain of lasting significance for insisting
125. Calkins, Art. (1930), 217.
126. This tendency to broaden her absolutism "did not lessen
her conviction of the truth of idealism." See Bright-
man, Art. (1931), 46. It simply strengthened her posi-
tion. Many eminent thinkers commend Calkins for her
clear analysis and interpretation of numerous philosoph-
ical systems. See especially Hocking, who refers to her
book The Persistent Problems of Philosophy as of "nota-
ble meritT" TOP (1st ed.), 24. See also Dresser, POS,
258, 388, and 391. Patrick includes this book of hers
in a select list of books that "should be read by every
student in philosophy. Their wholeness and their ethi-
cal idealism insure their lasting value." ITP, 222.
Pratt credits her with the same ability in surveying
psychological literature. See his Personal Realism
,
312. Among Miss Calkins 1 unpublished manuscripts there
are six chapters and an appendix, written after 1925,
that seem to be part of a projected book possibly en-
titled "Contemporary Systems of Philosophy."
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upon personality as a category of reality, for being the
leading exponent of Roycean idealism, and for the rare skill
with which she made absolutism personalistic.
10. Summary.
Mary Whiton Calkins is a conspicuous representative
of absolutistic personalism. Her dynamic personality, keen
mind, and warm radiant spirit enabled her to pioneer in the
field of psychology, and to distinguish herself in the field
of philosophy. She arrived at her particular type of person-
alism through wide reading and critical appreciation of nu-
merous systems of philosophy, especially those of Berkeley,
Kant, and Hegel, through her study with Royce, and her ap-
preciative knowledge of the thought of Davidson, Howison,
Ward, McTaggart, and Bowne. She derived the use of the word
personalism from Renouvier.
Her entire thought centers in the idea that the Abso-
lute Self constitutes the whole of reality. Such a self is
supra- temporal, supra- spatial, and conscious of the experi-
ence of all finite selves. The finite selves are expressions
of the absolute self, representing its different purposes,
emotions, and thoughts. Each finite self, while a part of
the absolute, is unique, individual, and free. The physical
universe is the experiencing and willing of the absolute
self. The relationship between the selves within the abso-
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lute is best understood as a great society of selves held to-
gether by the consciousness of the absolute. One achieves
his greatest self-expression by complete loyalty to the total
society.
From such a metaphysical position, Miss Calkins ar-
rived at several significant philosophical views. Persons
are of supreme importance in her social philosophy. She ad-
vocated among other things free speech, profit-sharing, and
the elimination of the causes of war. Pier ethical system
centered on personality. The moral man becomes transformed
by participating in the moral development of the universe.
Her philosophy of religion involves a Cosmic Person as God,
prayer as a "reciprocal relation of spirit to spirit," the
idea that evil is merely a subordinate factor in good, and
the idea that the individual self experiences immortality.
We have seen that Miss Calkins occupies a significant
place in both American psychology and American philosophy.
She was one of the leaders in the then new field of psycholo-
gy, and while she is still recognized for some of her experi-
ments, her distinctive contribution was her point of view;
she championed self-psychology. She will continue to exert
an influence in philosophy for several reasons. (l) She was
one of the leading thinkers of her time to insist upon the
importance of personality as the ultimate category for all
reality. (2) As "the most prominent disciple of Royce," she
represents one of the most notable forms of American ideal-
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ism. (3) She made an original synthesis of modern absolut-
ism and the more recent personalism.

CHAPTER V
PLURAL-MONISTIC PERSONALIS!!
The third distinctive type of personalism in the
United States is plural-monistic, a logical synthesis of the
two types which have been previously considered. It is sim-
ilar to the view of the plural is ts, Davidson and Howison, in
that the distinct reality of every person in the universe is
recognized; it differs from the pluralistic position, how-
ever, in subscribing to a creative and sustaining Cosmic Per-
son. Its position of regarding ultimate reality as a Cosmic
Person is in harmony with that of the absolutists, Royce and
Calkins; yet it differs from absolutistic personalism by its
insistence upon the eternal reality of each distinct person.
Plural-monistic personalism, then, regards all reality as
personal, but maintains in addition that finite persons are
distinct from their Creator, the supreme Person. 1 "It holds
the essential fact /of reality/ to be a community of persons
with a Supreme Person at their head while the phenomenal
world is only expression and means of communication.
In the developing stream of American thought this
1. See Knudson, a student and follower of Bowne, who defines
personalism, in part, as "that form of idealism which
gives equal recognition to both the pluralistic and mon-
istic aspects of experience. ..." POP, 87.
2. Bowne, Art. (1905), 172.
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type of personalism has been represented by Johnson and Ed-
wards, by Alcott, who defined his personalism as "the depend
ence of the many on the One," by Yftiitman, who championed
both "Individuality" and "En-Masse," and by Harris, who was
largely influenced by Alcott as well as by Hegel. The sys-
tematizer and chief exponent of plural-monistic personalism—
the one who established it as a definite school of thought-
was the "typical personalist, "3 Borden Parker Bowne.
1. Life and Influence of Borden Parker Bowne (1847-1910).
Borden Parker Bowne, the methodical systematizer of
the third type of personalism, was born at Leonardville, New
Jersey, January 14, 1847. 4 He was particularly suited to
give expression to the richest heritage of American philoso-
phy inasmuch as he could trace his own ancestry back to the
English Puritans, William and Ann Bowne, "who in 1631 came
to Salem, Massachusetts, and thirty years later moved to
Monmouth County, New Jersey.
"
&
Bowne* s parents, Joseph and Margaret Parker Bowne,
provided him with an excellent home. The family house was
unpretentious, as was any American rural farmhouse of a
3. See Brightman, Art. (1927), 162.
4. See McConnell, BPB, for the most thorough discussion
written of the life and thought of Bowne. See also Knud-
son, POP, 19n, K.M.B. (Mrs. Bowne), Art. (1921), Marsh,
Art. (1937), and Rowe, Art. (1929).
5. McConnell, BPB, 9.
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century ago, but Bowne* s deeply religious mother and morally
courageous father made it an intelligently affectionate and
righteous home. 6 Here Bowne* s religious outlook was first
fashioned. Here he had the "unusual opportunity In training
in some insights which proved of value to him in his after
religious and philosophical study." 7 Here the solid founda-
tion was laid upon which he built his life- endeavor : "to
raise religion to a high plane of ethical purpose and clear
thinking, and to set forth and defend the rationality of its
fundamental concepts . "
®
Bowne* s thorough education equipped him well for
leadership in the field of philosophy. Before going to New
York University he attended Pennington Seminary. His inten-
sive study there of fourteen hours a day enabled him to pass
the entrance examinations with distinction. 9 In the Univer-
6. It was a loyal Methodist home. Here Bowne developed a
church consciousness. He was granted a local preacher *s
license in 1867, ordained a deacon in 1872, and served a
church in Whites tone, Long Island, prior to his study in
Europe. He rejoined the New York East Conference in 1878
and was ordained an elder In 1882.
7. McConnell, BPB, 18.
8. Coe, Art. (1910), 515.
9. McConnell has written of Bowne 1 s ability to master fields
of study by himself, "He was as ready a learner in lan-
guages as in physics, making himself proficient in Latin,
Greek, German, French, Spanish, Italian, and oddly enough,
Norwegian. The only reason discoverable for the interest
in Norwegian was that in 1882 Bowne found it possible to
take a two weeks* trip into Norway, and he set himself to
the slight effort necessary for him to get at least a
reading knowledge of the language, with almost as little
concern as a tourist would ordinarily show in selecting
proper garments to wear in Norway." BPB, 24.
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sity he took courses in Mathematics, Greek, Oratory, Belle
Lettres, Political Economy, German, Latin, Introductory Phil-
osophy, Natural Philosophy, Modern Languages, Modern History,
Moral Philosophy, Natural Law, Chemistry, Chapel Oratory,
Constitutional Law, Spanish, Logic, Astronomy, International
Law, and Physics. His general average for the whole course
was 96.3%. He was awarded honors for excellence in Latin,
Greek, and Mathematics, and was assigned the Valedictory by
vote of the faculty. He received the Bachelor of Arts de-
gree in 1871, and also from the same University, the degree
of Master of Arts in 1876, and of Doctor of Laws in 1909. 10
In Europe Bowne studied in Paris and at the Univer-
sities of Halle and Gottingen. He came under the influence
of Ulrici, who wished him to translate his Gott und die Natur
into English, and Lotze, who wanted him to take a doctorate
with him. Although Bowne was greatly indebted to both of
these men he fulfilled neither of their wishes. Perhaps the
reason was not only that he "never stood in much awe of de-
grees, and felt that he could not afford the time and ex-
pense involved,"11 but also that he was already doing signif-
icant writing of his own and wished to make the most of his
own creative powers. While still a student in New York Uni-
versity he had worked out his system of ethics, and when in
10. See McConnell, BPB, 28
11. McConnell, BPB, 57.
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Germany he wrote numerous articles for the Methodist Review
.
He finished his first book, The Philosophy of Herbert
Spencer
,
in 1873 while still in Halle. The book was com-
posed of a series of articles which had appeared in the New
Englander in 1872.
Bowne was unable to secure a teaching position when
he returned to the United States in 1875. He accepted work
on the editorial staff of the Independent and taught modern
languages in New York University for a year. He was then
invited to the philosophy department of Boston University.
There he remained throughout his distinguished career, 12
bringing honor to the University and drawing to his classes
the numerous students who carried his influence around the
world, and who firmly established the philosophical system
which he championed.
It is enlightening to consider the sources of Bowne 1 s
ideas. Previous investigators have related his thought to
that of Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant, Hegel, Ulrici, and Lotze. 13
Bowne was indeed indebted to these eminent thinkers. He
12. Bowne was invited to the University of Chicago by Presi-
dent William Rainey Harper, to Yale by President Porter
and George Trumbull Ladd, and to Johns Hopkins. Bowne
refused to leave Boston University, saying "Ephraim is
wedded to his idols. Let him alone." See an unpub-
lished letter of Knudson's to Brightman dated April 13,
1936, McConnell, BPB, 91, and K.M.B. , Art. (1921), 9.
13. See, for example, the authoritative statements of Bright
man, Art. (1922), 371, and Art. (1927), 162; Jones, LUB;
CI eland, ROB.
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drew from the rationalism and pluralism of Leibniz. He
gained his empiricism from Berkeley, and also the idea that
matter is simply a means of communication between persons.
He was indebted to Kant for his critical approach to the
problems of philosophy, and also for the Kantian primacy of
the practical reason, the trustworthiness of reason, the
creativity of thought, and the idea of personality being an
end in itself. He received from Hegel his emphasis upon co-
herence as a criterion of truth and the rationality of the
real. Bov/ne was also considerably indebted to his two Ger-
man professors, Ulrici and Lotze. Hildebrand has pointed
out that his debt to Ulrici was "much greater than his pub-
lished works indicate." 14 Be that as it may, Bowne did rec-
ognize his relation to Ulrici. He wrote, in the preface to
Studies in Theism : "I shall always be under general obliga-
tion to my friends and former instructors, Professor Ulrici,
of Halle, and Professor Lotze, of Gottingen. n15 His closer
relationship to Lotze than to Ulrici is evidenced in the
fact that he dedicated the first edition of Metaphysics "in
grateful recollection to the memory of my friend and former
teacher, Hermann Lotze." 16 Jones has correctly written:
"Wir sehen, wie der grosse strebende Geist
Lotzes denjenigen Bownes zur Lebenstatigkeit
14. Hildebrand, Art. (1932), 102. See also Ramsdell, Art.
(1935) 2 , 132.
15. Bowne, SIT, vi.
16. Bowne, MET, iii.
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angeregt hat, und wie weit diese Anregung zu
Resultaten im Leben Bownes gefuhet hat."!7
Bowne' s close relationship to his American antecedents
has not, however, been previously pointed out. Inasmuch as
thinking is a social process, no great mind is completely
original. Bowne made original syntheses of previously iso-
lated ideas, but he was able to do so only because of the
heritage and point of view that were his. Personalism had
been a dominant note in American philosophy long before he
began his distinguished career. It was against the back-
ground of a rich personal is tic heritage that he developed
his own ideas. This dependence upon earlier and contempora-
ry American thinkers does not detract from Bowne; it rather
adds to his stature. He stands forth as the thinker who was
clear-sighted and far-vis ioned enough to gather together the
significant thoughts left by many eminent minds, and weave
them, along with his own contributions, into a distinct phil-
osophical system. The choicest fruits of American philosophy
culminated in his systematic exposition of personalism.
Bowne would be the first to recognize his heritage,
although it is difficult to trace the sources of his views
because he seldom referred to other writers. He was so vig-
orous and intense a thinker that ideas which appealed to him
17. Jones, LUB, 117. See also Wilm who wrote that Bowne
"was known as a follower of Lotze. . . . Together with
Ladd he was perhaps the leading exponent of this type of
thought in America." Art. (1910), 422.
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became at once his own. In the oft- quoted sentences from a
letter of 1909 in which Bowne characterized his thought he
does not claim priority for personalism as a system of phil-
osophical ideas. To the statement in which he calls himself
"the first of the clan" of personal is ts, he adds "in any
thorough-going sense." 18 That is to say, Bowne recognized
that many previous thinkers held personal is tic ideas not
only in Europe, but more particularly in the United States.
He was not entirely original; rather he organized and sys-
tematized the numerous personalistic ideas into a concrete
system. Wilm has pointed out that Bowne ! s ideas were "the
common possession of a whole school of thinkers, the school
of personal idealism. "19 Rogers, likewise, corroborates the
contentions made in the second chapter of this study that
American personalism developed over a long period of time.
He wrote that throughout the nineteenth century
There is the determination to conceive reality
in such a way that the ideal values . . • which
attain to human life and human nature may be
felt to be solidly grounded, and not the pre-
carious by-products of an impersonal evolution. u ^u
To this he has also added: "The emphasis upon the self as a
source of the categories for rendering reality intelligible
. . . is present ... in most of the recent philosophy of
18. See K.M.B. (Mrs. Bowne), Art. (1921), 10; and Knudson,
POP, 16.
19. Wilm, Art. (1910), 422.
20. Rogers, EAP, 316.
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theism. 1,21 Muller, too, has written: "Dank Bownes sorg-
faltiger und systematischer Ausfuhrung . . . 1st der Per-
sonalismus zu einer bewussten, organisierten Bewegung
geworden.
"
22 Finally, Hocking has written that Bowne's
"contribution to metaphysics" was "a summary account of the
curve of metaphysical speculation since Kant."23 Without
reading more into the thought of these men than that which
they intended, one can conclude that Bowne, by his original
systematic organization, did not stand outside the historic
stream of thought. It was his genius to organize what he
conceived to be the summit thoughts of man's intellectual de-
velopment into a coherent system. In many ways he went so
far as to anticipate the future emphasis upon personality.
Bowne was familiar with the thought of Edwards, who
has been considered as a personalistic thinker. He, in fact,
defended Edwards against being used as a screen by Huxley
for the latter ! s doctrine of automatism. He recognized that
Edwards, along with Calvinism, did "not deny freedom." 24 It
21. Rogers, EAP, 324.
22. Miiller, AP, 179.
23. Hocking, Art. (1922), 374.
24. Bowne, SIT, 417. See elsewhere, however, where Bowne
attributed "much fictitious psychology and ethics" and
"a general browbeating of human nature" to Edwards. But
at this point he also attacked the early Methodists for
testing "conversion by its emotional attendants." Bowne,
SIC, 215. It is also well to remember Gardiner's state-
ment: "Competent critics unite in regarding Jonathan
Edwards as the most original metaphysician and subtle
reasoner that America has produced. ..." Gardiner,
Art. (1900), 573.

188
can be assumed that Bowne knew Alcott and his thought. 25
Bowne served with Alcott and William F. Warren, of Boston
University, on the committee having charge of the Boston Mon-
day Lectures, for which Joseph Cook (1838-1901), a Congrega-
tional minister, was the lecturer. 26
This fact, in itself, was significant, for Cook, a
popular izer of "the results of the freshest German, English,
and American scholarship on the more important and difficult
topics concerning the relation of Religion and Science," 2,7
was himself personalis tic. 28 He knew the thought of Edwards,
was a friend of Alcott, a respecter of Whitman, an admirer
of Lotze, 29 and in many ways was an exponent of ideas cham-
25. It will be recalled that Alcott, a personalist, wrote
that the drift of thought in New England was toward "per-
sonal Theism."
26. See Cook, HER, vi.
27. Cook, HER, v.
28. The Boston Monday Lectures began in the Meionaon in 1875
and were so well received that they were transferred to
Park- street Church in October, 1876, and then to Tremont
Temple, "which was often more than full." Cook had stud-
ied and travelled widely. He lectured on such subjects
as biology, transcendentalism, orthodoxy, conscience,
heredity, marriage, socialism, labor, Occident, Orient,
and current religious perils. The lectures have been
published in eleven books of the above titles. So unique
were Cook's lectures that it was written, "One has to go
back to the time of Peter Abelard, of the University of
Paris, for a parallel to it." See Cook, CON, 2, in back
of the book. It is well to note that Cook believed Al-
cott to be "the first clear formulator of the Personal-
istic position. . . ." See Shepard, PP, 499.
29. Cook wrote that Lotze was "full of scorn for the idea
that the Power that put into us personality does not it-
self possess personality." BIO, 102. He quoted Alcott
as saying to him in a conversation, "You may tell Boston
that I, for one, regard Lionel Beale and Hermann Lotze
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pioned by Bowne. In 1877 Cook said to his Boston audience:
As science progresses, it draws nearer, in all
its forms, to the proof of the Spiritual Origin
of Force; that is, of the Divine Immanence in
natural law; that is, of the Omnipresence of a
personal First Cause. . . . 30
In 1878, he stated: "All law in nature is but the uniform
action of an Omnipresent Personal Will." Also, "The tangi-
bleness of the moral law in conscience is scientifically
known ... to be identical with the tangibleness of an Omni-
present Personal Will." 31 Further, writing that "The union
of mind, free-will, and conscience in any being constitutes
personality in that being," he concluded, "The moral design-
er of the moral law is, therefore, a person." 32 Finally, he
thought of "God as Personal." 33 Bowne not only served on
the committee for Cook, but can easily be seen to have been
somewhat indebted to him. In 1922, Hocking wrote of Bowne ! s
critique of mechanical impersonalism made in 1908, "...
as the rising men in philosophy." BIO, 186. Cook agreed
with both Alcott and Bowne when he said: "I am proud to
say I have some acquaintance with Hermann Lotze, and
that I regard him as the rising, as Germany regards Her-
bert Spencer as the setting star in philosophy." See
Cook, BIO, 103. The applause that followed this state-
ment, so like one of Bowne 1 s, Is significant, for Cook*s
publishers noted in his books that "Mr. Cook ! s audiences
included in large numbers, representatives of the broad-
est scholarships, the profoundest philosophy, the acutest
scientific research, and generally of the finest intel-
lectual culture, of Boston, and New England. ..." See
Cook, BIO, v.
30. Cook, BIO, 32.
31. Cook, CON, 69.
32. Cook, CON, 109.
33. Cook, CON, 128.
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There is no more powerful and convincing chapter in American
metaphysical writing. . . . n34 Back in 1880, Bowne wrote of
Coolers personalistic discussion on theories of life: "In
the present state of the debate there is no better manual of
the argument than the work in hand. The emptiness of the me-
chanical explanation of life v/as never more clearly shown." 35
Bowne was also related to other American personalists.
In a "little philosophical club," he met with, among others,
Davidson, Harris, and Howison. 36 He knew the thought of
Royce, but felt that "Royce had not pulled himself clear of
Hegelianism. 1,317 Royce wrote to Brightman, after Bowne 1 s
death, "I suppose that our agreements were rather on the in-
crease toward the end of his work. I always prized him
much." 3^ He surely knew the thought of Calkins also, al-
though he had finished most of his writing when she was just
beginning hers. For her part, "she gained much from him
34. Hocking, Art. (1922), 374.
35. See Cook, LAB, 6, in the back of the book. Cook referred
to Bowne on several occasions. See especially HER, 44-45
and 49.
36. See the previously quoted statement by James, Art.
(1907), 111.
37. See McConnell, BPB, 132.
38. See Brightman, Art. (1922), 370. Bowne served as Chair-
man of the Department of Philosophy at the International
Congress of Arts and Science in St. Louis. Royce spoke
just before him on September 20, 1904, and Howison, as
well as Ladd, spoke after him. Each must have heard the
others 1 addresses and exchanged ideas later. Harris
also addressed the Congress the same day at the same
time, although in another hall. He, too, would have
visited and exchanged ideas with his old friends. See
Rogers, COAS (Cambridge Edition), 74, 152, 171, and 173.
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intellectually and professionally and admired him deeply." 39
In method, Bowne was both rationalistic and empiric-
al, rigorous and pragmatic. He held that life is more than
logic, yet that logic must be applied to life. In this re-
spect he was similar to Whitman (and recent psychologists
who recognize the irrational elements in the total personal-
ity), who said:
Do I contradict myself?
Very well then I contradict myself,
(I am large, I contain multitudes ). ^0
Bowne is more widely known as a rationalist than as a prag-
matist; hence it might be well to note that latter aspect of
his many faceted intellectual outlook, and also to indicate
his relationship to the thought of William James.
Bowne wrote:
We must study facts in the light of principles,
and we must also study principles in the light
of facts. Without the former we are lost in a
rabble of details; without the latter we make
no connection with reality and simply hang in
the air. 41
When dealing with the problem of ethical behavior, he con-
tinued in the same manner:
Life must be moralized by being brought under
the control of moral principles, and morals
must be vitalized by being brought into con-
nection with our everyday human life in the
world that now is. 42
39. From the previously mentioned letter by Raymond Calkins.
40. Quoted by Purness. Art. (1932), 5.
41. Bowne, Art. (1900), 247.
42. Bowne, Art. (1909), 708.
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In all of Bowne' s writing he championed the rights and needs
of the self, which are more than mind alone, or will, or
feeling. The self has irrational impulses, urges, and pro-
pensities. It lives in a universe of many irrational facts
of experience to which it must "become adjusted. The self
and the universe also reveal possibilities of conserving and
increasing values that are beyond water-tight rational cate-
gories. The self, through reason, assumes the v/orld to be
an expression of reason. Through feeling it experiences aes-
thetic values. Through will it experiences morality. Life
is enriched by the consequences of these ventures of the per-
sonality. 43 Ramsdell has pointed out that Bowne 's pragmatism
is evidenced in (1) his view of the mind, (2) his use of the
criterion of interest satisfaction, (3) his use of the cri-
terion of workability or results, (4) his criterion of sur-
vival, and (5) his view of truth as teleological. 44
It is interesting, at this point, to consider Bowne's
relationship to the thought of James. Ramsdell, who con-
cedes that Bowne was under the indirect influence of Kant,
Lotze, Herbart, and Spencer, has maintained that Bowne owed
his pragmatism to James. 45 It is Ramsdell' s thesis that
"the most direct and decisive pragmatic influence upon the
43. See McConnell, BPB, 151. McConnell also states: "If
... we could speak of a higher pragmatism, Bowne was
a pragmatist. " 151.
44. Ramsdell, Art. (1934).
45. See Ramsdell, Arts. (1934), (1935) 1 , and (1935)^.
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thought of Bowne came from William James."46 Investigation
does not seem to warrant such a conclusion.
If anything, Bowne seems to be prior, 47 and James
somewhat indebted to him. (James 1 cosmopolitan philosophic-
al background is so broad, however, that throughout his life
and work he remained an incorrigible individualist indebted
to none specifically. Therein lay his charm as a person as
well as a philosopher.) James published The Will to Believe
in 1896. As early as 1874, when James was still an instruct-
or in Anatomy and Physiology in Harvard College, Bowne wrote,
"Will is the sum- total of the dynamic idea. . . . 1,48 Fur-
ther, "The conscious ego is a being capable of knowledge and
thought, and able to direct its own activity into such chan-
nels as it may choose. . . ."49 Bowne also criticized sci-
ence for having "fallen upon evil days" because its asser-
tions could not be pragmatically "put to a test." 50 In 1879,
46. Ramsdell, Art. (1935)^, 133.
47. See Flewelling, who has written: "It is no distraction
from James to call attention to the fact that the dis-
tinction of Bowne 1 s philosophy from that of other ideal-
ists . . . lay just in his insistence upon the pragmatic
test for truth in both philosophy and religion. In the
publication of these views, Bowne possessed priority."
Art. (1922), 378. See also Strickland, who has pointed
out that James, Dewey, and Schiller merely popularized
the pragmatic method; they were not its founders. Art.
(1910). Likewise, Hocking indicates that Fichte, Kant,
Vaihinger, Balfour, Nietzsche, and Peirce precede James
in the use of pragmatism. TOP, 146.
48. Bowne, POHS, 112.
49. Bowne, POHS, 168.
50. Bowne, POHS, 282.
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when James was just beginning work on his Pr inciples of Psy-
chology
, Bowne wrote in language that later became James 1 :
"We live and act long before we reflect and speculate." 51
In the same book, Bowne suggested that action must be tested
by pragmatic consequences. He wrote: "... Struggling,
agonizing, etc., are not heroic in themselves. ... To
struggle for nothing is the mark of a fool and not of a
hero." 52 James published his monumental book, The Princi-
ples of Psychology , in 1890. Bowne finished his Introduc-
tion to Psychological Theory four years earlier, in 1886,
and indicated his pragmatic leanings in the statement:
The dreary folly of laboriously building up
speculative theories, which every hour we
practically deny, may seem very brilliant for
a while, but it grows tiresome at last. 53
Here Bowne also stated his empirical concern for evidence.
He criticized Schopenhauer, Hartmann, Spinoza, Leibniz, and
Herbart in their views of will because they were "deductions
from some general metaphysical or psychological theory,
rather than foundations of psychological facts. We shall do
better to begin with facts." 54 In 1907 James wrote in Prag-
matism that the pragmatist "turns towards concreteness and
adequacy, towards facts, towards action and power." 55 This
51. Bowne,
52. Bowne,
53. Bowne,
54. Bowne,
55. James,
SIT, 411.
SIT, 432.
IPT, 38.
IPT, 219.
PRA, 51.
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must have been what Bowne had in mind fifteen years earlier,
when he concluded his Principles of Ethics with the state-
ment:
The abstract ethics of the closet must be re-
placed by the ethics of life, if we would not
see ethics lose itself in barren contentions
and tedious verbal disputes. 56
James indicated, in correspondence, his use of Bowne 's
ideas. When James was in Rome caring for his health and
writing his G-ifford lectures he heard that Bowne had pub-
lished some earlier articles in book form. James wrote to
Bowne, speaking of the previous articles: "They seemed to
me important; and I need the book for my work." 5 ' Bowne
sent James a copy of The Christian Life to which James re-
plied: "I have found this book so very useful to my own
thought that since you write of having published 'two others
of the same sort 1 (happy fecundity!) I am going to ask you
to send them to me alsot" 5° It would be interesting to know
what James found of value in these books. He may have been
attracted to the statement: "religious truth can be expressed
only by figures borrowed from the relations of the life that
now is. t,59 or to, "we do not bring men to God by means of
theology." 60 Or, "We must expand our conception of religion
56. Bowne, POE, 309.
57. The letter is quoted by McOonnell, BPB, 274. Marsh also
refers to this communication between Bowne and James.
See Art. (1937), 4.
58. The letter is quoted by McConnell, BPB, 275.
59. Bowne, TCL, 33.
60. Bowne, TOL, 67.
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until it becomes the principle of all living, and includes
all life within its scope." 61 Or, he must have appreciated
Bowne ! s pragmatic test of the value of the Bible. Bowne
wrote, "The only abiding significance of the Bible lies in
helping us to this view," that is, to the "Christian view of
God and man and their mutual relations.
"
6^ Surely he was at-
tracted to the section entitled "Types of Religious Experi-
ence." 63 James referred to these books in his Gifford lec-
tures, and although he called them "rationalistic booklets,"
he said they were "wonderfully able," and that they were
books "which everyone should read." 64 More closely related
to Bowne 1 s personalism, however, are the statements by James:
"Religious thought is carried on in terms of personality,
this being, in the world of religion, the one fundamental
fact." 65 Further, James writes of "a concrete bit of person-
al experience," and says:
That unsharable feeling which each one of us
has of the pinch of his individual destiny as
he privately feels it rolling out on fortune's
wheel may be disparaged for its egotism, may
be sneered at as unscientific, but it is the
one thing that fills up the measure of our con-
crete actuality, and any would-be existent that
should lack such a feeling, or its analogue,
would be a piece of reality only half made up. 66
61. Bowne, TGL, 149.
62. Bowne, TCR, 10-11.
63. Bowne, TCL, 119-130.
64. James, VRE, 502.
65. James, VRE, 491.
66. James, VRE, 499. In a footnote, James also refers the
reader to Lotze, who was, it will be recalled, the one
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One must conclude that Bowne' s method was pragmatic
and functional as well as rationalistic. While recognizing
the value of the pragmatic method, however, he also knew its
limitations, hence went beyond it to a more complete, coher-
ent method. He wrote, in a letter to Knudson January 18,
1905, that he found Schiller^ Humanism
,
Dewey 1 s Pragmatism
,
and James 1 Will to Believe "one-sided but useful," and sim-
ply a "reaction against an overdone intellectual ism.
Hocking has pointed out the greater comprehensiveness of
Bowne in relation to the thought of James in the statement:
The real difference, however, was profound.
For the "life" which provides the evidence of
metaphysical truth was, for Bowne, not simply
a state of resolve, or feeling, but a state of
empirical cognition. It is possible to know
the truth, and not merely to choose it as one f s
adopted hypothesis. Life is will, plus thought
and experience. . .
Flewelling adds: "Bowne did a larger work, in that he not
only laid down a method for judging truth but also accompa-
nied it with an appropriate metaphysics." 69 Bowne was prag-
matic, but more. "Our natural life," he wrote, "is no acci-
dent but the raw material which we are to build into the
to whom Bowne dedicated the first edition of his Meta-
physics .
67. Quoted by McConnell, BPB, 149. See also Strickland,
Art. (1910).
68. Hocking, Art. (1922), 572.
69. Flewelling, Art. (1922), 378-579. So, too, Marsh has
written that "Bowne went further than his friend /Jemes/,
not only laying down a method for judging truth, but ac-
companying it with an appropriate metaphysics." Art.
(1937), 7.
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ideal form." 70 Life is more than logic, yet logic must be
applied to life if it is to achieve its fullest expression.
Another interesting phase of the life and influence
of Bowne was the sources of his power. Brightman has indica-
ted four sources, viz., (1) his thought and expression were
clear, (2) he had a remarkable grasp on the systematic whole
of his philosophy at every point, (3) he had rare skill in
polemic, and (4) he possessed a deep and sincere religious
experience. 7 -1- Snowden has written that Bowne was a "clear
and keen and strong thinker in the field of philosophy" and
that he expressed himself in both philosophical and literary
style. "His pages," Snowden wrote, "are the most brilliant
philosophical writing of our day and will long remain as a
difficult standard and model for others to imitate." 7^
Bowne was the first personalist to organize his phil-
osophy methodically into a reasonably complete and coherent
system. It is for this reason that he has been erroneously
looked upon as the founder of personalism. Because of his
70. Bowne, Art. (1909), 711. See also Coe, Art. (1922),
especially 381 and 382.
71. Brightman, Art. (1922), 370-371.
72. Snowden, Art. (1922), 388-389. Plewelling has added
that "Because of this quality of clearness Bowne was a
forerunner in many positions towards which the world of
modern thought is more slowly making its way." Art.
(1922), 378. Marsh has likewise written of Bowne: "His
pellucid, beautiful literary style reminds one of the
older English masters of philosophy: There is a certain
primitive strength in his words, and an elemental power
in his sentence structure." Art. (1937), 10.
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systematic work, however, and of the fact that he gave ex-
pression to the rich American personalistic heritage in the
young, expanding Boston University and its vigorous School
of Theology, he gathered around him an eager group of follow-
ers who looked to him as the father of personalism. In the
sense of having established a Bowne tradition he is the
father of American personalism. None of the earlier person-
alists, including Howison and Calkins, had established a
school.
Those indebted to Bowne are legion. 73 He has influ-
enced Edgar Sheffield Brightman, Albert C. Knudson, George
Croft Cell, Francis L. Strickland, George Albert Coe, George
A. Wilson, Ralph Tyler Flewelling, Herbert A. Youtz, L. R.
Eckardt, H. C. Sanborn, I. R. Beiler, Daniel L. Marsh, W. H.
Sheldon, Randolf F. Foster, Francis John McConnell, Lynn
Harold Hough, S. Parker Cadman, Harry Emerson Fosdick,
Charles R. Brown, John Wright Buckham (a student of Howi-
son' s), James H. Snowden, "and many others." The "many
others" are continually increasing under the able leadership
of Brightman, who holds the Bowne Chair of Philosophy at
73. Coe has written that the attractiveness of Bowne 1 s doc-
trines "brought him a remarkable large following. In
addition to his immediate pupils, the number of which is
large, those who have found in his published writings a
new wine that rejoices the intellect of man are literally
a multitude. And they girdle the earth." Art. (1910),
521. Brightman has given the most complete list in his
address to the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy
which met at Harvard University in September, 1926. See
Brightman, Art. (1927), 164-165.

200
Boston University, Knudson, Dean Emeritus of Boston Univer-
sity School of Theology, Dean Earl B. Marl at t, L. Harold
DeWolf, Paul E. Johnson, and P. Gerald Ensley of the same
university, Walter G. Muelder, of the School of Religion at
the University of Southern California, Carroll DeWitt Hilde-
brand of DePauw University, Louis Norris, of Baldwin-Wallace
College, Peter A. Bertocci, of Bates College, Clare McKellar,
of Central College, and others who follow the Bowne tradition
under these men."74 It should also be noted that a "personal-
istic discussion group" has met several times during the an-
nual meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philo-
sophical Association.
Recognition of Bowne f s influence in American philoso-
phy may be seen in a few comments by eminent thinkers."^
74. It is to be recognized that the followers of Bowne,
through whom he has made a significant contribution to
American philosophy, are independent and original in
their own thinking while remaining within the Bowne tra-
dition. Some are more pluralistic, some more monistic;
others are more realistic or pragmatic. Some subscribe
to an Absolute God while others hold to a Finite God,
etc. For evidence of the varying degrees of originality
of those influenced by Bowne, see Vilieman, who has writ-
ten: "Whether E. S. Brightman should be classed with
liberals or with naturalists ... is uncertain. His
independence and originality make it hard to classify
him." GOR, 487n. See, incidentally, Brightman 1 s answer
to Wieman's doubt in Brightman, POR, 213n.
75. Bowne 's influence was not as wide as it might have been.
This was partly due to the fact that he disliked publici-
ty, did not refer much to contemporary philosophers ex-
cept for polemic purposes, and declined opportunities to
teach in positions that might have given him wider pub-
lic acclaim. McConnell specifically lists four reasons
why he did not, in his lifetime, receive greater
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Plewelling described Bowne as "the morning star of this
greater humanism.
"
76 Buckham designated Bowne* s volume Per-
sonal ism "one of the outstanding products of American ideal-
ism." 77 Iverach, the Principal of the United Free Church
College in Aberdeen, declared that Bowne was "the equal of
any other thinker" in America. 78 Duncan acknowledged his in-
debtedness to Bowne ! s books "for much stimulus, help, and en-
richment." 79 So, too, Posdick has written regarding Bowne 1 s
book, Personalism : "I still recall the thrill with which I
followed his argument ^for a rational basis for faith in
God/. It was, at the time of reading, one of the most stim-
ulating books I ever went through." 8^ Finally, it must be
recognized that American thought was much nearer Bowne f s
philosophical position at the time of his death than it was
when he first began his professional career. 81
A final indication of the richness and influence of
recognition. They are: (1) He was a theist. (Many phil-
osophers suffer from theophobia. ) (2) Bowne was a
Methodist. That strengthened him in one denomination,
but limited him in others. (3) He "was not the voice of
his day," i.e., as was Spencer, whom he attacked, and
who also outlived his own acclaim. (4) His style of
writing was not as "popular" as was his style of lectur-
ing. McConnell, BPB, 270-273. See also Brightman, Art.
(1927), 166-167.
76. Flewelling, Art. (1922), 379.
77. Buckham, Art. (1920), 29.
78. Iverach, Art. (1920), 33.
79. Duncan, Art. (1922), 384.
80. In an unpublished letter to Brightman from Fosdick in
the American Colony in Jerusalem, May 8, 1926.
81. See Coe, Art. (1910), 522-523, and Cell, Art. (1928),
390-391.
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Bowne f s life is found in the honors he received and the es-
teem in which he was held on his trip around the world in
1905 and 1906. He visited Japan, China, India, Turkey,
Egypt, and the European countries and "was enthusiastically
received in university circles from the first." "In Japan,
particularly, he received such honors as fall to few schol-
ars," 82 being presented with, among other gifts, a gold medal
by the Imperial Education Society. He addressed the entire
staff and student body of Bombay University on the subject
"The Religion of the Future." The group consisted of Par-
sees, Mohammedans, Christians, Anglo-Indians, Eurasians, and
Hindus of all castes. The Reverend A. W. Mell, who heard
the address, wrote:
It was enthusiastically and delightfully re-
ceived. The students cheered heartily its main
points, and at the close the cheering developed
into a great ovation. For five minutes Doctor
Bowne had to stand and receive the applause of
the great crowd. Students and professors
thronged to the front to greet this prophet of
the future. 83
The life and influence of Bowne marks an important
chapter in the "coming of age" of American philosophy. A
vigorous and prolific personalistic writer, he organized the
personalis tic streams of thought of both his American and
European antecedents to become the chief representative of
"typical" personalism. His philosophy, which was as broad
82. Coe, Art. (1910), 521.
83. McConnell, BPB, 261.
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and deep as life itself, gave equal recognition to both the
pluralistic and monistic aspects of experience. It was,
thus, a culmination of the views of earlier American person-
alists and a logical synthesis of the positions represented
by Howison and Calkins. Bowne v/as a leader of the liberal
American tradition which views reality as "a community of
persons with a Supreme Person at their head."^4
2. Epistemology.
Consider Bowne 1 s view of the problem of knowledge.
When one knows the answers Bowne gives to the questions of
whether or not the mind is active or passive, what is the re-
lationship between thought and thing, what is the relation-
ship between knowledge and belief, and kindred questions, he
knows the general direction of Bowne 1 s thought. Epistemology
is basic to an understanding of his philosophical position.
Bowne, as the other personalists
,
rejects skepticism
at the outset. To have any rational standing whatever, skep-
ticism must meet several conditions. (1) It must be sup-
ported by reasons. (2) It must give unsupported assertions
or "admit the laws and principles of logic as binding upon
all thought as at least negative conditions of truth." (3)
The skeptic "must assume the community and identity of intel-
84. Bowne, Art. (1905), 172.
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ligence." (4) He must "assume the identity of the object in
experience." (5) The skeptic must know something. 85 In
each case the skeptic vitiates his own position in meeting
any of these presuppositions of thought. Skepticism may be
excellent as a method arising out of rational criticism; as
a system it is untenable. It cannot maintain its position
without denying itself. "The validity of knowledge is pretty
sure to get itself recognized in the long-run in spite of
the skeptic. . . . 1,86 The question then becomes, not is
knowledge possible, but how is knowledge possible?
In answering the latter question, Bowne agrees with
Samuel Johnson, the first American personalist, that the
mind is active, and with Kant and other personalists that it
is also creative. Bowne 's emphasis upon activity is in har-
mony with all of his American antecedents. It will be re-
called, for example, that Edwards referred to the mind as an
"active cause," that Alcott viewed nature as "thought in so-
lution," that Harris believed consciousness "presupposes an
absolute ego or person," that Howison maintained that objec-
tive nature was created by the community of minds, and that
Calkins held the finite mind to be active and assertive with-
in the framework of the absolute. Bowne wrote, as had each
of them in turn: "The principles of knowing are primarily
85. Bowne, TTK, 269-270.
86. Bowne, TTK, 294.
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immanent laws of mental activity," 87 and "The world I per-
ceive is the world I construct." 88 Empiricism is, thus, in-
sufficient; experience itself depends upon mental activity.
One organizes and interprets sensations and impressions in
the knowing process until he arrives at clear perceptions
and conceptions. The world of objective "things" exists
"only as the mind reconstructs it as a world of thought." 89
It is the mind that is active and creative, that "builds up
in consciousness a system of conceptions." Not only is this
the process for arriving at individual knowledge, but it is
also the method whereby the active, creative minds of inter-
related persons build up the sciences, arts, and humanities,
that organize and systematize knowledge. Without mental con-
struction by a self there would be no knowledge. Bowne
wrote of this in his Harris Lectures:
The flitting and discontinuous impression is
interpreted into a continuous and abiding world
only by a permanent self with its outfit of ra-
tional principles; and if this were taken away
there would be only an inarticulate £lux of im-
pressions without rational contents. 90
Two more basic ideas in Bowne' s epistemology are the
conditions of thought and the categories of thought. Regard-
87. Bowne, PER, 57.
88. Ibid., 72. McKellar, in an unpublished doctoral disser-
tation, CAOM, deals effectively with the question of the
creative activity of mind, and also points out that
Bowne makes this principle "fundamental" in his view of
personality.
89. Bowne, TTK, 56.
90. Bowne, PER, 69.
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ing the first, Bowne is not concerned with the multitudinous
physiological and psychological conditions of thought, rath-
er with the conditions given in the structure of thought it-
self. There are three conditions, other than the fundamen-
tal one that consciousness presupposes all thought. (1) For
any thought whatsoever there must be unity and identity of
the thinking self. Apart from a conscious and abiding sub-
ject, thought is an "unreal abstraction." (2) Thought pre-
supposes the law of identity and contradiction. "Conceptions
must have fixed meanings and must be used consistently there-
with."91 (3) Thought is possible only because of the posi-
tive principle of "the fact of connection among the objects
of thought." It "can never escape making a general metaphys-
ical assumption about its objects and their systematic con-
nection. " 92
Regarding the categories, one deals with "those imma-
nent mental principles which underlie articulate experience
and make it possible." 93 Categories, denied by the protag-
onists of common- sense and empiricism, have had an honorable
place in the history of philosophical thought from the time
of Aristotle. The categories suggested by Bowne as organic
principles by which one builds up experience are: time, num-
ber, space, motion, quantity, being, quality, identity,
91. Bowne, TTK, 30.
92. Ibid., 35.
93. Ibid., 59.
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causality, necessity, possibility, and purpose. Bowne was
not concerned to be systematically complete. Rather, he
wished to show that the mind must work according to certain
principles, and through them reach knowledge. Whenever such
a system of categories is postulated, one is tempted to ask
whether or not the list could be extended until one had a
category for every object experienced. Bowne anticipated
this; he pointed out, however, that while there is a multi-
plicity of experiences, nothing passes into the mind except
through the activity of the mind. The various activities of
the mind fall into certain classes which express the nature
of the mind itself. Further, there is an objective order of
objects, but objects are known only through the activity of
the mind. "The thing world must be reproduced in the thought
world, and the forms of the thing world must take on the
forms of the thought world." 94 While there is an objective
order, the key to knowledge lies in the mind itself. The
categories do not precede the mind, "rather they are to be
understood through the mind's living experience of itself." 95
It follows from such an epistemological viewpoint
that although Bowne maintains a basal monism of active intel-
ligence, he subscribes to a dualism of thought and thing.
Attempts have been made to remove this dualism on the part
94. Bowne, TTK, 116.
95. Bowne, PER, 105.
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of materialism and absolute idealism, but Bowne holds these
to be irrelevant. Dualism is "ineradicable." The knower is
distinct from the known; the "me" is separate from the "not-
me"; the "thought cannot become the thing, neither can the
thing pass bodily into" the thought. "As a concrete process
knowing is necessarily individual, a gathering by the 'me 1
of information respecting the 'not-me'." 96
Before leaving the problem of epistemology it is well
to consider Bowne 's idea of the relationship between knowl-
edge and belief. Here he very clearly relates himself to the
practical, living, functional point of view. Knowledge is
that which is "self-evident in the nature of reason," while
belief is based upon rationality, but is not necessarily
proved. Belief is practical; it is a matter of hearsay rath-
er than of demonstration. Much of belief grows out of life,
and much is real only in life. Beliefs are tested by will
and action, by living convictions. One f s beliefs "are not
the product of speculation; they have to be achieved, or con-
quered, in life itself." 97 While one must believe the neces-
sary truths of intelligence, he may believe "all those prac-
tical principles which are necessary for the realization of
our highest and fullest life." 98 Belief builds upon knowl-
edge to lead one into a richer, fuller life. It leads one
96. Bowne, PER, 59.
97. Bowne, TTK, 381.
98. Ibid., 584.

209
from the syllogisms of the closet "out into the open field
of the world and life and history; . . . there is where, in
matters of practice, the decisive debate is carried on. "^
It is evident that Bowne 1 s epistemology is the most
systematic and thorough in the development of American per-
sonalism. He begins with self-activity and ends with the
conviction that "this world can never be explained on any
impersonal plane. "100 ^e m±n(^ creates its own world through
specific conditions and categories and is distinct from the
object of its thought. Knowledge is possible only on the
basis of personal experience. His mature conclusion is that
The world of experience exists for us only
through a rational spiritual principle by
which we reproduce it for our thought, and it
has its existence apart from us only through
a rational spiritual principle on which it
depends, and the rational nature of which it
expresses. -LU -L
3. Metaphysics.
Metaphysics, according to Bowne, answers the question,
what is reality?102 His preliminary answer that "Those
things exist which act," 103 is similar to Johnson's idea of
99. Bowne, TTK, 385.
100. Bowne, PER, 110.
101. Ibid., 110.
102. See Bowne, MET, Rev. ed. , 1. This is similar to his
teacher Lotze's definition: "Metaphysics is the science
of that which is actual, not of that which is merely
thinkable." Lotze, COM, 15.
103. Bowne, MET, 27.
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self-activity, to Edwards's, that all existence is to be
thought of in terms of consciousness, and to Berkeley's
"spirit is activity." His final answer that personality is
the key to reality is more similar to Alcott's statement,
"The Person is the presupposition of all things and be-
ings," 104 to Harris 1 thought that the first principle is
"Self-Activity," and to Royce's view that reality is "Abso-
lute Personality." He agrees here, of course, with Calkins
and Howison, although he differs from them in his pluralistic
monism. His final view is that reality is "a world of per-
sons with a Supreme Person at the head." 10^ Personality is
to be understood as meaning "selfhood, self-consciousness,
self-control, and the power to know. 1,106
Bowne f s most brilliant and succinct attack upon imper-
sonal ism is found in his chapter by that title in his Harris
lectures. There he has pointed out that impersonalism may
be reached by "the sense-bound mind" which arrives at natu-
ralism and by the "uncritical" mind, which, through the fal-
lacy of the abstract, arrives at the general principles of
an abstract idealism. Materialistic mechanism and abstract
idealism, the two forms of impersonalism considered by Bowne,
are metaphysically "impossible."107
104. In his diary, as quoted by Shepard, JOBA, 450.
105. Bowne, PER, 277.
106. Ibid., 266.
107. Ibid., 263.
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They are empty forms of thought to which no
reality can be shown to correspond, and upon
criticism they vanish altogether. If we next
ask what insight impersonalism gives into the
problems of experience, we find nothing but
tautology and infinite regress. Such a theory
does not pay expenses. The alternative is per-
sonalism or nothing. 108
Bowne summarized the limitations of impersonalism even more
succinctly in an earlier article in which he wrote:
On the impersonal plane we can never reach
unity from plurality, or plurality from unity;
and we can never find change in identity, or
identity in change. Continuity in time be-
comes mere succession without the notion of
potentiality, and this in turn is empty. Ex-
istence itself is dispersed into nothingness
through the infinite divisibility of space
and time, while the law of sufficient reason
loses itself in barren tautology and the in-
finite regress. The necessary logical equiv-
alence of cause and effect in any impersonal
scheme makes all real explanation and progress
impossible, and shuts us up to an unintelli-
gible oscillation between potentiality and
actuality, to which there is no corresponding
thought. 109
Bowne ! s personal metaphysics involves several signifi-
cant concepts. He agrees, first of all, with the previous
American personalists that being is active; the nature of a
thing is found in its activity. This reality is not found
in the sense world; it is
grasped only in the unpicturable notions of
the understanding. ... We must rise from the
world of lumps into the world of energy. .. .
The universal nature of being is to act. 110
108. Bowne, PER, 267.
109. Bowne, Art. (1905), 172. In MET Bowne (wrongly) denies
that you can take change into intelligence.
110. Bowne, MET, 28-29.
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Further, the physical world is phenomenal. Nature,
as matter and force, a mechanism in space and time, is a
"phantom of sense thinking." It is not an order of law, nor
is it absolutely continuous. Evolution does not help solve
the problem; it only describes phenomenal order. Nature is
idea; it is a "function of will and purpose;" it exists "only
in, for, and through intelligence." 111
Space and time are also phenomenal. They are real
for finite experience; but they are not independent of ex-
perience. They are the forms of outer and inner experience,
the functions of self-conscious intelligence. Personality
is not within a space-time continuum. Rather the space-time
continuum exists only for the self-conscious, intelligent
experient.
So with causality; it cannot be explained on the basis
of mechanism. The mechanical notion of causality involves
infinite regress, tautology, and the denial of change. It
is a "perfect nest of contradictions and impossibilities." 112
Volitional causality, however, is experienced. It "is imma-
nent in the process of change," and provides for unity, self-
direction, change and identity. "Volitional causality, that
is, intelligence itself in act, is the only conception of
metaphysical causality in which we can rest." 113
111. Bowne, MET, 294.
112. Bowne, PER, 196.
113. Bowne, MET, 92.
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Finally, Bowne's plural-monistic metaphysics is to be
understood in terms of a world-ground. Here his thought is
similar to that of Alcott, but quite distinct from that of
Howison and Calkins. Bowne explains "the existence and com-
munity of the many" by "affirming a fundamental reality which
is truly one, and which produces and coBrdinates the many."-^'
The world-ground is unitary, unchangeable, eternal, omnis-
cient, and omnipotent. 11 ^ The world-ground of speculation
is the personal God of religion. One discovers complete per-
sonality in the "absolute and infinite being."
4. Ethics.
One of Bowne's contributions was to the field of eth-
ics. Here his primary concept of the intrinsic worth of per-
sonality was a solvent for the knotty ethical problems and
the traditional points of view. Moral life, for Bowne, be-
gins with "Duty Ethics," not with the abstract theories of
hedonism, utilitarianism, or naturalism. So, too, it begins
with the normal unfolding of the potentialities of human
life in concrete situations; it begins in the thick of life.
114. Bowne, PER, 278. Howison holds that the "world-ground"
does not produce the many. Calkins maintains that the
many are part of the One. Bowne declares that one can
easily "fall into pantheism at this point." PER, 280.
It will be recalled that an earlier personalist, Whit-
man, often fell prey to Hegelian pantheism.
115. For a succinct account of these attributes see Bowne,
POT, 139-170.
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Although Bowne was not concerned with erecting an eth-
ical system of his own, he was interested in discovering eth-
ical truth and the principles which underlie conduct. His
emphasis upon the complete development of each personality
in its social interaction makes him an exponent, however, of
the ethics of perfection, or what has been called the self-
realization theory. He wrote specifically that the moral
life is "the expression of personal choice and self-realiza-
tion. "1-^ Representatives of this point of view are legion,
and although Bowne transcends his predecessors in some re-
spects, it is enlightening to see what he has in common with
them. He advocated the idea of purpose and harmony with
Plato, the importance of well-being with Aristotle, and the
principle of the law of love with the early Christians. He
championed views of modern ethical thinkers: Kant's concept
of the moral law, Hegel's idea of the self-realization of
the human spirit, T. H. Green's view of the ideal of person-
ality, and Lotze's idea that ethics is basic for metaphysics.
So, too, Bowne' s ethical position is similar to that of his
American predecessors. He was concerned with the "intelli-
gent free agents" and "right reason" of Samuel Johnson, the
"moral agency" of personality with Edwards, the "moral pur-
pose" in the "Kosmos" with Whitman, the emphasis of Davidson
upon moralizing life, the importance of the will in ethical
116. Bowne, Art. (1909), 710
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experience as a "self-determining power" held by Harris, and
the free moral agency of finite selves as advocated in dif-
ferent degrees by Royce, Calkins, and Howison. In his eth-
ics, Bowne was concerned with uniting the intuitive and ex-
perience schools of thought, and aiming morality at the
"fulness and richness of life." "Our moral task," he wrote,
consists "in the moralization of life."-1-1
'
7
Among the fundamental ideas in Bowne 1 s system of eth-
ics are those of the good, duty, and virtue. These concepts
are not to be viewed abstractly, however. Apart from experi-
ence they are meaningless. The good is "the realization of
normal human possibilities." Duty is "to help • . . what-
ever ministers to the enlargement and enriching of life."
Virtue is "working for the common good." Bowne has written
of the good:
The ideal good is conscious life in the full de-
velopment of all its normal possibilities; and
the actual good is greater or less as this ideal
is more or less approximated. For man the at-
tainment of this good involves the perfection of
individual life and of social relations. For
man the good is perfectly realizable only in and
117. See Bowne, POE, viii. For the high regard in which
Bowne 1 s ethical treatment is held, see Knudson, Art.
(1922), 396, and McConnell, BPB, 163. For further
views of the relationship of Bowne' s ethical position
to that of other thinkers see Brightman, ML, especially
294, and Titus, EFT, 87-88. It is also significant to
note, in view of our contention that personalis tic
ideas preceded Bowne in American thought, that Bowne
outlined what later became his book on ethics in 1869-70
when he was still a young student. See McConnell, BPB,
30.
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through the co-working of the community; indeed,
the good exists mainly in a social form. Hence
virtue itself largely takes on the form of work-
ing for the common good; and unselfishness is
often set forth as the chief if not the sole
virtue.
The development of morals is also an important idea
in Bowne's ethical position. In subscribing to such a view
he utilized the evolutionary method of his day without tak-
ing its naturalistic content, and anticipated to some extent
such a later work as Westermarck' s Origin and Development of
Moral Ideas (1906). He went beyond even such later produc-
tions, however', in his emphasis upon the fact that moral de-
velopment has for its goal and criterion the enrichment of
each person in a society of persons in which value experience
is ever increased and expanded.
Fundamentally empirical, Bowne has written that "our
human life does not begin ready-made but grows, and it not
merely grows but it grows out of subnormal and subrational
conditions. "I19 Life begins as potentiality. Man does not
begin physically, rationally, or morally perfect. He must
attain "his true self," transcend the irrational and unmoral.
He must bring the natural under the control of the spiritu-
al. 120 This moral development takes three general direc-
118. Bowne, POE, 69.
119. Bowne, Art. (1909), 708. See also Bowne's criticism of
professional moralizers for dealing only with moral ab-
stractions and not duly considering the concrete condi-
tions of existence. Art. (1900), 248.
120. Hocking has ably illustrated the neutrality of human
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tions. (1) The moral ideal unfolds and the sense of duty is
strengthened. This is within the free moral agent himself.
(2) The moral principles become embodied in codes and insti-
tutions. This is the "extension of practical wisdom." (3)
The moral field is extended until it includes "the entire
life of the individual and of society, and also the inclu-
sion of at least all human beings within the sphere of moral
relations.
"
121
Bowne recognizes that the complete moralization of
life is a long way from realization. There is incomplete
harmony in the codes of men and social groups. This diver-
sity does not, however, vitiate the validity of moral princi-
ples nor the ideal of moral behavior. General agreement in
the principles of action, even if not in specific codes of
behavior, is evidenced in the feeling of obligation, in the
postulation of specific virtues, and in the direction of the
moral ideal. One must not give up the principles, but work
for a "far greater mental and moral seriousness . • . than
obtains at present." 122 So, too, with the moral ideal. It
ought not to be surrendered because it is at any given moment
impossible of realization. "We must also remember," Bowne
nature, i.e., its possibilities for both good and for
evil, and also the necessity of man making "of himself
what he will." See HN, 15-16, and also What Man Can
Make of Man .
121. Bowne, POE, 153.
122. Ibid., 163.
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has written,
that until the perfect is come we shall have to
work v/ith imperfect instruments, imperfect mo-
tives, and imperfect men, and not allow a moral
aestheticism to degenerate into a weakness of
mind and character resulting in practical im-
potence. There is something wrong with the
ideal when it thus defeats its elf. 123
Despite the lack of perfection, or complete self-realization,
moral principles must be maintained, and ideals he pursued.
And the dynamic within the individual and within society for
continual development comes from the very structure of the
universe, from the fact that persons are ends in themselves.
A final concept of importance in Bowne' s ethical view-
point is his idea that ethics and religion are related.
Throughout the history of thought this alliance has been
held by some to be fictitious, by others to be necessary.
Bowne holds to the latter position because of the nature of
reality. The objective moral order can be completely under-
stood only on the basis of the meaning and destiny of human
life, which in turn follows from the structure and meaning
of the universe. Bowne wrote:
The aims we purpose for ourselves and others are
necessarily involved in our general theory of
life and existence, that is, in our religious
and speculative conceptions .124
When one thinks the problem through, he assumes, according
to Bowne, "a moral world order, a future life, and a moral
123. bowne, Art. (1900), 261
124. Bowne, POE, 195.
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world governor who assures the final triumph of goodness." 125
The moral law and ideal become, on this basis, not only
facts of finite experience, but also expressions of the will
of the Supreme Person.
Rather than applying these ethical ideas to the lead-
ing ethical relations at this point in the discussion, let
us make the applications when considering Bowne 's social
philosophy. Before leaving the ethical problem, however, it
will be well to point out the significance of Bowne's view-
point. He empirically recognized the natural, related eth-
ics to the problems of life and conduct, emphasized the com-
mon good, pleaded for the "will to do right," renounced
abstractions such as virtue, pleasure, and happiness, and
cautioned against an abstract and impracticable idealism.
Living persons actively achieve morality by increasing the
fulness of life in harmony with the will of the Supreme Per-
son.
5. Social Philosophy.
One develops a person- centered social philosophy from
a personalistic ethical system. Bowne was no exception. Al-
though he did not write a specific social philosophy, he
made a vigorous application of his ethical views to many
125. Bowne, POE, 200.
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challenging areas of social activity. His wide social con-
cern touched such problems as government, woman suffrage,
war, the family, subject people, poverty, and the necessity
of material productivity to increase the abundant life for
all. McConnell has written that Bowne 's thought "suffered
from an excess of individualism," but also that such a view
was the temper of his day. -1-26 Bowne, nevertheless, dealt so
sharply with critical problems that his principles are acute-
ly contemporary.
He was, for one thing, sensitive to the impelling
need for a social philosophy. Like Alcott and Davidson, he
lamented the disorganization of much in civilization up to
and including his own day. With compassion he wrote:
It is a grim scene which the historical proces-
sion of humanity presents— the many races, their
alienation, their wars and mutual slaughter, the
failure to reach anything in most cases and the
scanty and insecure result in all. The great
mass of individuals have not had the conditions
of a properly human existence—buried in igno-
rance, pursued by disease, persecuted by pain,
and all" the while, like some tremendous Niagera,
pouring over into the abyss of death and dark-
ness. . . .127
126. See McConnell, BPB, 168-170. For an able discussion of
Bowne's contribution to social thought see Pritchard's
unpublished Boston University Master's thesis, SPRB,
especially 166-176. See, more especially, Bristol's
appreciation of "social-personalism" as suggested by
Bowne. Bristol concludes with ideas similar to those
held by Bowne after a thorough study of adaptation as a
theory of social progress. See SA, particularly 328
and 331.
127. Bowne, Art. (1910) 2 , 889.
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To remedy this the social order must be moralized, spiritual-
ized by the dynamic of a religious concern for persons. To
such a task Bowne devoted his life.
Among other things, Bowne advocated woman suffrage, a
burning issue of his day. This put him in the liberal per-
sonalistic tradition of Alcott, Whitman, Davidson, Cook, and
Calkins, who in their turn championed equal suffrage. Bowne
recognized the ancient origin of the subjugation of women
and the fact that social evolution in the light of the ideal
is a slow process, yet he was vitriolic in denouncing those
who impeded recognition of the rights of women. He wrote re-
garding this:
... If we should call the roll of opponents,
we should find among them all savages, enemies
of society, of the family and good government,
rums ell ers, drunkards, constitutional stand-
patters and weak-minded men in general. -^8
The social order, he maintained, would never be at its best
until this specific problem was remedied. Women, as moral
persons, must share in the privileges as well as the respon-
sibilities of a moral society.
Bowne also considered the perennial problem of war.
He recognized the horror and wastefulness of war and the fact
that fighting is the "lowest and cheapest of all forms of
public service," 129 yet he held that "the horrors of peace
128. Bowne, Art. (1910) 1 , 536.
129. Ibid., 531.
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may "be greater" than those of war. "War would he very much
out of place in heaven;" he wrote, "hut it is sometimes very
much in order on earth." 130 Bowne was able to take this po-
sition on the basis of his distinction between morally justi-
fiable and unjustifiable wars. The first type includes wars
of self-defense and those which have secured the rights of
humanity. These have both been "historically necessary and
beneficent." The second type includes "war for passion's
sake" and "war for ambition's sake," both of which are the
"sum of all crimes." 131 Despite the usefulness of some wars,
Bowne hoped that the achievements of science, the develop-
ment of an industrial society, and the spread of the Chris-
tian idea of man would eliminate war from human society. The
earlier type of patriotism, which held "My country, right or
wrong," and the idea that the state is supreme must both be
supplanted by the idea that "humanity has become more than
all states." Only then will men and nations arrive at their
full moral stature.
A vital social problem in which Bowne preceded his
130. Bowne, Art. (1900), 259. Bowne differed here in his
judgment of war with Whitman and Calkins, both of whom
were outspoken against it.
131. See Bowne, POE, 300-301. Bowne' s concern for the elim-
ination of war was similar not only to the views of
other personalists, but also, in some respects, to such
modern thinkers as Voltaire, Rousseau, Kant, Comte,
Tarde, and Spencer. Voltaire, in particular, has said:
"War is the greatest of all crimes. . . . " Quoted by
Durant, SOP, 267.
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day was that of the handling of subject and backward people
on the part of the Western Powers. The contemporary world
revolution hinges on some of the problems which he clearly
foresaw forty years ago. He regarded the white race not as
"the" race, but only as a pioneer race in achieving a worth-
ful civilization. So great was his respect for the Oriental
people that he remarked a few weeks before he died that if he
had his life to live over again he would teach in China. 132
This attitude, not evident in his earlier writing, was devel-
oped largely on the basis of his trip around the world in
1905 and 1906. Two incidents from that trip illustrate his
social vision. The first occurred in Japan in the home of a
friend. Roused from deep meditation, he said:
"I have never before had such a vision as this."
"What vision?"
"Just the vision of these masses of mankind,
their possibilities in themselves and in their
possible relation to the welfare of the whole
world." 133
The second incident occurred in India, where Bowne enjoyed
the beautiful sights but was impressed with the human misery.
He was especially distressed over the treatment of the na-
tive Indians by the foreigners who ruled them. Referring to
Bowne, McConnell has written:
He had a carrier, or porter, accompany him out
of the hot land into the mountains, where at
night the air is bitingly cold. The porter was
132. See McConnell, Art'. (1922), 352
133. Quoted by McConnell, BPB, 256.
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barelegged. As night came on Bowne inquired of
the keeper of the home where he was to be en-
tertained, what arrangements were to be made
for the shivering servant. The indifferent
answer was that the servant could sleep under
a porch, almost wholly exposed to the night
air. It came near making a scandal and rocking
the foundations of the British empire, in the
judgment of the host, when Bowne insisted that
some quarters be provided inside the house.
Almost forty years later, it is only the more liberal social
thinkers who have a grasp on the problem which Bowne clearly
foresaw. Society can achieve its full potentialities only
insofar as it becomes a moral institution— only insofar as
all persons contribute to and share in its beauty and majes-
ty.
Of final importance in Bowne 1 s social philosophy is
his view of government. He advocated a liberal democracy in
which "the largest possible life and liberty for each" is
"compatible with the highest good of all." 135 In such a de-
mocracy power and wealth are to be distributed on a humani-
tarian basis; political rights are to be equal; opportunities
are to be open to all. Any government, then, as society it-
self, is purely instrumental. It is merely a medium through
which persons reciprocally attain the fullest life. Whitman
134. McConnell, BPB, 259.
135. Bowne, Art. (1910) 1 , 527. Bristol has pointed out that
Bowne was progressive in his social philosophy for hold-
ing to the idea that there are two constituent factors
in well-being, "outward fortune and inner worth and
peace." Both elements are necessary for "individual
and social activity that shall attain ultimately the
coveted goal." SA, 331.
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had perhaps as clear and progressive a view as any of the
personalists heretofore mentioned regarding the relationship
of the many to each other in social interaction, but here
one sees that Bowne is just as forward-looking. In fact,
considered in the light of contemporary totalitarian and op-
pressive systems of government, he sounds revolutionary.
Pointing out that governments "derive their rights solely
from the service they render their subjects," he adds:
. . . Whenever government fails to render service,
or becomes the oppressor of the people, it loses
all reason for existence and may rightly be over-
thrown by any power able to render the service
demanded by the true interests of the people. 136
Bowne was continually related to the practical, however, and
recognized that an ideal government is possible only with
ideal men. The chief task of any group of people is, there-
fore, to educate and moralize itself. The good society is
not developed by legislation; it grows only through the mutu-
al high regard for personality. When this occurs government
becomes a well- sharpened tool whereby each citizen builds
for himself and others the fullest moral and spiritual life.
If Bowne 1 s social philosophy began empirically with a
recognition of the tremendous need for social improvement—
the cognizance of the many evils inhibiting social progress
—
it ended with an unshakable faith in an ideal for society,
the mutual co-operation of enlightened persons. Though
136. Bowne, Art. (1900), 258.
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humanity does much to deny the validity of a social ideal of
interacting personalities, its existence is both certain and
increasingly worthful. With rare faith in his own social
views, Bowne wrote the year before his death:
One loves to dream of a time when humanity shall
come to its own, when physical nature shall be
subdued to human service beyond all present con-
ception, when sin and disease shall have disap-
peared, when the social order shall be an ex-
pression of perfect justice, when the race shall
be rich enough to afford all its members the op-
portunity of a truly human existence, when the
bondage of physical drudgery shall be taken off
human shoulders, when the treasures of knowledge
shall be a universal possession, and when, in
antithesis to these things and conditions there
shall be in man a moral spirit wise enough to
use them and strong enough to control them.
Then the kingdom of man, which is also the king-
dom of God, will have finally come, and the new
heaven and the new earth which were seen in
ancient vision will be here.^3 '''
6. Philosophy of Religion.
Bowne was essentially a philosopher of religion. His
personalism was, by definition, the view that a "Supreme Per-
son" created and sustained the "community of persons" which,
together with Himself, constitutes reality. Throughout a
long fruitful life Bowne was closely related to religious
interests and was, in particular, a minister in the Methodist
Church. Although he wrote in many areas of philosophy, most
137. Bowne, Art. (1909), 722. Bowne used these same words
to conclude his discussion of "The Modern Conception of
the Kingdom of God." See SIC, 325-326.
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of his writing was in, or related to, religious fields. 138
His philosophy of religion may be understood by a discussion
of his views of God, man, prayer, the church, and the Chris-
tian life.
Bowne was preeminently theistic. His argument for
that position was chiefly one of faith, or belief. He used
the design argument somewhat, and occasionally appealed to
the idea of cosmic causation, yet he felt that Kant was cor-
rect in pointing out that "the ontological argument properly
proves nothing, and that the cosmological and design argu-
ment depend on the ontological." He went beyond Kant, how-
ever, to maintain that "there is an element of faith and
volition latent in all our theorizing." Faith and belief
are necessary in every field of thought. Hence one has just
as much certainty in believing in God as in holding to the
postulates of scientific knowledge, or knowledge in any area
138. Bowne wrote such books as Studies in Theism , The Chris-
tian Revelation , The Immanence of God , and Studies in
Christianity
.
Among his numerous articles he dealt
with such subjects as "But Are They Converted?" "Com-
paring Religions," "Faith in Our Immortality," "The New
Gospel," "Religion in Education," and "Gains for Relig-
ious Thought in the Last Generation." Three of Bowne'
s
students corroborate this view of Bowne* s religious in-
tensity. Knudson termed Bowne a "vigorous defender of
the faith" and wrote that "his philosophy was of the
theological type." See Art. (1934), 1057. Brightman
has written: "Philosophy for Bowne must be religious
because life is religious. ..." See Art. (1922), 371.
Marsh, in a Founders' Day address at Boston University,
said: "One of the most sovereign marks of our great
philosopher was his profound religious nature." See
Art. (1937), 12.
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of life. One cannot see God, but likewise, Bowne wrote in
his early Studies in Theism , one cannot see an atom, nor
ether. The reality of God is discovered in life— in nature,
in history, in every pursuit of the mind and spirit. Skepti-
cism, agnosticism, and atheism are merely assumptions which
"wreck both life and conscience." Theism, on the other hand,
while not proved, is "an implication of our moral nature and
practical life."139 It is the "fundamental postulate of our
total life."140
The several divine characteristics according to Bowne
are: First, God is a unity, "uncompounded, indivisible, and
without distinction of parts." Second, He is unchangeable.
Third, He is omnipresent, the "ground of all finite existence
and activity." 141 Fourth, He is eternal, that is, He tran-
scends time, and is the "conductor of the world-process.
"
Fifth, God is omniscient. Sixth, He is omnipotent. Finally,
and inclusive of all the other attributes, God is the "com-
plete personality." 14^
139. Bowne, POT, 260.
140. Bowne, POT, iv.
141. Bowne, IOG, 3.
142. So ably did Bowne advocate the personality of God that
Buckham wrote in 1920: "The Theism of Professor Bowne
is a great advance in philosophic acumen over the con-
ventional theism which it helped to supplant." See Art.
(1920), 29. Likewise in a recent statement, McConnell
lauds Bowne for his clear affirmation of the personality
of God. This, he implies, is valid in contrast to the
"somewhat curious turn" of much contemporary theistic
thinking which discounts "the personal as relative and
therefore not quite appropriate to the idea of God as
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Bowne held to a religious view of man. He differed
from Howison, who held that God was not the creator of man,
and from Calkins, who held that man was part of the absolute.
Man, according to Bowne, is a free, independent, and immor-
tal being, created by God to participate with Him in the con-
servation and increase of values. Bowne was well aware of
the fact that man is complex, finite, and a sinner in vary-
ing degrees. Nevertheless, he held that men
are to pass from the unconsciousness of nature
and the ignorance of childhood to the conscious
recognition and acceptance of the divine will;
and then they are to go on with God in deepen-
ing sympathy and growing fellowship forever . -^3
Men must accept their lives as a "gift" of God, and their du-
ties as the "will" of God. As "God's children," they are
"to be workers together with him in the divine labor of real-
izing his will and building up his kingdom."-1-44
Prayer, to Bowne, was "the very essence of religion."
He defined it broadly as the "desire and effort of the soul
to relate itself and all its interests to God and his
will."-1-45 One, in this sense, prays without ceasing; he
lives with a prayerful attitude; he continuously cooperates
absolute, or at least above anything as relative as
personality." See Art. (1943), 35-38.
143. Bowne, SIC, 220.
144. Bowne, EOR, 243. Regarding Bowne 1 s view of man, McCon-
nell has written: "One of his /Bowne f s7 sentences
which I recall most distinctly was that Love met us as
we came into the world and Love will meet us as we go
into the next." Art. (1943), 39.
145. Bowne, EOR, 132.

230
with God. The entire life in all its contents of varied ex-
periences is a sacrament to the divine plan.
In dealing with the subject of prayer, Bowne arrived
at several conclusions. (1) One ought not offer prayers
which can be answered by himself. it is utterly foolish to
petition for those things which man must work for himself.
(2) One may, as a child of God, pray about everything, but
in the spirit of "Thy will be done." (3) One "must not be
disturbed over God's seeming delay." Impatience grows from
a belief in spiritual magic. (4) "Alleged answers to prayer"
should be intelligently understood. 146 (5) The life of
prayer gives prayer meaning. The saying of prayers may be-
come mechanical; the spirit of prayer is the "essence of re-
ligion," "life's deepest spring." To pray, then, is to live
146. One is reminded of the naive faith in prayer in popular
thought. Two illustrations occur to the writer: The
first is the experience of the wife of a missionary who
was returning from the Orient during the early phases
of the present war. The ship on which she and her chil-
dren were sailing was torpedoed and sunk. Most of those
aboard were drowned. She and her children were saved.
This, she said, was an answer to her prayer. The sec-
ond illustration is that of the famed Rickenbacker
rescue in the Pacific. Several of the men involved
maintain that God answered their prayers directly by
saving them from death at sea. Bowne would ask: "What
of those who went down with the ship and for whom equal-
ly fervent and believing prayer was offered?" What of
the Master's prayer that was not answered when he asked
the cup to pass from him, but was answered when he
prayed: "Not my will, but Thine be done?" Bowne was
not skeptical of all special providences, but he was
critical of claims of special answers to prayer. He
was concerned that prayer should not become "blasphemous
raving" nor viewed as a "talisman." See EOR, 149.
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with a sense of dependence on God and a willingness to do
His will. 147
It has been stated previously that Bowne v/as reared
in a loyal Methodist home, and that he was a lifelong cham-
pion of the interests of the church. He was, at one time,
tried for heresy by his church, but the event was a discred-
it to his critics rather than to his churchmanship. If he
was a critic of the church, it was because of his love for
it, and his desire to make it a more worthy instrument of
God for the moral and religious progress of man. There was
in the church, according to Bowne, too much "artificial mo-
rality and pseudo- spirituality. " The church must get "a
deeper sense of its relation to the truth and its obligation
to it;"148 it must put itself "where it really belongs, at
the head of all the forces in life that make at once for so-
cial permanence and social progress." 14^ Church organiza-
tions are many; the kingdom is one. The Church will realize
its high destiny when its body of believers zealously pursue
the ideals of the kingdom.
One might also comment on Bowne ! s view of the Chris-
tian life. As all preceding American personalists, he was
concerned with the dignity of the soul and its most complete
development. As Royce, for instance, had concerned himself
147. See Bowne, EOR, 153-159.
148. Bowne, SIC, 399.
149. Ibid., 354.
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with the "beloved community" of persons within the Absolute,
and, as Howison was interested in the "eternal republic" of
co-creative selves, so Bowne was engrossed with the process
of building "men into the realization of their Divine son-
ship."150 His conclusions on the subject appear in a small
book, The Christian Life
, which was later revised to become
a chapter in his larger book, Studies in Christianity * Some
of the significant facts in the Christian Life are: (1) Per-
sonal religion is the ideal. Rites and formulas are instru-
mental to personal development. (2) One must distinguish
between the language of theology and that of experience.
(3) One must distinguish between theory, which is necessary,
and the simple truth of God's grace. (4) One must put su-
preme emphasis upon the ethical and volitional element in
conversion, and upon absolute loyalty to the will of God.
(5) Religious experience is as complex and multiform as life
itself. (6) Attention must be given to Christian training
and edification. (7) All the normal interests of humanity
—
the social, industrial, educational, and political—must be
taken into the field of religion; religion must be the prin-
ciple of all living. (8) Methods are instrumental; it is
the spiritual life in which religion must be interested. 151
Man must develop character through his own effort. He must
150. Bowne, TCL, 143.
151. See Bowne, TCL, 144-152.

"plod along the dusty road of daily routine," but aware that
the Spirit of Christ is with him. He must be a co-worker
with God so that the divine will may be seen and done on
earth as it is in heaven. Then will humanity become a "fit
organ for the expression of God." Then will "the divine life
flow through us and all our thoughts and work, and be the
life of our life."152 Then will man achieve his full stature
as a member of the divine community of persons which consti-
tutes reality.
7. Bowne's Place and Influence in American Philosophy.
Bowne ! s place in American philosophy is secure; his
influence is profound. His thought has weathered the test
of time for it was rooted in a rich heritage; it "moved in
the regions where the central and inevitable problems of
philosophy are located;
"
153 j_t gave new depth and range to
America's intellectual life. 154
Many recent and contemporary thinkers have given in-
creased recognition to Bowne-— this despite the fact that, as
has been previously mentioned, Bowne was not as influential
152. Bowne, EOR, 285.
153. Brightman, Art. (1927), 167.
154. It has been emphasized that Bowne was aware, to some
extent, of his personalis tic heritage. At one time,
for instance, he wrote: "in the field of metaphysics
proper I note a strong tendency toward personal ideal
ism, or as it might be called, Personalism. ..."
Art. (1905), 172.

in his day as he ought to have been. A few references were
made in the early part of the chapter to indicate the high
esteem in which Bowne was held by his students, his col-
leagues, and his fellow philosophers. Several more will be
made here to validate objectively the contention that Bowne'
ideological influence is steadily increasing. Baker has de-
voted considerable attention to Bowne in her treatment of
The Concept of a Limited God . 155 The most succinct state-
ment of Bowne ! s importance has been given by Brightman in
his address to the Sixth International Congress of Philoso-
phy in 1926. There, among other statements, he quoted the
distinguished German philosopher, Eucken, who called Bowne
"distinctly America's first philosopher." 156 Buckham has
written that Bowne 's book entitled Personal ism "has taken
its place as one of the outstanding products of American
Idealism." 15
"7 Cell put Bowne foremost in a group of think-
ers who, at the turn of the twentieth century, made "eine
kraftige, zielbewusste" movement toward a "personalistische
Religions"5philosophie" that marked "einen Wendepunkt in der
amerikanischen Philosophie. 1,158 In 1910 Coe wrote: "the
general state of thought is much nearer the position for
which he /Bovine/ contended than it was when he was elected
155. See especially 104-120 and 148.
156. See Brightman, Art. (1927), especially 165-166.
157. Buckham, Art. (1920), 29.
158. Cell, Art. (1928), 390-391.
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to his professorship in Boston University. 1,159 Cunningham,
too, in his able book, The Idealistic Argument in Recent
British and American Philosophy , devoted nineteen pages to
Bowne, who, he says, "was very influential as a teacher of
philosophy." 160 Duncan has written that Bowne 1 s personal ism
"furnishes the soundest possible basis for ethics, pedagogy,
and civil society," and that " it alone can give an account
of the relation of the human self to the divine self . . .
upon which religion may securely rest." 161 Ferm, who in his
textbook, First Adventures in Philosophy , has devoted some
attention to personal ism, calls Bowne "the great exponent
and father of the school of Personalism." 162 Flewelling,
who has been previously quoted, founded in 1920 The Personal
-
ist , a quarterly which represents the Bowne tradition.
Gamertsfelder and Evans, in their widely used textbook, Fun-
damentals of Philosophy , refer to Bowne frequently and state
that the "present important place" of personalism "is due to
the influence of B. P. Bowne." 163 Knudson, who has been
called "the outstanding personalistic theologian of the Eng-
lish-speaking world," 164 paralleled Hocking's well-known
159. Coe, Art. (1910), 522-523.
160. See 315-333.
161. Duncan, Art. (1922), 386. Italics my own.
162. See 170. Ferm, as most writers, has identified Bowne
so closely with Lotze that he has completely overlooked
the American strains of thought that have helped make a
strong personalism possible.
163. See 480, also 237, 238, 430, 541, 563, and 710.
164. See Brightman, PIT, vii.
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tribute to Bowne's metaphysics with one to Bowne's theology.
Knudson wrote:
• • • It may be said that as a summary account
of the curve of apologetic thought since the
time of Schleiermacher there is no more power-
ful and convincing chapter in American theolog-
ical writing than that of Bowne on the nature
and basis of religious faith.-1-65
Patrick referred to Bowne's Personalism , with several other
books on idealism, as representing "the idealistic tradition
in its modern form," and as being of "lasting value."-1-66
Pratt, in his Personal Realism , mentioned Bowne in the dis-
tinctive company of Lotze, Green, the Cairds, Royce, Hocking,
Ward, and Brightman— all of whom have permanent philosophic-
al significance. 167 So, too, Thilly mentioned Bowne with a
group of eminent thinkers in his History of Philosophy . 168
In speaking of Bowne, Wieman has also classified him with
others, viz., W. A. Brown and D. C. Macintosh, both of whom
he calls "representative liberals."-1-69 Wilson, a personal
-
ist, referred to Bowne as a writer of one of the "improved
forms of idealism." 1
"70 It should also be noted that Bowne
is referred to, along with the outstanding American philoso-
phers, in one of the ablest histories of modern philosophy
165. Knudson, Art. (1934), 1057.
166. Patrick, ITP, 222.
167. See Pratt, PR, 216.
168. Thilly, HOP, 562.
169. Wieman, G-OR, 455.
170. Wilson, SAIW, 166. Wilson also quoted Bowne in a book
written just before his death. See RWL, 104.
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to be published in recent years, that by Wright of Dartmouth
College. 171 Finally, one of the most interesting tributes
to Bowne is that made by a Latin American philosopher of
broad background, Franquiz of the University of Puerto Rico.
He says of Bowne what this investigation established for the
entire tradition of American personalism; he has not only
written that Bowne is "one of the greatest minds of the West-
ern Hemisphere," a superlative tribute in itself, but has
gone on to say that his "thought contributed in many ways to
the intellectual strengthening of all the values and institu-
tions for which American history and Christian democracy must
stand.
"
172 y-foe personalistic tradition has given continuous
force and guidance to the genius of American life. Be that
as it may, these several references to Bowne 1 s influence have
been cited despite the risk of being tedious, to validate
the contention that his thought is significant, his influence
profound.
There are several important reasons for Bowne 's sig-
nificant position in American philosophy. First, and fore-
most, he was the systematic organizer of personalism. There
had been many American thinkers before him who had emphasized
171. See Wright, HOMP, 485.
172. Franquiz, POC, viii. It is interesting to note that
Franquiz is one of a large number of second generation
Bowne enthusiasts. He received his doctorate under
Brightman, who, he says, "has nurtured the budding phil-
osophic consciousness of contemporary Latin America."
See the front page of POC.
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personality as the only adequate concept by which one could
understand the problems of life and reality. He, however,
amplified that concept, gave it breadth and depth, dealt
with it thoroughly in most of the areas of philosophy, and,
for the first time, expressed comprehensively its wide-ranged
importance. He was not, by any means, the first personalist,
even though he did make an independent "synthesis of the con-
tributions to personal is tic thought made by Berkeley, Kant,
and Lotze." He was original, however, in his systematic or-
ganization of preceding personalistic thought both in Europe
and in America. And he was indeed, as the first completely
systematic personalist, the "father of the school of person-
al ism. "
Second, Bowne was a "typical" personalist. As
pointed out earlier, his position gave equal recognition to
the valid claims of both pluralism and absolutism. He took
the Aristotelian golden mean between the two views so ably
advocated within the personalistic tradition by Davidson and
Howison on the one hand and by Royce and Calkins on the
other. As a catalytic agent his thought softened the sharp
contrasts between the opposing views not only within person-
alism, but between the rigors of the older German and Brit-
ish absolute idealism and the newer pluralism of British and
American writers. Bowne, with Johnson, Edwards, Alcott,
Whitman, and Harris, was less extreme than either Howison or
Calkins. He was, therefore, more able to give a balanced
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recognition to both the Supreme Person and the finite person,
to the group and the individual. As a happy balance between
totalitarianism and anarchy, his position represents, more
completely than the others, the philosophical foundations of
American democracy and Christian culture.
Third, he was a great teacher. Knudson has written
that "his professional chair was his throne." Brightman has
added that virtually every student in Boston University dur-
ing Bowne ! s time was "required to study under" him, and that
most of the theological students "elected to do so." It was
Bowne 1 s attractiveness as a teacher that enabled him to
transmit the fruits of his vigorous mind and radiant spirit
to the countless numbers of students who have carried his
views around the world.
Finally, Bowne will live as the "father" of a great
tradition in American philosophy. He, more than anyone else,
is responsible for the existence of personalism as a distinc-
tive school. This is due to the above mentioned combination
of facts—his systematic organization of thought, his melio-
ristic position, and his greatness as a teacher. His Ameri-
can antecedents and contemporaries, including such eminent
personalists as Wilson and Ladd, as well as those who are
more fully treated in this investigation, did not develop as
complete a system as Bowne. They were not as prolific.
Their views were not as true to the American heritage. They
did not gather a large group of enthusiastic students about
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them who later assumed responsible positions in the relig-
ious and educational life of the nation. Each made a signif-
icant contribution to personalism, but it was Bowne who es-
tablished it as a definite school. While Bowne was not as
original as he was heretofore thought to be, he may, never-
theless, be considered more than anyone else the founder of
personalism in America. He proclaimed, with greater vigor
and insight than any of his antecedents or contemporaries,
the significance of personality in all areas of thought and
life and action. His permanent philosophical significance
is assured.
8. Summary.
Bowne, it is thus seen, was the first distinctive
representative of plural-monistic personalism. His keen,
critical mind, broad interests, and intense love for teach-
ing enabled him to organize the noblest philosophical fruits
of the past and transmit them as a system to the future. As
a young thinker he gained much from his immediate professors,
Clark and Martin of New York University, and Ulrici and
Lotze of Germany. As an able student of the history of phil-
osophy he drew personal istic ideas from Leibniz, Berkeley,
Kant, and Hegel. As an American with a significant heritage
he appreciated the thought of Edwards, was familiar with the
views of Alcott and Cook, and knew the personalis tic posi-

tions of Harris, Howison, and Royce. He clarified and elab-
orated the preceding thought, took a mediating position be-
tween some of the extremes of others, and through a host of
students and followers established his general position as a
dominant note in American philosophy.
Prom his central thought— that personality is the key
to reality, several basic concepts evolve. Self-activity is
central in his epistemology; knowledge is possible through
conscious personal experience. Metaphysical reality con-
sists of a plurality of finite persons who are created and
sustained by the Supreme Person, the most complete personal-
ity. In the field of ethics Bowne held that moral values
are achieved by self-realization and by living in harmony
with the will of the Supreme Person. His social philosophy
began with a recognition of the need for greater opportuni-
ties of self-development; it ended with the conviction that
the idea of harmonious interaction between persons will be
achieved on the plane of local, broad humanitarian, and cos-
mic experience. In his philosophy of religion, Bowne main-
tained a forceful theism, proclaimed the divinity of man,
championed the validity of prayer, supported the church as
an institution, and advocated the supreme importance of liv-
ing a Christian life.
Further, it has been seen that Bowne' s position in
American philosophy is tremendously significant for several
reasons. First, he methodically organized personalism into
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a system. Second, his position, which represents a logical
synthesis between pluralistic and absolutistic personalism,
made him the first important representative of the most com-
prehensive type of personalism, plural-monistic. Third, as
a brilliant teacher and prolific writer, he exerted great
influence through his many eminent students and followers.
Finally, he is the father of a specific personalistic tradi-
tion.
As America matures, and as the philosophical founda-
tions of its life and institutions become more evident, it
will be increasingly discovered that Bowne has given bril-
liant expression to a dominant indigenous philosophy.
•

CHAPTER VI
COMPARISON OP THE THREE DISTINCT TYPES OF PERSONALISM
The results of the investigation thus far have shown
the development of personal ism in the United States and have
indicated the chief ideas in the three distinct types. The
remaining task is to compare the types in terms of the lives
and influence of the philosophers, the fundamental issues
that led up to the division of types, and the way in which
the differences are associated in specific issues.
1. Comparison of the Lives and the Influence
of the Philosophers.
Johnson and Edwards came from excellent colonial fam-
ilies, made the most of their educational opportunities, and
contributed richly to the life of the young nation through
the church and the field of education. They established no
school of thought as such. Alcott, Whitman, Davidson, and
Harris were contemporaries of varying influence. Alcott,
who was unsettled in his early life, had more influence than
is usually assumed. He served as a mediator between the
East and the West, or more specifically, between the Concord
transcendental is ts and the St. Louis School, and directly
influenced Harris. Whitman led a full, varied life. He is
known chiefly as a poet, but will be remembered as the bard
243
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of personality and democracy who was concerned that America
rise to its full stature by placing personality central in
its life. Davidson was born in Scotland, became well educa-
ted, travelled back and forth from continent to continent,
and poured his passion for persons into the life of the
world. Harris dominated the American philosophical and edu-
cational scene for many years, yet he does not have the per-
manent significance of some of the other thinkers such as
Edwards or Whitman. Royce, who began his life on the fron-
tier of California and rose to eminence as one of America's
most brilliant philosophers, had few followers and has been
relatively neglected in recent years. He was not self-con-
sciously personalistic to the extent that he was aware of
belonging to that school of thought.
Of chief concern perhaps is the difference in the
lives and influence of Hov/ison, Calkins, and Bowne. Howison
came to prominence slowly; he did not secure the position in
which he was most completely happy until he was fifty years
of age. His writing, although significant, was limited. He
was a brilliant teacher, however, and contributed to the per-
sonalistic consciousness of American philosophy. Calkins
began her life in a parsonage, was well educated, and gave
early promise of a fruitful career. She had no disciples,
yet wrote considerably, and championed personalism vigorously
in both American philosophy and psychology. Bowne, too, in-
dicated promise early in life. He became a prolific writer,
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a churchman, and an able teacher. He was the first to organ-
ize personalism systematically into a definite school of
thought. His plural-monistic position represents the typical
strain of personalistic thought in America and is a logical
synthesis (arrived at independently) between the extremes of
Howison and Calkins. He gained many followers (although
they differ from him and from each other in several signifi-
cant ways) and may be considered the most influential expo-
nent of personalism up to and including his own day.
2. The Fundamental Issues that Lead up
to the Division of Types.
The fundamental issues that lead to the division of
personalism into pluralistic, absolutistic, and plural-mon-
istic types are the basic questions that have concerned phil-
osophers ever since Thales. How can a person know, and what
can he know? What is the nature of reality? Is it one or
many? What is the nature of moral experience and behavior?
What is the nature of society? Is it a totalitarian whole
in which the parts are subservient? Is each part a law unto
itself? Or, is each part related to the other and to the
totality in some rational manner? What is the nature of God?
Is he absolute, one among many, or the Supreme Being who
creates and sustains all other persons? What of the finite
person? Is he a part of the whole, an independent entity,
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or a free co-worker with God? These questions, basic for
all philosophers, concerned the personalists of America.
The answers they gave were different in some respects and
similar in others. The differences, from the time of Johnson
on, are seen most clearly in the views of Howison, Calkins,
and Bowne.
3. The Way in Which the Differences Are Associated
with Specific Issues.
All the American personalists agree, when dealing
with the problem of epis temology, that an active self is
basic. Pluralistic personalism, however, makes knowledge
almost a matter of coincidence. Davidson makes feeling the
unifying factor while Howison holds to a "spontaneous objec-
tive cognition" by each mind. Absolutistic personalism goes
to the other extreme of holding that each person is directly
aware of his world inasmuch as he is part of the absolute.
Plural-monistic personalism, as represented by Johnson, Ed-
wards, Alcott, Whitman, Harris, and Bowne, holds that the
mind is active and creative. Bowne, in particular, pointed
out that the mind creates its own world and is distinct from
the object of its thought. 1
1. These thinkers did not hold, however, as did Howison,
that the finite mind creates the objective phenomenal
world.
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In the field of metaphysics the three types agree
that reality is personal. From that point on, however, the
differences become acute. The pluralists maintain that all
persons have infinite and eternal individuality. The world
of order and system is attained for Howison by the attrac-
tion of the metaphysically distinct personalities to the
"One Ideal." Final causation is the basic concept in his
"harmonic pluralism." The absolutistic position is that
things and persons are varying expressions of the One Abso-
lute Person. Royce, Calkins, and Hocking all agree on this
point. The Absolute preserves order and system, is the ul-
timate cause, embodies the absolute unity of all experience,
and is supra- temporal and supra-spatial. Every aspect of
the universe is part of the Absolute Person's self- experienc-
ing. Plural-monistic personalism takes a mediating position.
It holds, with Alcott, that "The Person is the presupposi-
tion of all things and beings." The Supreme Person "pro-
duces and coordinates the many." The World-Ground is, thus,
neither one among many nor the all-inclusive Absolute. He
creates and sustains, yet allows freedom and independence
for his creatures; in fact, he needs finite persons to ex-
press his own personality as a social being. Freedom is
more intelligible in the third type.
The differences in the field of ethics are not too
acute. To be sure, the pluralists hold to a "self-determin-
ing power" on the part of the finite person, the absolutists
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are concerned with moral experience for the "beloved commu-
nity," and the plural-monistic personalists are interested
in individual achievement of morality by living in harmony
with the will of the Supreme Person. These differences are
elemental from the speculative viewpoint, yet they become
less important when one considers the fact that all of the
American personalists were vitally concerned with "the mor-
alization of life." Every self realizes its own potentiali-
ties as it conserves and increases the "fulness and richness
of life" for the total society of persons.
One finds no systematic treatment of social philosophy
by any of the personalists considered in this investigation.
All of the thinkers were interested, however, in social
problems and treated them in various parts of their writing.
Johnson and Edwards, for instance, worked through the church
and educational institutions for the improvement of society.
Alcott was concerned with opportunities for the negroes,
with woman suffrage, and with improving the status of labor.
Whitman was passionately interested in the elimination of
war and with the establishment of personalistic democracy in
the "new world." Davidson championed economic justice, po-
litical freedom, and educational opportunity for all. He
criticized the whole structure of civilization for using
persons as tools rather than as ends. So, too, with Harris,
Royce, Howison, Calkins and Bowne. The last two were perhaps
more systematic than the others in their social philosophy.
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The reason the differences in the social philosophies of the
three types are not acute is because all three types make
personality of supreme importance. That is, they are all
concerned with spiritual reality. If any type were material-
istic or impersonal then indeed there would be an ideologic-
al conflict between the personalistic camps. As long as
personality is basic in the social structure the speculative
differences are lost sight of in the practical treatment of
persons as ends in themselves.
A final question of difference in .the three types of
personalism is that of philosophy of religion. All the Amer-
ican personalists that have been considered were, in varying
degrees, religious in both their private lives and their
philosophic outlook. There are significant differences, how-
ever, in their philosophies of religion. God, for the plu-
ralists, is only one among many. Especially is this true
for Howison who holds that God is not creative, but the
"Ideal," the Pinal Cause of the "Eternal Republic." On the
other hand God is the All in All for the Absolutists, and
with the exception of emphasis upon personality, one recog-
nizes a close relationship to the thought of such men as
Plotinus and Hegel. The plural-monistic personalists again
take a mediating position. God is, for them, the Supreme
Creative Self who allows independent activity for his finite
persons. This view was championed with particular vigor by
Alcott and Bowne; the latter, however, was far more system-
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atic and comprehensive in his treatment. None of the plural-
monistic personalists whose thought has been examined here
championed the doctrine of a finite God, a view that has sev-
eral ardent advocates among the followers of Bowne.
A distinct difference in the three types is evident
in the view of man. Man is of greatest significance for the
pluralists. Howison holds that man is the co-creator with
God of the entire universe including physical nature. God
is simply the Ideal. Man is of least cosmic significance
for the absolutists; he is part of the whole even though he
does exercise considerable freedom. The mediating position
of those who hold to pluralistic monism makes man not a co-
creator of physical nature, but a co- creator and sustainer
of values, and a co-worker with the Supreme Person in build-
ing the Kingdom of God. The self is immortal for all types
of American personalism. The pluralists find immortality in
the consciousness of the reality of the City of God; the ab-
solutists maintain that each self is an eternal expression
of the Absolute in a non- temporal form; the plural istic-
monists hold that the life of each self continues as an in-
dependent consciousness relating itself to the will of the
Supreme Person.
Prayer is valid in all three types. For the first,
prayer is conscious interaction between the entire community
of selves based upon "Inclusive Reason." For the second,
prayer is direct; it is social and private; it relates the

worshiper to the Absolute and to the other selves who are
part of his being. The third type holds that prayer is so-
cial and individual, but emphasizes freedom more than the
absolutists and, also, the necessity of praying to do the
will of God more than do the pluralists.
All types are concerned with the church and the Chris-
tian life. Davidson and Howison were not too closely re-
lated to the church, although Howison had studied for the
ministry. Royce and Calkins were interested in the church,
but, again, were not a vital part of it. Johnson, Edwards,
and Bowne in particular, of the third type, were clergymen
as well as philosophers and championed the Christian life.
4. Similarities and Differences in the Three Types.
An interesting similarity among the personalists them-
selves is the fact that they all gained national and interna-
tional recognition for their vigorous points of view, their
exemplary lives, and their contributions to the life of our
nation. The types are also similar in several matters of
thought. All base knowledge upon the experience of a self.
All maintain that ultimate reality is personal. The three
types are religious in outlook and furnish a satisfactory
philosophy of religion for the separate exponents. Each
type is concerned with a moral order and a just social sys-
tem. Of the three significant representatives of each type,
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Howison champions the "Eternal Republic," Calkins the "Great
Society," and Bowne the "Kingdom of God." These specific
thinkers were particularly outspoken in their attacks upon
impersonal ism, skepticism, and the false claims made by the
exponents of a crude evolutionism. They were in the vanguard
of the American philosophers who reacted against the limita-
tions of a philosophy based upon natural science while util-
izing the fruits of the exact scientists and doing justice
in their systems to the newer sciences of biology, sociology,
and psychology. They were the vikings of a more comprehen-
sive philosophy than was possible during the early nineteenth
century, the champions of one that has expanded in the twen-
tieth century.
The chief difference in the three types of personal-
ism is metaphysical. The pluralistic personalists hold that
reality consists of a plurality of co-creative and co-eternal
selves. The absolutists subscribe to the view that reality
is one— the Absolute. Every last fact in the universe is a
part of the absolute's experience. The pluralist ic-monists
attempt to do justice to all factors of experience. In such
a position there is a basal monism in the unity of the world
ground and in the quality of reality; there is a pluralism
of quantity, for while each self is dependent upon the Su-
preme Person it possesses its own unique individuality.
This three-way difference, as was indicated in the treatment
of the manner in which the differences are associated with
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specific philosophical issues, runs throughout the whole
range of speculation, and, to a lesser degree, throughout
the practical application of ideas to life. Pluralism and
monism are usually extreme. Plural-monistic personalism ac-
counts for the claims of each and arrives at a logical syn-
thesis. It has consequently been more dominant than the
other two types throughout the history of American philoso-
phy. Bowne was both its most systematic organizer and its
most vigorous exponent.
5. Summary of the Comparison of Types.
It has been seen that pluralistic personalism is rep-
resented by Davidson and Howison, and absolutistic personal-
ism by Royce and Calkins. Plural-monistic personalism was
held by Johnson, Edwards, Alcott, Whitman, Harris, and Bowne.
Of the entire group, Bowne was the only thinker to establish
his position firmly as a definite school of thought. He was,
therefore, the most influential personal is t up to and includ-
ing his own day.
The fundamental issues which lead up to the division
of types centered about the chief questions of philosophy.
Similarities and differences are, therefore, evident in the
fields of epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, social philoso-
phy, and philosophy of religion. All types are preeminently
similar in the fact that each forms the basis for a spiritual
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view of life. Each is concerned with the dignity of man and
the harmonious relationship of all persons within the uni-
verse. The most important difference, and one which is felt
to some degree in every field of thought, is that the plural-
ists emphasize the complete independence of every self, the
absolutists make every self a part of the whole, and the plu-
ralis tic-monists recognize the freedom and uniqueness of
every self while holding that each is dependent upon (not a
part of) the Supreme Person. The latter type has been the
most influential in the history of American philosophy.

CHAPTER VII
A CRITICAL CONCLUSION
Personal ism has been a dominant philosophy in the
history of American thought. It has grown in strength and
breadth throughout each period as various thinkers have made
their individual contributions. The interdependent interplay
of personalistic ideas found its fullest expression in the
views of Howison, Calkins, and Bowne, each of whom repre-
sents the different points of view that have been referred
to throughout this investigation as distinct types of person-
alism. Despite this three- fold division, personal ism has al-
ways regarded personality as the ultimate category of reali-
ty and life. Each of the many thinkers, therefore, not only
added to the cumulative deposit of personalistic thought,
but also played an important role in the life of the nation;
democracy and a Christian culture have been made possible in
America through the belief in the intrinsic worth of the in-
dividual and in the necessity of each person living harmoni-
ously with the total group of persons.
The investigation has been chiefly historical and
academic. Its significance, however, is contemporary and
creative. For that reason the conclusions are historical,
comparative, and critical.
First, personalism' s position in the historical devel-
255
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opment of philosophy should be more widely recognized. The
earlier American personal ists were unaware of their philo-
sophical heritage. By the time of Bowne the broad general
background of personalism was becoming evident. Bowne in-
tended to write a history of philosophy with this in mind,
but was unable to before his death. Knudson has stated this
development most succinctly by placing in the "personalistic
Hall of Fame" Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Aquinas,
Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant, Hegel, Lotze, and Bowne.
He has steadily maintained that personalism
represents one of the oldest and broadest cur-
rents in the history of human thought; it
stands organically and structurally related to
the spiritual philosophy of all the ages. It
is the ripe fruit of more than two millenniums
of intellectual toil, the apex of a pyramid
whose base was laid by Plato and Aristotle.
Plewelling, too, has written of the historical development
of personalism. Among other things, he has pointed out that
the great epochs of progress in western society
have centered upon some phase of this conflict
over the place of the person in the structure
of society, some new discovery of the person in
respect to social relations.^
Other personalists have referred to historical backgrounds,
1. Knudson, POP, 434.
2. Plewelling, Art. (1943), 174. See, also, his recent dis-
cussion of The Survival of Western Culture . In this new
book he answers Spengler by concluding that Western cul-
ture will survive. Among his several reasons for this
view is his idea that "there is coming in philosophy a
new understanding of the importance and place of the per-
son in any adequate view of reality and the cosmic order."
SOWC, 298.
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but no systematic treatment of the full sweep of personal-
ism's development has appeared.
Second, and more obvious from this investigation, per-
sonalism is to be considered as an indigenous American phil-
osophy. It has been said that America has no philosophy of
its own, that it "plays an inherited European game," that
American philosophers lack "imagination in generating lead-
ing ideas," are "afraid of speculative ideas," and "do over
and over again, an immense amount of dead specialized work
in the region of 'facts'." 3 A new nation, to be sure, is
dependent in all areas of its life, to some extent, upon its
inheritance. So American philosophy has taken much from
British, French, and Qerman thought. The democratic Chris-
tian culture of the United States, however, was nurtured and
developed by thinkers who consistently and comprehensively,
for the first time in history, championed the sacredness of
the person. In every area of our national life the effort
has been made to recognize certain inalienable rights of the
individual. Personalism has championed, from the colonial
days to the present, political equality, educational oppor-
3. See Dewey, who also pleads for an American philosophy re
gardless of its nature. He would welcome any so long as
it is "sufficiently bold" and "in the degree in which it
marked the coming to consciousness of a group of ideas
which formulated a coming to self- consciousness of our
civilization and thereby furnished ideas, supplied an
intellectual polity, to direct further observations and
experiments and to organize their results on a grand
scale." Art. (1927), 542.
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tunity, economic, social, and industrial reforms, scientific
progress, and religious freedom. This fact has been general-
ly overlooked by both personalists themselves and by the his-
torians of American philosophy. Although the personalists
considered in this investigation were dependent to some ex-
tent upon older streams of thought, each felt himself to
have an original point of view. The interpenetration of the
respective viewpoints, however, assumed increasing clarity
and similarity as the American intellectual enterprise ma-
tured. Personalistic ideas cohered "on a grand scale," to
use Dewey's phrase, and in the United States a new system
self-consciously evolved.
Third, as personalism improved upon the "genteel tra-
dition" in American philosophy by emphasizing the concrete
and specific, so it ought continually to redefine itself in
terms of recent theoretical and practical developments. It
must become less rationalistic and more functional— function-
al in the sense of harmonious activity as meant by Plato and
Aristotle rather than as used exclusively by pragmatism or
instrumentalism. Brightman has suggested that "as science
has developed, so has personalism. . . . " 4 One might add
that as the total life of man has developed, personalism has
grown in breadth and depth. If personalism gives the most
coherent account of the total experience of man, let it
4. Brightman, Art. (1943) 1 , 42.
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recognize with more confidence the vast, almost unknown, as-
pects of personality that are being investigated and utilized
in the various branches of learning. It will then express
itself more in harmony with the temper of the present day by
including, yet transcending, irrational psychologies, human-
istic philosophies, and impersonal ways of life. Personali-
ty will then be seen as a functional unity which is life it-
self. It is a functioning personality that makes possible
Whitehead's "concrescence" or "nexus of events," that inte-
grates what Dewey calls an existential act or process, that
is necessary for what Wieman terms "the unpredictable full-
ness of value to be found in the creative synthesis of de-
cisive moments,"^ that gives meaning to value experience, to
war and peace, to life and death. In short, although self-
activity has been emphasized by all the personalists consid-
ered, personality ought to be seen as a functioning reality
that is basic in every area of life. Personalism then be-
comes not only the voice of a rationalistic heritage, but
also the expression of contemporary insights.
Fourth, personalism ought to express its social phil-
osophy vigorously and systematically. All of the personal-
ists considered were tremendously concerned with the crucial
social problems of their day, yet none of them, as has been
previously mentioned, gave a complete treatment of the
5. Wieman, GOR, 480.
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problem. Personalisra, as a philosophy, has been most ably
expressed in its exposition of religion and in its critique
of science. The individual has, therefore, gained recogni-
tion in philosophic and religious literature and in scien-
tific thought. An increasingly regimented and impersonal
politico- industrial society, however, demands a new procla-
mation of the worthfulness of the individual in the social
sciences where the battles of men and nations are now being
fought. 6
Two acute thinkers of the Bowne-Knudson-Brightman
tradition indicate what is needed within the ranks of person-
alism. Oxnam, who has dealt brilliantly with this question
of collectivism versus individualism, has written:
It must be apparent to any thinking man that
some synthesis must be found which will con-
serve the proved values that lie in the creative
initiative that emerges from individualism and
which will appropriate the values that lie in
collective action with its elimination of waste,
development of the spirit of co-operation, and
6. McConnell, a recognized social prophet of the present day,
has made personal is tic contributions to numerous areas of
social thought and action. See particularly his lecture
on "Social Cross-Bearing," in which he discusses the prob-
lem of "the method by which the Christian ideal is to be
put into effect." CIASC, 117-144. Bristol, who was in-
fluenced by Bowne, has indicated what could be done by a
personalist in the way of a systematic exposition of so-
cial thought. See SA. The nearest approach to what the
present investigator has in mind has been done by Knudson
in his "truly great book," The Principles of Christian
Ethics . Here, in one section, Knudson deals systematical-
ly and critically with such burning social problems as
the individual, the family, the state and war, the church
and culture, and the economic order. See POCE, 176-280.
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protection of the group. It must be found by
intelligent men."7
Muelder, who speaks of personality as a "communitarian cate-
gory," has written that a "voluntary commitment to fellow-
ship" which is "social as well as individual"
would bring into being a pluralistic socialism
which recognizes social solidarity, objective
social wholes, social justice, forgiveness and
redemption. What we seek is an individualism
which is productive of the highest sociality
and a socialism which is productive of the
richest individuality. It would be a democrat-
ic collectivity which recognizes that reality
is a society of persons in which, among other
tasks, are the creation of a social mind among
men responsive towards and responsible to the
Supreme Mind to whom they owe their existence,
their ultimate value ideals, and their final
redemption.
^
This social expression of personalism should be amplified
until it effectively touches every political, social, and
economic problem in the life of our nation. As the thought
of Edwards, Royce, Howison, Calkins, and Bowne, in particu-
lar, has furnished the foundation for brilliant expositions
in the fields of metaphysics, ethics, philosophy of science,
and religion, so the insistent social demands of Alcott,
Whitman, Davidson, Calkins, and Bowne could be expressed in
a systematic social philosophy.
Finally, it is evident from this investigation that
the types of personalism in America can unite to become an
7. Oxnam, BTSC, 158.
8. Muelder, Art. (1943), 202-203.
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authentic voice of a new order— one in which both the digni-
ty of the individual and the worth of his corporate life
will be fully achieved.
It has been frequently pointed out that every writer
would experience satisfaction in discovering that the gener-
al trend of philosophy was in the direction of his own ideas
and even that philosophy is a tool of culture rather than
creative of culture. 9 This may often be the case, yet a
broader, more objective view is found in Hocking's use of
the legend of Merlin. Merlin, who was imprisoned in the for-
est, would not be free until the travellers who had heard
fragments of the secret that would release him put their
various parts together. So each of the various philosophies
have a part of the secret of the universe. Personalism,
therefore, can not pretend to be the final truth. It can
claim, however, to be one of the powerful factors in the gen-
ius of our American heritage, and a shining hope for the fu-
ture of all men. Philosophy is essentially creative; it has
the nomative function of directing history, of "transforming
life," as Radhakrishnan would say. It must "put forth a con-
structive theory of life" 10 that is fair to all the facts of
9. See especially Muirhead, Art. (1925), 12, and Spengler,
Per Untergang Pes Abendlandes.
lO.l^ee Radhakrishnan, Art. (1927). Radhakrishnan gets at
the heart of the personalistic view of culture when he
points out the limitations of impersonal ism. "Without
serenity and poise," he writes, "restraint and self-con
trol, we are not truly civilized, however great may be
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experience and that proclaims the worth of personality in
every significant relationship.
Personalism does this. America and the coming order
do not necessarily need new ideas and systems; rather they
need clarified and more emphatic expressions of the coherent
ideas present in a developing American personalism. Person-
alism insists, with Sorokin, that man must transcend his
"sensate form of culture" by incessantly striving for "the
greater nobility of Man" and "the greater glory of God.
It agrees with Howison that when "the shallow philosophy of
law and rights" is replaced by the person centered philoso-
phy we will possess "the Superstructure of a national life
at once genuine and devoted."-^ Personalism contends with
Flewelling that
Just so long as the freedom of the person is
only partially achieved, so long as it is de-
nied to any portion of society, high or low,
so long as there exists in the world those who
are not accorded the rights of the person, so
long there will remain the causes for revolu-
tion. The New Order, then, if we mean by that
the ultimate one, can be founded alone upon
the personalistic and Christian principle of
the intrinsic worth of the individual which is
the basis of all true democracy. 13
our outward accomplishments. A monkey trained to ride
a bicycle and smoke a pipe is still a monkey." Art.
(1927), 550.
11. Sorokin, COOA, 316 and 318.
12. Howison, Art. (1934), 379.
13. Flewelling, Art. (1943), 186. See also Flewelling'
s
brilliant book, The Survival of Western Culture . Here
he maintains that "the destiny of the West" will be
achieved only when personality becomes the creative goal
of history.
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So, too, personalism offers what Beard claims for the "idea
of civilization,"
a construct, or view of life, summational and
relative—universal in scor>e but applicable to
times, places, and circumstances—from which
inspiration and guidance may be derived in the
search for individual and social perfection.
Personalism, a dynamic power within the matrix of a develop-
ing nation, crosses the frontiers of mankind to proclaim for
all persons that which it has fostered in America— individu-
alism based upon recognition of the rights of others and a
passion for freedom which emanates in a full life for all
men. Personalism, to use a phrase of Carl Sandburg's, has
always said "Yes to life." It looks to a new order affirm-
ing: "The last word of spirit is Victory." 15
14. Beard, TAS, 673-674. It is to be noted, hov/ever, that
Beard thinks the American philosophy is pragmatism, rel
ativism, or ins trumentalism as opposed to absolutism.
He thereby indicates his bondage to James and Dewey.
See TAS, 661.
15. Brightman, TSL, 213.

ABSTRACT
Any system which emphasized personality as a fundamen-
tal principle in several fields of philosophy has been con-
sidered personalistic in this dissertation. Personalism has
developed into pluralistic, absolutistic, and plural-monistic
types in the United States. The chief representatives of
these positions have been Howison, Calkins, and Bowne. Per-
sonalism was a dominant philosophy in America, however, long
before these writers did their significant work. It was
part of the purpose of the dissertation, therefore, to in-
vestigate and evaluate the thought of the eminent men who
contributed to the development of American personalism prior
to the time of Howison, Calkins, and Bowne. The sources of
the study were chiefly the original writings of the various
American personalists.
Personalism was first represented in America by Samuel
Johnson, a noted clergyman and educator who was influenced
most permanently by Berkeley. Johnson emphasized self-ac-
tivity in epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics. Another
significant colonial was Jonathan Edwards. He held to an
active mind in epistemology, a dynamic soul in psychology,
consciousness of the real in metaphysics, and the action of
a moral agent in ethics. During the period of American phil-
osophy from the time of Edwards to that of Alcott— called
the period of enlightenment— the deists and the transcendent-
265
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alists contributed roughly to the personalistic tradition.
They held that God is rational, that man is a moral agent,
and that sentient beings, not the physical universe, are
metaphysically real.
The third important personalist was Amos Bronson
Alcott. He was familiar with Plato, Locke, Berkeley, Kant,
and Edwards, was a frequent visitor at the St. Louis School,
and knew Brokmeyer, Whitman, Davidson, Harris, and Howison.
He maintained, in all fields of philosophy, that "the person
is the presupposition of all things and beings." Walt Whit-
man, the fourth personalist, was the first American to pub-
lish an article entitled " Personal ism. " (It appeared in
Galaxy
,
May, 1868.) As "the bard of personality," he pro-
claimed the necessity of a person-centered educational sys-
tem, championed a personalistic social philosophy, and, more
than any previous thinker, identified personalism with the
genius of America as a nation. Thomas Davidson, the fifth
eminent personalist, held to an uncompromising pluralism.
He was part of the St. Louis group and the Concord School,
was a warm friend of Howison, and knew Bowne. He held reali-
ty to be an ideal world of sentient individuals. His social
philosophy was, therefore, a critique of the civilization
that uses men as tools rather than as ends; his philosophy
of education aimed at the production of free, self-directing
persons ready and able to act strongly in the affairs of
life. Sixth in the personalistic tradition is William Torrey
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Harris. He was influenced by Alcott and the St. Louis and
Concord Schools. Self-activity was central in all areas of
his philosophy. Finally, Josiah Royce made a contribution
to personal ism by maintaining that reality is an Absolute
Person. He was familiar with the work of Whitman and Harris,
often exchanged views with Howison, was the beloved teacher
of Calkins, and admired the work of Bowne. This rich native
heritage, so largely overlooked heretofore, was a major pro-
ductive force of the most worthful in American civilization.
It prepared the way for the later types of personal ism.
Pluralistic personalism is most ably represented in
the United States by George Holmes Howison (1834-1916). He
developed his personalism from his American heritage (partic-
ularly from the St. Louis Group and Alcott), from the views
of his European friends (chiefly Eucken, Schiller, and Ward),
and from his appreciative study of the works of Aristotle,
Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel.
Pluralistic personalism, according to Howison, views
reality as a universal society of persons, who, although
held together by reason, are completely individual and eter-
nal. Mind functions spontaneously to make perception possi-
ble. Nature is dependent upon the "assemblage of individual
minds," and is created, not by God, but by the final causa-
tion of a society of minds experiencing themselves and each
other. In the "eternal republic," the individual person
achieves moral goals in terms of the ideal (God), experiences
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free choice, and attains immortality. God is not a creator,
but the "ideal Type," "the way of absolute perfection."
Howison made a permanent contribution to a developing
American culture. (1) He helped give philosophy an impor-
tant role in American life. (2) He was a superlative teach-
er who influenced students that later assumed responsible
positions in American education. (3) He is the chief Ameri-
can representative of pluralistic personalism.
Absolutistic personalism is most conspicuous in the
thought of Mary Whiton Calkins (1863-1930). Royce has
gained more recognition, yet he was not so self-consciously
personalistic as his student and disciple. Calkins arrived
at her particular type of personalism through a critical ap-
preciation of numerous systems of philosophy (especially
those of Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel), through her study with
Royce, and through her appreciative knowledge of the thought
of Davidson, Howison, Ward, McTaggart, and Bov/ne. She de-
rived the word personalism from Renouvier.
Absolutistic personalism views the absolute self as
constituting all reality. Finite selves are expressions of
the different purposes, emotions, and thought of the abso-
lute self. The physical universe, too, is the experiencing
and willing of the absolute self. The relationship between
the selves within the absolute is best understood as a great
society of selves held together by the consciousness of the
absolute. One achieves his greatest self-expression by
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complete loyalty to the total society. On this basis Calkins
championed a person- centered social philosophy, ethical sys-
tem, and philosophy of religion.
Miss Calkins will continue to occupy a significant
place in American philosophy. (1) She was one of the lead-
ing thinkers of her time to insist upon the importance of
personality as the ultimate category of reality. (2) As
"the most prominent disciple of Royce," she advocated one of
the most notable forms of American idealism. (3) She made
an original synthesis of absolutism and personalism.
Plural-monistic personalism is most ably represented
by Borden Parker Bowne (1847-1910). He was influenced by
Clark and Martin of New York University, Ulrici and Lotze of
Germany, and the thought of Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant, and
Hegel. He was also familiar with the personal is tic thought
of his American antecedents, Edwards, Alcott, Cook, Harris,
Howison, and Royce.
Plural-monistic personalism views reality as a plural-
ity of finite persons who are created and sustained by the
Supreme Person. Bowne held that moral values are achieved
by living in harmony with the will of the Supreme Person.
His social philosophy recognized both the need for greater
opportunities of individual self-development and the neces-
sity of harmonious social interaction among persons. In his
philosophy of religion, he proclaimed a forceful theism, the
divinity of man, and the validity of prayer. He supported
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the church and advocated living a Christian life.
Bowne's position in American philosophy is signifi-
cant. (1) He methodically organized the numerous strands of
personalism into a coherent system. (2) His position, which
is a logical synthesis between pluralistic and absolutistic
personalism, made him the first self-conscious representative
of plural-monistic personalism. (3) He influenced many emi-
nent individuals. (4) He is the father of a distinctive per-
sonalistic tradition.
A comparison of the three distinct types of personal-
ism indicates that their similarities and differences grew
out of the fundamental issues of philosophy. All types are
alike in their concern for a spiritual view of life, the dig-
nity of man, and the harmonious relationship of all persons
within the universe. Their basic difference is that plural-
ism emphasizes the complete independence of every self, abso-
lutism views every self as part of the larger self, and
pluralistic-monism recognizes the freedom and uniqueness of
every self while holding that each is dependent upon (not a
part of) the Supreme Person. The latter type has been the
most influential in the history of American philosophy.
Several conclusions have emerged:
1. Personalism has developed steadily in the United
States through an interpenetration of the work of numerous
thinkers.
2. The chief contributors to this development up to
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Howison, Calkins, and Bowne were Johnson, Edwards, Alcott,
Whitman, Davidson, Harris, and Royce
.
3. Three dominant types of personalism have emerged
in America, pluralistic, absolutistic , and plural-monistic.
4. Howison represents pluralistic personalism. He
views reality as a universal society of eternal persons
bound together by reason. God is not the creator, but a
final cause. Howison was a superlative teacher, but estab-
lished no following.
5. Calkins, a more consciously personalistic thinker
than her brilliant teacher, Royce, represents absolutistic
personalism. Prom this viewpoint, every fact in the uni-
verse is a part of the absolute self's experience.
6. Bowne is the most distinctive representative of
plural-monistic personalism, a position which is a logical
synthesis of the pluralistic and absolutistic forms. He was
first to organize the numerous strands of personalism into a
coherent system. This form is the most influential in Amer-
ica.
7. The similarities and differences in all areas of
the three types of personalism hinge upon the metaphysical
view of reality.
8. Finally, it has been critically concluded that
(1) personalistic thought in the development of philosophy
should be more widely recognized, (2) personalism is to be
considered, in part, as an indigenous American philosophy,
(3) it ought continually to redefine itself in the light of

contemporary research, (4) it ought to express its social
philosophy more systematically, and (5) personalism can be-
come an authentic voice of the emerging order, for it inter'
prets the individual, his corporate life, and the Father of
all men, the Supreme Person.

APPENDIX
WALT WHI TMAN 1 S PERSONALI SM"
Walt Whitman was the first writer, as far as I can
determine, to have published a magazine article entitled
"Personalism." The article is a landmark in the history of
American philosophy because of its priority, and also because
of its mature personalistic point of view. It helps to sub-
stantiate the contention that many thinkers contributed to
the development of American personalism prior to Bowne.
Whitman thought so much of the ideas he expressed in "Person-
alism" that he was not content to allow it to remain a fugi-
tive magazine article; he incorporated it, along with an
earlier article entitled "Democracy," into his greatest prose
work, Democratic Vistas .1
"Personalism" expressed Whitman's mature thought. It
culminated his journalistic editorials in the Brooklyn Eagle
regarding the anti-slavery controversy and the issue of
state's rights versus federalism. He was the champion of the
individual (regardless of color) , but on the other hand, his
theory of individualism was greatly modified through the
civil war controversy to Include the individual's responsi-
bility to the nation. He is here concerned that America
1. The article was never republished, however, in its ori-
ginal form, not even in the definitive ten volume edition of
Whitman's complete works. See The Complete Writings of
Whitman (eds. Richard Maurice Bucke, Thomas B. Harned, and
Horace L. Traubel) , 10 vols. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons,
1902.
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achieve its cultural greatness by developing its own society,
literature, drama, music, and art. Both social solidarity
and individual liberty will be achieved when great personali-
ties develop democratic institutions in keeping with the
"purposes" of the "permanently real."
PERSONAMSM
/Galaxy , 5 (1868), 540-5477
To Democracy,^ the leveller, the unyielding first
principle of the average, is surely joined another principle,
equally unyielding, closely tracking the first, indispensable
to it, opposite, (as the sexes are opposite), and whose
existence, co-equal, confronting and ever modifying the other,
often clashing, even defiant, paradoxical, yet neither of
highest avail without the other, plainly supplies to these
grand cosmic politics of ours, and to the launched forth mor-
tal dangers of Republicanism, the analogic counterpart and
offset, whereby Nature restrains the deadly original relent-
lessness of all her first-class laws.
2. Whitman's idea of democracy, later defended in "Person-
alism," is that the individual and the group are not mutually
exclusive, rather they are compatible; individualism finds
its expression through the group. This point of view is
maintained in a long introduction to Democratic Vistas that
did not appear in either of his earlier articles, "Person-
alism" or "Democracy." There Whitman wrote: "This idea of
perfect individualism it is indeed that deepest tinges and
gives character to the idea of the aggregate." DV, 275.
Further, the mission of government "is not repression alone,
and not authority alone, not even of law, nor by that favor-
ite standard of the eminent writer, the rule of the best men,
the born heroes and captains of the race, (as if such ever,
or one time out of a hundred, get into the big places, elec-
tive or dynastic)—but higher than the highest arbitrary
rule, to train communities through all their grades, begin-
ning with individuals and ending there again, to rule them-
selves. What Christ appear»d for in the moral-spiritual
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This second principle is Individuality, the pride and
centripetal isolation of a human being in himself,—Identity
—
Personalism.*5 Whatever the name, its acceptance and thorough
infusion through the organisations of political commonalty now
shooting Aurora-like about the world, are of utmost importance,
as the principle itself is needed for very life's sake. It
forms, in a sort, or is to form, the compensating balance-wheel
of sine qua non of the successful working machinery of America.
—And, if we think of it, what does civilization it-
self rest upon-—and what object has it, with its religions,
field for human -kind, namely, that in respect to the abso-
lute soul, there is in the possession of such by each single
individual, something so transcendent, so incapable of grada-
tions, (like life,) that, to that extent, it places all beings
on a common level, utterly regardless of the distinctions of
intellect, virtue, station or any height or lowliness what-
ever—is tallied in like manner, in this other field, by
democracy 1 s rule that men, the nation, as a common aggregate
of living identities, affording in each a separate and com-
plete subject for freedom, worldly thrift and happiness, and
for a fair chance for growth, and for protection in citizen-
ship &c, must, to the political extent of the suffrage or
vote, if no further, be placed, in each and in the whole, on
one broad, primary, universal, common platform." DV, 280-2S1.
It is evident that Whitman not only considered his idea of
personalism to be his most important one (see DV, 292.) but
also that he continued to develop it long after having written
this article.
3. Whitman here defines personalism as individualism. Before
he finishes the article, however, he uses personalism to mean
the dependence of the many on the one, and vice versa (as de-
fined by Alcott in 1877, in his book Table -Talk
,
153.) He
holds to a reciprocal relationship between the one and the
many. He first hints at this idea on page 542, where he
speaks of "ensemble -Individuality." Whitman views democracy
as the many and the Individual as the one. Both are necessary
for balance. A burning issue during Whitman's day was that of
state's rights versus federalism. Whitman first favored
state's rights, or individualism (here he agreed with Goethe
and Emerson that the highest form of civilization is the cul-
ture of the individual.). Finally Whitman decided that both
were necessary, that personality is the justification of all
government. He came to realize that it was not a question of
the state versus the nation, nor the Individual versus the
state, but that the part and the whole, the one and the many
mutually enriched each other.
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arts, schools, etc., but Personalism? To that, all bends;
and it Is because toward such result Democracy alone, on any-
thing like Nature f s scale, breaks up the limitless fallows of
humankind, and plants the seed, and gives fair play, that its
claims now precede the rest.
The Literature, Songs, Esthetics, etc., of a country
are of importance principally because they furnish the mate-
rials and suggestions of Personality for the women and men of
that country, and enforce them In a thousand effective ways.4
As the topmost claim of a strong consolidating of the
Nationality of These States, is, that only by such powerful
compaction can the separate States secure that full and free
swing within their spheres, which is becoming to them, each
after its kind, so will Individuality, with unimpeded branch-
ings, always flourish best under imperial Republican forms.
—Assuming Democracy to be at present in Its embryo
condition, /see article in GALAXY, December, 1867_/7^and that
the only large and satisfactory justification of It resides
in the future, mainly through the copious production of per-
fect characters among the people, it is with regard to the
atmosphere and spaciousness fit for such characters, and of
certain nutriment and cartoon-draftings proper for them, and
indicating them, for New World purposes, that I attempt the
present statement—an exploration, as of new ground, wherein,
like other primitive surveyors, I must do the best I can,
leaving it to those who come after me to do much better. The
service, in fact, if any, must be to merely break a sort of
first path or track, no matter how rude and ungeometrical.
We have frequently printed the word Democracy. Yet I
cannot too often repeat that it is a word which still sleeps,
quite unawakened, notwithstanding the /5
r4l7 resonance and the
many angry tempests, out of which its syllables have come,
4» When "Personalism" is later incorporated into Democratic
Vistas , Whitman here appended a long footnote which begins
with the sentence: "After the rest is satiated, all interest
culminates in the field of persons, and never flags there."
5. Whitman is referring to his earlier article "Democracy,"
which is later incorporated in his eighty-four page pamphlet
Democratic Vistas . The purpose of the later, enlarged discus-
sion is expressed by Whitman in a letter to a Mr. Dowden. He
wrote: "I would say that the spine or verterber (sic) princi-
ple of my book is a model or ideal... of a complete healthy,
heroic, practical modern Man... formed and shaped in consonance
with modern science, with American democracy.... I seek to
typify a living Human Personality...." Quoted by Perry, WW,
199-200.
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from pen or tongue. It is a great word, whose history remains
unwritten, because that history has yet to be enacted. It is,
in some sort, younger brother of another great and often-used
word, Nature, 6 whose history also waits unwritten.
But I must get me to my theme.
—Much is said, and opportunely said, with reference
to aggregate-tendencies, masses, those vast and sweeping move-
ments, influences, moral and physical, of humanity, now and
always current over the planet, on the scale of the impulses
of the elements. Then it is also good to reduce the whole
matter to the consideration of a single self, a man, a woman,
on permanent grounds. Even for the treatment of the universal,
in politics, metaphysics or anything, sooner or later we come
down to one single, solitary Soul.
There is, in sanest hours, a consciousness, a thought
that rises, independent, lifted out from all else, calm, like
the stars, shining eternal. This is the thought of Identity
—
yours for you, whoever you are, as mine for me. Miracle of
miracles, beyond statement, most spiritual and vaguest of
earth 1 s dreams, yet hardest basic fact, and only entrance to
all facts. In such devout hours, in the midst of the signifi-
cant wonders of heaven and earth, (significant only because of
6. Whitman turned to "Nature" rather than to intellect for
inspiration. Here he was close to Housseau^ "Noble Savage."
7. Whitman did not use the word "metaphysics" to mean the
science of being or a study of reality. It was a hazy con-
cept to him meaning anything supra-physical . See his poem
"The Base of All Metaphysics" in Leaves of grass . He also
uses the word somewhat loosely in his poem "Going Somewhere:"
My science -friend, my noblest woman-friend,
(Now buried in an English grave—and this a memory-leaf for
her dear sake,)
Ended our talk—"The sum, concluding all we know of old or
modern learning, intuitions deep,
"Of all Geologies—Histories—of all Astronomy—of Evolution,
Metaphysics all,
"Is, that we all are onward, onward, speeding slowly, surely,
bettering,
"Life, life an endless march, an endless army, (no halt, but it
is duly over,)
"The world, the race, the soul—-in space and time the universe,
"All bound as is befitting each—all going somewhere."
See LOG, 397.
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the Me in the centre, )8 the creeds, conventions, venerable
authorities, fall away and become of no account before this
simple idea. Under the luminousness of real vision, it alone
takes possession, takes value. Like the shadowy dwarf in the
fable, once liberated and looked upon, it expands over the
whole earth, and spreads to the roof of heaven.
The quality of BEING, in the object's self, 9 according
to its own central idea and purpose, and of growing therefrom
and thereto—not criticism by other standards, and adjustments
thereto—is the lesson of Nature. True, the full man wisely
gathers, culls, absorbs; but if, engaged disproportionately in
that, he slights or overlays the precious idiocrasy and special
nativity and intention that he is the man's self, the main
thing, is a failure, however wide his general cultivation.^0
Thus, in our times, refinement and delicatesse are not only at-
tended to sufficiently, but threaten to eat us up, like a
cancer«H Already, the Democratic genius watches, ill-pleased,
these tendencies. Provision for a little healthy rudeness,
savage virtue, sanity, equipoise, is demanded. Negative quali-
ties, even deficiencies, would be a relief. Singleness and
8. and 9. Whitman was interested in the problems of episte-
mology. He wrote: "The kernel of every object that can be
seen, felt or thought of, has its relations to the soul, and
is significant of something there." Quoted by Furness, WWW,
236. He agreed with Bishop Butler that God implanted a ra-
tional faculty in man and, with George Pox, that the spirit
of God is in each person. He was partially influenced by
German philosophy, especially by Kant, in holding that "all
knowledge flows out from man into the object." He didn't
completely subscribe to the idea of the creativity of thought,
however, for he also held that "the object has a reality in
itself, which awakens the knowledge in the spirit." Quoted
by Purness, WWW, 236.
10. Whitman's emphasis upon personality always prevents him
from becoming completely transcendental. Individuality, ac-
cording to him, must never be lost in the Absolute. His view,
here, is similar to that of Bowne, a later personalist, as
opposed to that of Calkins or Royce. Whitman was increasingly
melioristic. The person gained in stature, however, rather
than lost, as it related itself to the total society of selves.
11. This agreement with Rousseau's unregenerated "noble sav-
age" is a reversion to Whitman's earlier views of "blow your
own horn" individualism. In 1847 he had written: "Men must
be 'masters unto themselves,' and not look to Presidents and
legislative bodies for aid." Quoted by Rogers and Black,
GOTP, I, 52. Elsewhere, Whitman criticizes Rousseau's col-
lectivism, or contract idea in terms of his own earlier
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normal simplicity, amid this more and more complex, more and
more artificialized, state of society—how pensively we yearn
for theml how we would welcome their return.
In some such direction, then—at any rate enough to
preserve the balance—we feel called upon to throw what weight
we can, not for absolute reasons, but current ones. To prune,
gather, trim, conform, and ever cram and stuff, is the pre-
vailing and enormous pressure of our days. While aware that
much can be said even in behalf of all this, we perceive that
we have not now to consider the question of what is demanded
to serve a rude and barbarous nation, or set of nations, but
what is most applicable, most pertinent, for numerous congeries
of conventional societies already becoming stifled and rotten
with literature, and polite conformity and art.
In addition to established sciences, we suggest a sci-
ence as it were of healthy average Personalism, on original-
universal grounds, 12 the object of which should be to raise up
and supply through The States a copious race of superb American
men and women, ahead of any yet known.
individualism, saying: "Where Rousseau is yet undeveloped is
in not realizing that the individual man or woman is the head
and ideal, and the State, City, Government , or what not, is a
servant, subordinate—with nothing sacred about it—nothing in
a judge or court either—but all sacredness is in the indivi-
dual, and the other, at most, is but a reflection of the
individuals." Prom an unpublished manuscript before 1855.
quoted by Furness, Art (1929), 465.
12. Whitman is here beginning to mature. He began the essay
with individualism but comes now to "average Personalism," a
concept meaning a synthesis of individualism and totalitarian-
ism. This is also evident in the expression, "original-
universal grounds," original meaning egoistic, and universal
meaning average. The hyphenated words indicate Whitman's
growth. He is now thinking in such terms as ego-group,
"original-universal," "ensemble-Individuality," "motive-
elements," and "mental-educational." This article definitely
marked a crossroad in Whitman's career. Prior to the Civil
War he saw only the individual; afterwards he began to see the
person in an environment. Half the essay, Democratic Vistas
,
is therefore old, whereas the other half is new, indicating a
more mature point of view. Whitman wrote of the influence of
the war year's experience upon his thinking: "It has given
me my most fervent views of the true ensemble and extent of
the States." SD, 97.
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-—America, leaving out her poll tics^has yet morally
originated nothing. She seems singularly unaware that the
models appropriate for former conditions and /542/ for Euro-
pean lands, are but exiles and exotics here. No current of
her life, as shown on the surfaces of what is authoritatively
called her Society, accepts or runs into the just -mentioned
theory; but all the currents there set squarely against it.
Never, in the Old World, was thoroughly upholstered Exterior
Appearance and show, mental and other, built entirely on the
idea of caste—never was the sufficiency of mere outside Ac-
quisition—never was Glibness, verbal Intellect, more the
test, the emulation—more loftily elevated as head and sample—
than they are on the surface of our Republican States this day.
The writers of a time hint the mottoes of its gods. The word
of the modern, say these voices (and among them the noblest
voice in America), is the word Culture.
We find ourselves abruptly in close quarters with the
enemy. This word Culture, and what it has come to represent,
involves, by contrast, our whole theme, and has been, indeed,
the spur, urging us to engagement. Certain questions arise.
As now taught, accepted and carried out, are not the
processes of Culture rapidly creating a class of supercilious
infidels, who believe in nothing?!^ shall a man lose himself
in countless masses of adjustments, and be so shaped with
reference to this, that, and the other, that the simply good
and healthy and brave parts of him are reduced and clipped
away, like the bordering of box in a garden?-^ You can culti-
vate corn and roses and orchards—but who shall cultivate the
primaeval forests, the mountain peaks, the ocean, and the
tumbling gorgeousness of the clouds? Lastly—Is the readily-
given reply that Culture only seeks to help, systematize, and
put in attitude, the elements of fertility and power, a con-
clusive reply?
13. Whitman omitted the expression "leaving out her politics"
from Democratic Vistas and inserted "and artistically." When
writing for the magazine readers he was concerned for their
interest in politics. In the later essay he was more inte-
rested in art, and perhaps wished to give himself freer reign
with a larger audience.
14. Faith is a keynote in Whitman^ thinking. One must al-
ways have faith in something.
15. Here again, one sees Whitman's recognition of social
forces, and also a concern for the individual within the ma-
trix of events.
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I do not so much object to the name, or word, but I
should certainly insist on a radical change of category, in
the distribution of precedence. I should demand a programme
of Culture, drawn out, not for a single class alone, or for
the parlors or lecture -rooms, but with an eye to practical
life, the West, the workingmen, the facts of farms, and jack-
planes and engineers, and of the broad range of the women also
of the middle and working strata of the States, and with re-
ference to the perfect equality of women, and of a grand and
powerful motherhood. I should demand of this programme or
theory a scope generous enough to include the widest human
area. It must have for its spinal meaning the formation of a
typical Personality of character, eligible to the uses of the
high average of men—and not restricted by conditions ineli-
gible to the masses.
The best culture will always be that of the manly and
courageous instincts, 16 and loving perceptions, and of self-
respect—aiming to form, over this continent, an Idiocrasy of
Universalism, which, true child of America, will bring joy to
its mother, returning to her in her own spirit, recruiting
myriads of men, able, natural, perceptive, tolerant, devout,
real men, alive and full, believers in her, America, and with
some definite instinct why and for what she has arisen, most
vast, most formidable of historic births, and is, now and here,
with wonderful step, journeying through Time.
-—The problem, as it seems to me, presented to the
New World, is, under permanent law and order, and after pre-
serving cohesion (ensemble-Individuality), at all hazards to
vitalize man»s free play of special Personalism, recognizing
in it something that calls ever more to be considered, fed,
and adopted as the substratum for the best that belongs to us
(government indeed is for it), including the new esthetics of
our future.^
16. Here Whitman is concerned with an ideal program of cul-
ture, not culture as it exists. It must mean something to
everybody, to the "typical Personality." Whitman is growing
away from rugged individualism to a sense of social respon-
sibility. He is reaching for the common denominator.
17. "Ensemble-Individuality" is the keynote to Whitman*
s
position. By "special Personalism" he means "Individuality"
as used in the second paragraph of the article. Personalism,
or "Personality" as used by Whitman, therefore, means both
individuality and the group in mutual relationship. The pur-
pose of America is to foster this personalism. Whitman's
continual growth away from his youthful individualism is seen
in a statement he made in his seventieth year (in 1889)
:
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To formulate beyond this present vagueness—to help
line and put before us, the species, or a specimen of the
species, of the Democratic ethnology of the /543/ future, is
a work toward which the Genius of our land, with peculiar
encouragement, invites her well-wishers. Already, certain
limnings, more or less grotesque, more or less fading and
watery, have appeared. We too (repressing doubts and qualms),
will try our hand.
Attempting then, however crudely, a model or portrait
of Personality, for general use for the manliness of The
States, we should prepare the canvas well beforehand. Parent-
age must consider itself in advance. 18 (Will the time hasten
when fatherhood and motherhood shall become a science—and the
noblest science?) To our model a clear-blooded, strong-fibred
physique, is indispensable; the questions of food, drink, air,
exercise, assimilation, digestion, can never be intermitted.
Out of these we descry a well-begotten Selfhood—in youth,
fresh, ardent, emotional, aspiring, full of adventure; at ma-
turity, brave, perceptive, under control, neither too talka-
tive nor too reticent, neither flippant nor sombre; of the
bodily figure, the movements easy, the complexion showing the
best blood, somewhat flushed, breast expanded, an erect atti-
tude, a voice whose sound outvies music, eyes of calm and
steady gaze, yet capable also of flashing—and a general
presence that holds its own in the company of the highest.
For it is native Personality, and that alone, that endows a
man to stand before Presidents or Generals, or in any distin-
guished collection, with aplomb ; and it is not Culture, or
any knowledge or Intellect whatever, as claimed of late by
the leading American teacher of that theory. 19
MI find I'm a good deal more of a socialist than I thought I
was: maybe not technically, politically, so, but intrinsi-
cally, in my meanings. " In fact, it was Whitman's concern for
a greater sense of social solidarity in America that led him
to remark, in his old age, "We've got a hell of a lot to learn
yet before we're a real democracy." Both of these statements
are quoted by Purness, Art. (1939).
18. Whitman was an advocate of eugenics and physical culture,
but only insofar as such programs would contribute to person-
ality.
19. Whitman is referring to Emerson. In his later essay,
Democratic Vistas , Whitman omitted the phrase "as claimed of
late by the leading American teacher of that theory," for he
was not willing to "abuse" Emerson permanently in a book as
he was in a fugitive magazine article. It should be noted
that Whitman owed much to Emerson that he did not recognize
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With regard to the mental-educational part of our mo-
del, enlargement of intellect, stores of cephalic knowledge,
etc., the concentration thitherward of all the customs of our
age, especially in America, is so overweening, and provides
so fully for that part, that, important and necessary as it
is, it really needs nothing from us here—except, indeed, a
phrase of warning and restraint.
Manners, too, though important, we need not dwell upon
here. Like "beauty, grace of motion, etc., they are results.
Causes, original things, being attended to, the right manners
unerringly follow. Much is said, among artists, of the grand
style, as if it were a thing by itself. When a man, artist or
whoever, has health, pride, acuteness, noble aspirations and
emotions, he has the motive-elements of the grandest style.
The rest is but manipulation (yet that is no small matter.)
Whoso dilates to the idea of the Infinite holds the clue of all
grandeur, as all meaning. What is here said may be trite; but
our current society, with its blare, dandyism, and pettiness
—
its feasts, presenting infinitudes of little dishes, and so
seldom anything large or solid—perpetually needs such hints.
(We should perhaps talk in a still sharper tone, and
widely extend our fault-finding, but that we plainly see, even
in directions where our scourge might fall the heaviest, only,
after all, faults and evils inevitable to the free growth of
some of the most precious law-characteristics of our land and
age—even those we are here attempting to enforce.)
—Leaving still unspecified several sterling parts of
any model fit for the future Personality of America, I must
not fail to pronounce myself on one, probably the least at-
tended to in modern times—a hiatus, indeed, threatening its
gloomiest consequences after us. I mean the simple, unsophis-
ticated Conscience, the primary moral element. The subtle
antiseptic called health is not more requisite to the bodily
physiology than Conscience is to the moral and mental physio-
logy. It emanates the first and last splendor of character,
and gives what all the beauty and genius of the world cannot
make up for. If I were asked to specify in what quarter lie
the grounds of darkest dread, respecting the America of our
hopes, I should have to point to this particular. I should
demand the /54:£/ invariable application, to Individuality,
this day, and any day, of that old, ever-true plumb-rule of
persons, eras, nations. Our current triumphant Civilizee,
with his all-schooling and his wondrous appliances, will still
show himself but an amputation while this deficiency remains.
as was the case of Aristotle in terms of his debt to Plato
or Comte and Saint-Simon. Whitman always covered up his in-
debtedness. See Esther Shephard's book Walt Whitman f s Pose.
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Beyond (continuing, but assuming a more hopeful tone),
the vertebration of the manly and womanly Personalism of our
Western World, can only be. and is to be (I hope), its all
penetrating Religiousness.*^ The architecture of Individuality
20. Religion is central in all of Whitman's thought. In
this emphasis (if not as systematic), he is similar to other
American personalists such as Samuel Johnson, Jonathan Edwards,
Alcott, Howison, Calkins, and Bowne. Whitman was more indi-
vidualistic in his reaction to institutionalized religion.
Religion, he maintained, ought to be released "from all tyranny
of authority" and thrown "open to the investigation of great
minds." He wrote: "I demand something far more real than that
^the "show" of churchesj for America. I say that today the
mummery of the churches, in which none believe but all agree to
countenance, with secret sarcasm and denial in their hearts, is
what stands most in the way of a real athletic and fit religion
for these States." From Whitman's notes for lectures on reli-
gion, as quoted by Furness, WWW, 41-42. In 1888 Whitman ex-
pressed his attitude toward charges of irreligion: "I claim
everything for religion. . .yet I have been called irreligious,
an infidel... as if I could have written a word of the Leaves
without its religious root-ground. I am not traditionally re-
ligious .. .but even traditionally I am not anti: I take all
the old forms and faiths and remake them in conformity with
the modern spirit, not rejecting a single item of the earlier
programs.... People have thought I was powerful 'set agin'
the church. ... I am done with the letter of the church—with
its hands and knees: but that part of the church which is
not jailed in church buildings is all mine too, as well as
anybody's—all of it, all of it I" Quoted by Furness, WWW,
218-219. How like Voltaire's view of religion that was un-
appreciated by the church of eighteenth-century France I On
another occasion Whitman wrote: "Religion is dead...but the
spirit of it, that for which it existed, that which it estab-
lished—viz. the santity of Man , exists and is the main fact
of the present time; the Tact that shapes, and controls and
governs all others." Quoted by Furness, WWW, 219. Whitman's
emphasis upon religion is even stronger in the later essay,
Democratic Vistas , than it is in the present article. There
he ends the paragraph with this sentence that beyond the
"Personalism of our Western World... is to be... its all pene-
trating Religiousness." He also continues to develop the idea
that religion is of the individual and not of the mass. His
Quaker, mystical background is evident in the next paragraphs
as he writes that the "identified Soul... can really confront
Religion when it extricates itself entirely from the churches,
..." and only "one's isolated Self" can "reach the divine le-
vels, and commune with the unutterable."
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will ever prove various, with countless different combinations;
but here they rise as into common pinnacles, some higher, some
less high, only all pointing upward.
The final work of Religion is a work that no organiza-
tion or church can ever achieve. As history is poorly retained
by what the technists call history (those bald fables in the.
libraries), and is not given out from their pages, except the
learner has in himself the sense of the well-wrapt, never yet
written, perhaps impossible to be written, history; so Religion,
although casually arrested, and, after a fashion, preserved in
the churches and creeds, does not depend at all upon them, but
is a part of the identified Soul, which, when greatest, knows
not Bibles in the old way, but in new ways—the identified
Soul, which can really confront Religion when it extricates
itself entirely from the churches, and not before.
Personalism fuses this, and favors it. I should say,
indeed, that only in the perfect uncontamination and solitari-
ness of Individuality may the spirituality of Religion posi-
tively come forth at all. Only here, and on such terms, the
meditation, the devout ecstasy, the soaring flight. Only
here, communion v/ith the mysteries, the eternal problems,
whence? whither? Alone, and identily, and the mood—and the
Soul emerges, and all statements, churches, sermons, melt away
like vapors. Alone, and silent thought, and awe, and aspira-
tion—and then the interior consciousness, like a hitherto un-
seen inscription, in magic ink, beams out its wondrous lines
to the sense. Bibles may convey, and priests expound, but it
is exclusively for the noiseless operation of one's isolated
Self, to enter the pure ether of veneration, reach the divine
levels, and commune with the unutterable.
—To practically enter into Politics is an important
part of American personalism. To every young man, North and
South, earnestly studying these things, I should say, Under-
stand that America goes about its development its own way
—
sometimes, to temporary views, appalling enough. It is the
fashion among dillettants and fops to decry the whole formula-
tion and personnel of the active politics of America, as beyond
redemption, and to be carefully kept away from. See you that
you do not fall into this error. America is doing very well,
upon the whole, notwithstanding these antics of the parties,
and their leaders, these half-brained nominees, and the many
ignorant ballots, and many elected failures and blatherers.
It is the dillettants, and all who shirk their duty, who are
not doing well. As for you, I advise you to enter more
strongly yet into politics. I advise every young man to do
so. Always inform yourself; always do the best you can; al-
ways vote. Disengage yourself from parties. They have been
useful, and to some extent remain so; but the floating, uncom-
mitted electors, farmers, clerks, mechanics, the masters of
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parties—watching aloof, inclining victory this side or that
side—such are the ones most needed, present and future. For
America, if eligible at all to downfall and ruin, is eligible
within herself, not without; for I see clearly that the com-
bined foreign world could not beat her down. But these sa-
vage, wolfish parties alarm me. Owning no law but their own
will, more and more combative, less and less tolerant of the
idea of ensemble and of /£>45/ equal brotherhood, the ever-
overarching American ideas, it behooves you to convey yourself
implicitly to no party, but steadily hold yourself judge and
master over all of them. 21
—So much (hastily tossed together, and leaving far
more unsaid), for an ideal, or intimations of an ideal, toward
American manhood. But the other sex, in our land, equally re-
quires suggestion.
I have seen a young American woman, one of a large fa-
mily of daughters, who, some years since, migrated from her
meagre country home to one of the northern cities, to gain her
own support. She soon became an expert seamstress, but find-
ing the employment too confining for her health and comfort,
she went boldly to work, for others, to house-keep, cook,
clean, etc. After trying several places, she fell upon one
where she was suited. She has told me that she finds nothing
degrading in her position; it is not inconsistent with personal
dignity, self-respect, and the respect of others. She confers
21. Whitman clearly anticipated tendencies of democracy to
resort to fascism in correcting its shortcomings. In fact,
after more careful consideration, he inserted after "to no
party," in Democratic Vistas , the phrase "nor submit blindly
to their dictators ." WBTtman^ growing social consciousness
is also evidenced by the fact that in the later essay he i-
talicized the word "ensemble" for emphasis.
22. Whitman never used the word man generically. When neces-
sary, he always added after man, "woman." It is interesting
to note that Whitman, who advocated woman suffrage in advance
of his day, was related to other thinkers with such ideas. He
knew and greatly admired Lucretia Mott, a quiet Quaker woman
who was the first woman to speak of equal woman suffrage with-
out restrictions. She was also one of four women to call to-
gether the "Equal Rights and Womans 1 Suffrage Convention" at
Seneca Palls, New York, In 1848. There is a statue of her in
the basement of the capitol in Yifashington in the series of
statues of national leaders. It all coheres that Whitman, with
the Quakers and some of the Trans cendentali st s , was in the van-
guard of taking a stand for woman suffrage and against slavery
as a result of the recognition of the sacredness of personality.
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benefits and receives them. She has good health; her presence
itself is healthy and "bracing; her character is unstained; she
has been able to help her parents and educate and get places
for her sisters; and her course of life is not without oppor-
tunities for mental improvement, and of much quiet, unco3ting
happiness and love.
I have seen another woman who, from taste and necessity
conjoined, has gone into practical affairs, carries on a me-
chanical business, partly works at it herself, dashes out more
and more into real hardy life, is not abashed by the coarseness
of the contact, knows how to be firm and silent at the same
time, holds her own with unvarying coolness and decorum, and
will compare, any day, with superior carpenters, farmers, and
even boatmen and drivers. For all that, she has not lost the
charm of the womanly nature, but preserves and bears it fully,
though through such rugged presentation.
Then there is the wife of a mechanic, mother of two
children, a woman of merely passable English education, but of
fine wit, with all her sex f s grace and intuitions, who exhi-
bits, indeed, such a noble female Personality, that I am fain
to record it here. Never abnegating her own proper indepen-
dence, but always genially preserving it, and what belongs to
it—cooking, washing, child-bursing, house-tending, she beams
sunshine out of all these duties, and makes them illustrious.
Physiologically sweet and sound, loving work, practical, she
yet knows that there are intervals, however few, devoted to
recreation, music, leisure, hospitality—and affords such
intervals. Whatever she does, and wherever she is, that charm,
that indescribable perfume of genuine womanhood, attends her,
goes with her, exhales from her, which belongs of right to all
the sex, and is, or ought to be, the unvariable atmosphere and
common aureola of old as well as young.
My mother has described to me a resplendent person,
down on Long Island, whom she knew years ago, in early days.
She was known by the name of the Peacemaker. She was well to-
ward eighty years old, of happy and sunny temperament, had al-
ways lived on a farm, was very neighborly, sensible, and dis-
creet, an invariable and welcomed favorite, especially with
young married women. She had numerous children and grand-
children. She was uneducated, but possessed a native dignity.
She had come to be a tacitly agreed upon domestic regulator,
judge, settler of difficulties, shepherdess, and reconcilor in
the land. She was a sight to draw near and look upon, with
her large figure, her profuse snow-white hair, dark eyes, clear
complexion, sweet breath, and peculiar personal magnetism.
The foregoing portraits, I admit, are frightfully out
of line from these imported /jS^of models of womanly Person-
ality—the stock feminine characters of the current novelists,
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or of the foreign court poems (Enids, Guiniveres, Princesses,
or Ladies of one thing or another), which fill the envying
dreams of so many poor girls, and are accepted by our young
men, too, as supreme ideals of feminine excellence to be sought
after. But I present mine just for a change.
Then there are mutte rings (we will not now stop to
heed them here, but they must be heeded), of something more
revolutionary. The day is coming when the deep questions of
woman's full entrance amid the arenas of practical life, poli-
tics, trades, teaching, etc., will not only be argued all a-
round us, but will be put to decision, and real e xperiment.
—Of course, in These States, for both man and woman,
we must entirely recast the type of highest Personality from
what the Feudal world bequeaths us,. and which yet fully pos-
sesses the imaginative and esthetic fields of the United States
pictorial and melodramatic, not without use as studies, but
making sad work, and forming a strange anachronism upon the
scenes and exigencies around us.
Of course, the old, undying elements remain. The task
is, to successfully adjust them to new combinations, our own
days. Nor is this so incredible. I can conceive a community,
today and here, in which, on a sufficient scale, the perfect
Personalities, without noise, meet; say in some pleasant West-
ern settlement or town, where a couple of hundred best men and
women, of ordinary worldly status, have by luck been drawn to-
gether, with nothing extra of genius or wealth, but virtuous,
chaste, industrious, cheerful, resolute, friendly, and devout.
I can conceive such a community organized in running order,
powers judiciously delegated, farming, building, trade, courts,
mails, schools, elections, all attended to; and then the rest
of life, the main thing, freely branching and blossoming in
each individual, and bearing golden fruit. I can see there,
in every young and old man, after his kind, and in every woman
after hers, a true Personality, developed, exercised, propor-
tionately in body, mind, and spirit. I can imagine this case
as one not necessarily rare or difficult, but in buoyant ac-
cordance with the municipal and general requirements of our
times. And I can realize in it the culmination of something
better than any stereotyped eclat of history or poems. Per-
haps, unsung, undramatized, unput in essays or biographies—
perhaps even some such community already exists, in Ohio,
Illinois, Missouri, or somewhere, practically fulfilling it-
self, and thus outvying, in cheapest vulgar life, all the rich
pages of old-world Plutarch and Shakespeare, or our own Emerson
23. Whitman is here re -evaluating personality in the broader
terms of communal living. Each individual is a complete per-
sonality only as he has a social consciousness of the "general
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In short, and to sum up, America, betaking herself to
formative action (as it is about time for more solid achieve-
ment and less windy promise), must, for her purposes, cease to
recognize a theory of character formed by merely esthetic or
literary standards, or from any ultramarine, full-dress for-
mulas of culture, polish, caste, etc., and must sternly pro-
mulgate her own new standard, yet old enough, and accepting
the old, the perennial, elements, and combining them into
groups, unities, appropriate to the modern, the democratic,
the West, and to the practical occasions and needs of our own
cities, and of the agricultural regions. Ever the most pre-
cious is the common. Ever the fresh breeze of field, or hill,
or lake, is more than any palpitation of fans, though of ivory,
and redolent with perfume; and the air is more than the cost-
liest perfumes
•
And before we close, for fear of mistake, we may not
imtermit to beg our absolution from all that genuinely is, or
goes along with, Mentality, Education, and even Culture. Par-
don us, venerable shades J if we have seemed to speak lightly
of your office. The whole civilization of the earth, we know,
is yours, fZ^Tf with all the glory and the light thereof. It
is, indeed, in your own spirit, and tallying the loftiest
teachings of it, that we aim these poor utterances. For you,
too, mighty ministers J know that there is something greater
than you, namely, the fresh, eternal qualities of Being. Prom
them, and by them, as you, at your best, we, too, after our
fashion, when art and conventions fail, evoke the last , the
needed help, to vitalize our country and our days.
Thus, after all, we pronounce not so much against the
principle of Culture; we only supervise it, and promulge as
deep, perhaps a deeper, principle. As we have shown, the New
World, including in itself, and, indeed, founded upon, the
all-levelling aggregate of Democracy, we show it also including
the all-varied, a11-permit ting, all-free theorem of Individual-
ity, and erecting therefor a lofty and hitherto unoccupied
framework or platform of Personalism, broad enough for all,
eligible to every farmer and mechanic—to the female equally
with the male—a towering Selfhood, not physically perfect
requirements of our times." He began the article equating
personalism and individualism; now he equates it with indi-
vidualism plus a social consciousness. He, therefore, unites
with his close friend Alcott in transcending Emerson^ one-
sided view. It is interesting to note that Whitman omits
Plutarch, Shakespeare, and Emerson in Democratic Vistas . For
again, he does not wish to go on permanent record against
Emerson.
24. Here, again, the many assumes as much, or more importance
than the one.
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only—not satisfied with the mere minces and learning's stores,
but Religious, possessing the idea of the Infinite (rudder and
compass sure amid this troublous voyage, o'er darkest, wildest
wave, through stormiest wind, of man's or nations 1 progress)—
realizing, above the rest, that known humanity, in deepest
sense, is fair adhesion to Itself, for purposes beyond—and
that, finally, the theme, great as it is, of the Personality
of mortal life is most important with reference to the immortal,
the Unknown, the Spiritual, the only permanently real, which,
as the ocean waits for and receives the rivers, waits for us
each and all, 25
Walt Whitman
25. Whitman's climax is a fitting indication of the growth of
his thought through the entire article. The "Personality of
mortal life," which at first means individualism and later
means relationship to a group is now important only "with re-
ference to the immortal," the "permanently real," which is
"Spiritual." Alcott paid a high tribute to Whitman's philo-
sophical conclusions when he called him "the American Columbus,
whose sagacity has thus sounded adventurously the sea of our
Social Chaos and anchored his thought securely in soil of the
newly discovered Atlantides about which the Grecian Plato died
dreaming." He later wrote to Whitman, after receiving a copy
of "Personalism," "...Your thought is on the track of empire
and sees the route to Personal Powers for the nation as for
the individual and never a people needed more the Cosmic
thought to inspire and guide its action." Quoted by Clifton
Purness in an unpublished biography of Whitman. Whitman ex-
presses in his own ideas the poetry he demands for the future;
i.e., "consistent with the Hegelian formulas, and consistent
with modern science." His idea of the "all" is not pantheis-
tic, however. The soul maintains its "permanent identity?;
the all is accompanied with the "idea of eternity," "of it-
self, the soul...." DV, 323. He wrote of personal identity
after death in the words:
My foothold is tenon'd and mortis 'd in granite,
I laugh at what you call dissolution
And I know the amplitude of time.
I know I am deathless,
I know this orbit of mine cannot be swept by a
carpenter's compass,
I know I shall not pass like a child's carlacue cut
with a burnt stick at night.
Quoted by Pound, WW, xlii. Whitman recognized the idealistic
position of his personalistic ideas when he wrote in his later
Democratic Vistas : "What is I believe called Idealism seems
to me to suggest ... the course of inquiry and desert of favor
for our New World metaphysics...." DV, 320.
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